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THE LAW OF BUSINESS TORTS IN MISSISSIPPI
[Note: This Article has been divided with the second
half appearing in 15 Miss. C. L. REv. (forthcoming 1995), ed.]*
James L. Robertson**
David W Clark***
"Why is a man at liberty to set up a business which he knows will ruin his neigh-
bor? It is because the public good is supposed to be best subserved by free competi-
tion. " '
I. THE PROBLEM
People have long seen predictability and clarity and reasonableness and practi-
cability as virtues the law should pursue.2 Particularly is this so in the world of
business and commerce where we hope to encourage enterprise and investment
and transaction. Long ago, Joseph Story saw the new nation's future tied to the
growth of trade and that this presupposed an enlightened and uniform body of
commercial law, ascertainable by reason and verifiable by experience, and to this
end he gave us Swift v. Tyson3 for the law of the land and DeLovio v. Boit4 for the
law of the sea. As all know, Swift v. Tyson met its demise on other grounds,' and it
is one of the cruel ironies of fate that few see the success of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code as the ultimate proof that Story was right.'
Markets exist because we have found in our legal structures minimally ade-
quate means to the ends of predictability and clarity and reasonableness and
practicability. Yet, Story's vision remains before us. No one doubts we enhance
* The second half deals with the following issues: trademarks, trade secrets, right of publicity, tortious in-
terference with contracts, interference with other advantageous economic relations, and remedies.
** Partner, Wise Carter Child & Caraway, Jackson, Mississippi; Justice, Supreme Court of Mississippi,
1983-92; B.A., 1962, University of Mississippi; J.D., 1965, Harvard University.
*** Partner, Wise Carter Child & Caraway, Jackson, Mississippi; B.A., 1970, Millsaps College; M.A., 197 1,
Harvard University; J.D., 1974, University of Michigan. Much appreciation and credit is due Mr. Clark for his
contribution of the Antitrust section (Part V) to this Article.
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457,466 (1897) [hereinafter Holmes,
Path of Law].
2. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW ch. 2 (rev. ed. 1969), where the author perceptively de-
scribes eight "moralities" law must satisfy, at least to some minimal extent, if it is to perform its instrumental
purposes.
3.41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
4. 7 E Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776).
5. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6. Story was right in his vision that the country needed an enlightened and uniform commercial law. He was
as wrong as he could be when he sought his end through a natural law jurisprudence. What drew the ire of Holmes
and Brandeis and so many others was Story's acceptance of the old declaratory dimension of the natural law - the
idea that law was somehow "out there" to be discovered by judges, and then "declared" publicly - and his applica-
tion of that view to hold that judge-made law is not law at all but mere evidence of law. See, e.g., Martin P.
Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth Century America -Major Themes and Developments,
36 J. LEGAL Eouc. 441,442 (1986). It was Story's holding that the word "laws" within the Rules of Decision Act
(presently 28 U.S.C. § 1652, then § 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789) did not include judge-made law that proved
the undoing of Swift v. Tyson.
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the macroeconomic well-being of our nation to the extent we may enhance the
predictability, clarity, reasonableness, and practicability of the law of commerce.'
For example, and within the scope of what follows, Professor H. Lee
Hetherington, while instructing us regarding the right of publicity and the problem
of reasonably protecting the commercial value of a person's identity, tells us first
the rights recognized must form "the organizing principle for a complex industry,
responsible for a significant level of commercial and creative activity."8
Hetherington cajoles lawmakers "to provide the certainty needed. . . [in this] ec-
onomic sphere," to provide "simplified test[s]"9 to the end of "predict[able] legal
consequences,"1 and to be prepared to "[sacrifice] some degree of flexibility for
the correlative benefits of certainty and speed."11 He is right to do so. Markets,
like rivers, need stable banks.
This leads to the view from within. Market participants in this state are regu-
lated on a dozen fronts, from taxation to employment relations. They often and
justifiably find bewildering the plethora of legal limits to which they are held. At
the very least, they seem entitled, within the core of each discrete area of regula-
tion, to have the sovereign speak with one voice and tell them what it expects. Spo-
radically, with fits and starts, the law tries to do this, even to the point of
conforming state law to legally superior federal law where the market participant is
subject to both, and so in the area of income taxation, the rules and regulations are
substantially similar. Franchise, use, and property taxes are committed to the
state. Though well short of perfection and ever in need of tinkering with time, the
Uniform Commercial Code is our greatest success to date - from sales to commer-
cial paper to investment securities to documents of title to secured transactions.
On the other hand, areas such as employer/employee relations are augmented by a
major new statute seemingly every year, not to mention an evolving common law,
enough to leave the head spinning.
Against this backdrop, in both its internal and external dimensions, from mi-
croeconomic and macroeconomic perspectives, we see the field of business torts
as one of the law's least virtuous. We have seen a dozen or more frequently over-
lapping labels for the various mines in the field. Some see theoretical underpin-
nings and experiential conceptions varying from one tort to another, and
inconsistently so. Fundamentally, we differ widely in our view of the nature of
markets, of behavior within them, and of our ability to do more good than harm
when we intervene. 12 We differ in our ideological visions, and this leads us to read
7. This is one of the principal lessons Professors Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks taught the legal
community a generation ago. HENRY M. HAT, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 2-6 (tentative ed. 1958) [hereinafter HART & SACKS, LEGAL PROCESS].
8. H. Lee Hetherington, Direct Commercial Exploitation of Identiiy: A New Age for the Right of Publicity, 17
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1,26 (1992).
9. Id. at 27.
10. Id.
11. Id. at49.
12. See, e.g., William H. Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust Policy, 66 TuL. L. REV. 1
(1991) [hereinafter Page, Ideological Conflict].
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rules of law differently. At another level, our law seeks objective external
standards in one instance, while addressing another seemingly similar instance
with internal standards. 3 At the level of adjudication, we are pulled toward a just
judgment ex post and an intelligent precedent ex ante, trapped within the tensions
of those inexorable judicial impulses to make Humpty Dumpty whole again and, at
once, reduce the risk that his brothers and sisters will fall at all. The mines the
market participant must negotiate are found among all of the known legal genera -
public law (federal and state) and private law, and species: statute, case law, ad-
ministrative regulation, and contract-and we must be sensitive to the import and
nuances of this sort of legal landscape. We fall far from perfection in execution in
all dimensions of our law.
A century ago Holmes described the plight of the lawyer's client: "People want
to know under what circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming
against what is so much stronger than themselves .... *"14 The question persists,"5
as the states whose wrath we risk incurring today are infinitely more active than in
Holmes' day. The citizen's need for sound counsel regarding the dimensions of
that risk is exponentially greater. 6 Economic endeavor is increasingly complex,
and entrepreneurs have less and less time to act if they are to take full and mea-
sured advantage of each opportunity for profit. Of course, "[t]he legal counselor
has a duty to inform the client of the view the courts will take of what is fair or
unfair business conduct. "17 But there is more. The ever exploding cost of confron-
tation and litigation compels the client to seek not only a decision he can defend,
but one he will not have to defend, and the trick is to figure out how to do this.
After surveying but a corner of the field, Lawrence J. Franck reports, in what is, if
anything, an understatement: "The difficulty in properly advising a client. . . is at
once apparent."I 8
In a sensible society the market participant should be able to go to his lawyer
and ask what the law asks of him, what the law proscribes, and be given a reasona-
bly reliable and understandable answer, even if it be stated in the form of a general
13. See, e.g., Gary Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in Antitrust and Tortious
Interference Law, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1097 (1993).
14. Holmes, Path of Law, supra note 1, at 457.
15. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 223 (1990).
16. And so Professor Hetherington repeatedly emphasizes the need for predictability in the law regarding use
of the commercial value of celebrity identity, and appropriately so. Hetherington, supra note 8, at 3, 27, 29, 30,
31.
17. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1.06, at 25 (3d ed.
1992).
18. Lawrence J. Franck, The Tort of Wrongful Interference with Contracts: A Conflict of Values, 38 Miss. L.
INST. PRoc. ON Bus. TORTS 131, 163 (1983).
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standard. In the present context, Holmes' bad man metaphor19 seems particularly
appropriate. The market participant knows his business success will likely harm
one or more of his competitors. He knows as well he will not satisfy every con-
sumer. Not every contract will prove as profitable as once seen. Unhappy compet-
itors, consumers, and contractors are potential plaintiffs, and so each market
participant needs to be able to predict "the incidence of the public force"2" and, to
do this, he needs a lawyer. But what the client does not need is a lawyer who says,
"Well, there is a federal statute that says thus and such. Then, the state act requires
this or that. Behind all of this is the common law rule that may or may not apply."21
And, of course, your contract says you must do so and so. He may, of right, de-
mand, "But what must I do?" and, of right, expect an intelligible answer.22 In one
of his earliest legal insights, Holmes wrote: "The only question for the lawyer is,
how will the judges act? Any motive for their action, be it constitution, statute,
custom, or precedent [or any combination thereof], which can be relied upon as
likely in the generality of cases to prevail, is worthy of consideration as . . .law
. . "23 Today what we want almost as much is that no one will need to ask the
judges to act.
H. THE LANDSCAPE
A. Call It "Business Torts"-Because That Is What Many
Call It and We Have To Call It Something
For years market participants have pursued sharp practices as they have ped-
dled their products and competed with one another, but the field of business torts
is still not fully recognized as such and has experienced growth pains as it has
19. Holmes' most prominent expression of his bad man metaphor reads like this:
You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a good one for wishing to avoid an encoun-
ter with the public force . . A man who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and prac-
tised [sic] by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money,
and will want to keep out of jail if he can ....
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for
the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.
Holmes, Path of Law, supra note 1, at 459. See also G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW
AND THE INNER SELF 218-22 (1993).
20. Holmes, Path of Law, supra note 1, at 457.
2 1. The last thing the lawyer needs is academic treatment considering "[olnly Mississippi, non-statutory law"
because this"makes the topic manageable." William C. Walker, Jr., Common Law Protection of Economic Expect-
ancies: "Business Torts"in Mississippi, 50 Miss. L.J. 335, 336-37 (1979) [hereinafter Walker, Common Law Pro-
tection]. Not even the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (Tentative Draft 1994), for all of its
virtues, is wholly satisfying, as it addresses the market participant only vis-a-vis his competitor and not his con-
sumer or contractor, and only in discrete areas of the law.
22. Professor J. Thomas McCarthy has written that "[u]nfair competition is mainly a common law tort only
partially or occasionally codified or defined by statute. The 'law' of unfair competition is largely found in case
law precedent." This observation strikes me as a bit dated, but what offends me more is McCarthy's "therefore":
"Predictability and certainty in this area are probably not as great as in legal fields covered by specific codes, as,
for example, the Uniform Commercial Code." I MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 1.06, at 25. Descriptive of present
reality in some jurisdictions, yes; but of what ought to be or must inevitably be, or, in the hands of lawyers with
insight and vision, what is, No! Hence, this Article.
23. FREDERIC ROGERS KELLOGG, THE FORMATIVE ESSAYS OF JUSTICE HOLMES 92 (1984).
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evolved. There is no general agreement as to what particular torts make up the
field, nor whether it is limited to torts, properly so called, nor even whether we
should see it as a single field susceptible of study and practice as such. Those of us
who see the commonality that (to my mind) is undeniably present cannot agree
whether to seek a unified field theory or accept a commonwealth of largely inde-
pendent states. We cannot even agree what to call the field -"commercial torts"
and "competitive torts" being but two titles as viable as "business torts." Some
would use the label "prima facie tort." Others doubt continued use of "tort"24 at all,
a view given considerable support by the actions of the American Law Institute a
few years back. The great bulk of the rules and remedies within the field were ex-
cluded from the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1979.25 A more enduring con-
cern is whether - and, if so, to what extent - a part of the field should be left to
private ordering,26 with-to that extent-the public law relegated to an enabling
and enforcement role and to providing default rules.
24. Most definitions of "tort" are stated at a sufficient level of abstraction that they add nothing to the word
itself. See I MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 1.03, at 16. We find in J.M. Griffin & Sons v. Newton Butane Gas &
Oil Co., 50 So. 2d 370 (Miss. 1951), that "a tort is an unlawful violation of a private legal right." Id. at 373. See
also Duncan v. Coahoma Bank, 397 So. 2d 891, 894 (Miss. 1981). BLACK'S LAW DIcTioNARY (6th ed. 1990)
defines a tort as "[a] private or civil wrong or injury . . . . A wrong . . . independent of contract." Id. at 1489.
Corpus Juris Secundum says that "[a] 'tort' is a legal concept possessing the basic elements of a wrong with resul-
tant injury and consequential damage which is cognizable in a court of law." 86 C.J.S. Torts § 1 (1954). This, of
course, tells us nothing. The American Law Institute did not even try to define the term in either the first or
second Restatement of Torts. (That may tell us something.) Perhaps the most useful expression is that in the latest
edition of Prosser on Torts:
It might be possible to define a tort by enumerating the things that it is not. It is not crime, it is not
breach of contract, it is not necessarily concerned with property rights or problems of government, but is
the occupant of a large residuary field remaining if these are taken out of the law. But this again is illusory,
and the conception of a sort of legal garbage-can to hold what can be put nowhere else is of no help.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 2 (5th ed. 1984).
25. Professor Herbert Wechsler, then Director of the American Law Institute, offered this explanation:
Readers familiar with the first Restatement will note a substantial change at the beginning of this volume
in the scope accorded to Division Nine. The chapters (34, 35, 36 and 38) that were concerned with trade
practices and labor disputes have been omitted, in the view that these subjects have become substantial
specialties, in their own right, governed extensively by legislation and largely divorced from their initial
grounding in the principles of torts.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS introduction (1979). In the Introductory Note to the Restatement (Second)
proper, we find
[iun the more than forty years since. . . [the first Restatement], the influence of Tort law has continued to
decrease, so that it is now largely of historical interest and the law of Unfair Competition and Trade Regu-
lation is no more dependent upon Tort law than it is on many other general fields of law and upon broad
statutory developments, particularly at the federal level.
Id. § 1.
Both the Director's introductory comments and those of the Restatement as well suggest that, if restatement
should be attempted in these areas, it would be done by separate project. In April of 1988, we had the formal
announcement of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition wherein the Reporter, Robert C. Denicola, ex-
plained, by reference to the foregoing comments, that "[t]he current project represents an independent restate-
ment of the law relating to unfair trade practices." Robert C. Denicola, Reporter's Memorandum at xv (Apr.
1988) (Tentative Draft No. 1).
See also Professor Robert C. Denicola, Statement Before the 1988 Annual Meeting of the ALl (May 20, 1988),
in 65 A.L.I. PRoc. 460-61 (1988); Paul T. Hayden, A Goodly Apple Rotten at the Heart: Commercial Disparage-
ment in Comparative Advertising as Common-Law Tortious Unfair Competition, 76 IowA L. REv. 67, 69 n. 11
(1990); supra notes 7, 15.
26. Of course, too much horizontal private ordering and even some practical vertical arrangements may get a
market participant into antitrust trouble.
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Professor William C. Walker, Jr. acknowledges the problem but would stick
with the label "business torts," offering a pragmatism: "The fact that some activ-
ities are usually called business torts is sufficient reason to treat them under that
label."27 He has a point, but whatever label one favors, we must keep well in mind
it is only a label, taking care not to afford the. one we pick power beyond the de-
scriptive. 28 It is the field and its phenomena that should inform the phrasing of the
label. What is important is what the label identifies, for that will be our subject of
study.
B. The Long List of Business Torts
and the Limits of Listing
What lies within the field? Most would include- without regard for rank, level
of generality, or overlap- those "torts"29 generally (if not generically) labeled as
(1) defamation of product or producer, traditionally known as commercial dispar-
agement or trade libel, or, more recently, injurious falsehood; (2) seller misrepre-
sentations and false advertising, or, more generally, deceptive marketing; (3)
trademark and trade name infringement; (4) unlawful imitation of product design
and packaging, sometimes "passing off," or "palming off'; (5) (mis)appropriation
of trade secrets and other trade values; (6) (mis)appropriation of the commercial
value of a person's identity, sometimes known as the right of publicity; (7) unfair
trade practices or, less descriptive but more familiar, unfair competition; (8) anti-
trust offenses such as combinations in restraint of trade, conspiracies to monopo-
lize, price discrimination, tying arrangements, predatory practices, and the like;
(9) improper use of conventional business tactics such as refusals to deal; (10) tor-
tious interference with contracts and contractual relations; (11) (tortious?)
breaches of covenants not-to-compete; ending with (12) the catchall/what-is-left
(intentional or otherwise improper) interference with prospective economic ad-
vantages."
Others would include actions labeled deceit, disparagement (or slander) of title,
breach of (some) fiduciary duties, lender liabilities, and commercial fraud, while
27. William C. Walker, Jr., Business Torts: An Introductory Overview of Some Common-Law Principles, 38
Miss. L. INST. PROC. ON Bus. ToRs 1 (1983) [hereinafter Walker, Business Torts]. Professor Gary Myers uses the
term in his recent article. Myers, supra note 13, at 1106-07.
28. We must be careful that we not succumb to what I have elsewhere and often labeled the tyranny of labels.
See, e.g., Whittington v. Whittington, 608 So. 2d 1274, 1284 (Miss. 1992) (Robertson, J., dissenting); Cun-
ningham v. Lanier, 589 So. 2d 133, 140 (Miss. 1991); see also Joseph P. Bauer, A FederalLaw of Unfair Competi-
tion: What Should Be the Reach of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REv. 671, 732 (1984); John
Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 420 (1983).
29. Without implying that all are torts in the common law or even the Restatement sense, we must use some
such term-though it be but a label itself.
30. See, e.g., GEORGE J. ALEXANDER, COMMERCIAL TORTS (2d ed. 1988); Developments in the Law-Competi-
tive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REv. 888 (1964) [hereinafter Developments]. Like others, Professor Walker mis-describes
"intentional interference with economic relations" as the label for the competitive tort that "do[es] not fit under
another tort formulation." Walker, Common Law Protection, supra note 2 1, at 337. He then treats as discrete torts
less amorphous and more settled actions such as disparagement or trade libel, palming off or unfair competition,
each of which at its core is a form of interference with economic relations. All business torts interfere with eco-
nomic relations, and that they do so is what helps form the single field.
[Vol. 15:13
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still others would add statutory actions such as patent and copyright infringement,
unconscionability in contracts, usury, and civil RICO.31 More recently we have a
proclamation that there is a new business tort -at once a residual and an umbrella
business tort, if you will: "[All] other acts or practices determined to be similarly
actionable as an unfair method of competition, taking into account the nature of
the conduct and its likely effect on both the party seeking relief and the public," 2
which, of course, is not that different from intentional/improper interference with
prospective contractual and other economic expectancies," except for the latter's
more pronounced penchant for requiring proof of intent before liability is found.
However accurate or complete this or anyone else's list34 may be as a matter of
positive description, we need be ever sensitive to the lesson of experience, here as
elsewhere, that it would be foolhardy to try to draft a detailed specification of all of
the acts we wish to proscribe. "[U]nfair or fraudulent business practices may run
the gamut of human ingenuity and chicanery, 35 "given the creative nature of the
scheming mind."36
C. The Nature of the Field Beneath the Label
There remains a problem of conception, one of the chicken-and-the-egg vari-
ety. Is the field - business torts, if I may - a field because it tends to be treated as
such, or do we treat it as such because we see certain commonalities that tend to
31. In 1970, the Mississippi Legislature shortened the list one by repealing the Fair Trade Act of 1938, Miss.
CODE ANN. § 1108 (1942) (repealed 1970). See 1970 Miss. Laws ch. 461.
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1(a) (Tentative Draft 1994). Compare the approach to
"improper" conduct in the context of interference with prospective economic advantages as presented in RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979). See also ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 181-82.
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 766B (1979).
34. Professor McCarthy offers "some examples," suggesting this is the only way to see and appreciate the
field:
infringement of trademarks and services marks;
dilution of good will in trademarks;
use of confusingly similar corporate, business and professional names;
use of confusingly similar titles of literary works on other literary property, and on commercial goods;
the appropriation of distinctive literary and entertainer characterizations;
simulation of a container or product configuration and of trade dress and packaging;
infringement of the right of publicity;
misappropriation of valuable business values;
"bait and switch" selling tactics;
false representations and false advertising;
"palming off" goods by unauthorized substitution of one brand for the brand ordered;
theft of trade secrets;
filing a groundless lawsuit or administrative challenge as an aggressive competitive weapon;
sending cease and desist letters charging patent infringement before a patent has been granted;
an unreasonable rejection of goods shipped under contract;
physically obstructing entrance to a competitor's place of business and harassing its customers.
I MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 1.05, at 22-24. Professor McCarthy makes clear he does not see his list as ex-
haustive. I MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 1.05, at 22. For the most part, his examples fall within the list we have
presented above. Notice that the last four are not what McCarthy calls "nominate torts." I MCCARTHY, supra note
17, § 1.05, at 24. See also the survey of the field found in KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, at 962-1031.
35. People ex rel. Mosk v. National Research Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
36. Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n, 496 P.2d 817, 830 (Cal. 1972). See also Ronson Art Metal Works,
Inc. v. Gibson Lighter Mfg. Co., 159 N.Y.S.2d 606 (App. Div. 1957), quoted in Electrolux Corp. v. Val-Worth,
Inc., 161 N.E.2d 197,204 (N.Y. 1959). See generally I MCCARrHY, supra note 17, § 1.03, at 18.
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form a field? We promote predictability and clarity when we treat legal phenom-
ena as before, yet we learn from experience that at times we cling to the past at the
price of reasonableness and practicability. Law evolves, and we must allow it to
evolve. Groupings of rules become attractive and plausible and beneficial as they
regulate like phenomena, albeit those phenomena may evolve, and our percep-
tions and understandings may improve with time. Where we find sundry laws ad-
dressing persons pursuing a common practice, there is profit when we step back
and look at the whole and see if the law speaks with clarity and with one voice.
Judges and administrators are aided. One more easily applies the parts when one
has in mind the whole-its breadth, its past, and what it tends to be. Citizens in
search of the equitable administration of the law benefit as well, ex ante and ex
post. And so Professor Walker is on point when he writes: "By viewing business
torts as having a common theme and pattern, one may better understand the indi-
vidual variations on that theme."37 Though similar interests run throughout, their
combination and intensity vary, an undeniable reality that has led some to think a
single theory of action may well mask the differences without offering compen-
sating advantages. 8 Still, I would think it unfortunate were the field seen and
practiced as one occupied and serviced by isolated and discrete legal compart-
ments- forms of action, if you will.
The serious point is that there is no natural law of business torts. The law of our
field "is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some
sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified."39 Seeing this precludes the
perennial and pervasive practice of those who pursue what the law ought to be, the
survey of statutes and cases without regard to jurisdiction. If we are to understand
the positive law, we must limit ourselves to the positive expression of "some sov-
ereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified," albeit we have some fifty "insu-
lated chambers"4" from which to pick. We have to choose, and, because I have
lived my life in Mississippi and know its law and its ways better than those of any
other jurisdiction, I choose its articulate voice, which includes the voice of the
37. Walker, Business Torts, supra note 27, at 1.
38. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 1.14[1], at 44,45; Developments, supra note 30, at 891. To the present
point, I find the following quite apt:
An examination of cases involving fact situations and circumstances similar to those involved in this suit
indicate that they have been instituted and courts have considered them under various designations,
among them libel, trade libel, disparagement of property, unfair competition and malicious interference
with business. However, their being called one type of action or another has not prevented courts from
applying in a given case principles, elements or law governing decision in one of the other type actions
used as a vehicle for such a suit.
Royer v. Stoody Co., 192 F. Supp. 949, 950 (WD. Okla. 1961). See also Hayden, supra note 25, at 68.
39. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Letter from
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold J. Laski (Jan. 29, 1926), in HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 11 822-23 (Mark De-
Wolfe Howe ed., 1953); Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock (Feb. 17, 1928), in
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 11215 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1946).
40. In his dissent in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), Holmes spoke of the sovereign prerogative of
the people to experiment by enacting laws addressing their "desires.., in the insulated chambers afforded by the
several States." Id. at 344.
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super-sovereign United States, to the extent the Constitution commands. 1 I would
like to think what follows might help our vertically dual sovereign in making its
voice more articulate and more predictable, clear, reasonable, and practicable.
41. I have found the articulate voice of the federal/state sovereign in Mississippi in a variety of sources. Most
prominent are its statutes and the decisions of the federal courts and of the Supreme Court of Mississippi. I draw
heavily upon published expositions, such as Walker, Common Law Protection, supra note 21, at 335; the six papers
published in 38 Miss. L. INsT. PRoc. ON Bus. ToRTs (1983); and the five papers presented May 21, 1993, at the
University of Mississippi Center for Continuing Legal Education's seminar entitled "The New Business Practice:
Business Torts, Intellectual Property & Unfair Trade Practices."
The work of Professor William H. Page in antitrust law is in a class by itself. See, e.g., Page, Ideological Conflict,
supra note 12; William H. Page, Optimal Antitrust Penalties and Competitors'Injury, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2151 (1990)
[hereinafter Page, Antitrust Penalties]; William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Charac-
terization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Efficiency, 75 VA. L. REv. 1221 (1989); William H. Page, The Scope of
Liability forAntitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1445 (1985) [hereinafter Page, Scope ofLiability]. See discussion
infia Part V. I have learned much from the work of two prominent Mississippi scholars, Professor H. Lee (Herky)
Hetherington, supra note 8, and Professor Gary Myers, supra note 13, although each speaks normatively of what the
law ought to be and ranges broadly beyond the bounds of Mississippi and thus offends the positivist's injunction.
A special word need be said about the Restatements of the Law, for one of the occasions for this piece is the Ameri-
can Law Institute's present publication of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition. Restatements have no offi-
cial standing as such. However articulate their voice, they are the law of no state. And yet it is an observable fact that
Mississippi's courts and lawyers regularly resort to the Restatements as highly persuasive and often dispositive
sources of law. This is so historically. See, e.g., Lowndes Coop. Ass'n v. Lipsey, 126 So. 2d 276, 277 (Miss. 1961)
(Restatement of Contracts § 75, Definition of Consideration); Shurley v. Aaron, 80 So. 2d 61, 62 (Miss. 1955) (Re-
statement of Property § 44, Definition of a Determinable Fee); Tri-State Transit Co. v. Martin, 179 So. 349, 351
(Miss. 1938) (Restatement of Torts § 461, Liability for Aggregation of Preexisting Injury); C.L. Gray Lumber Co.
v. Shubuta Motor Co., 153 So. 155, 156 (Miss. 1934) (Restatement of Agency § 8, Definition of Apparent Author-
ity). And it remains so today and across the legal spectrum. See, e.g., Omnibank of Mantee v. United S. Bank, 607
So. 2d 76,92-93 (Miss. 1992) (Restatement of Restitution §§ 14, 173); McCoy v. Colonial Baking Co., 572 So. 2d
850 (Miss. 1990) (Restatement (Second) ofJudgments § 48, Preclusion in Loss of Consortium Claims); Newman v.
Newman, 558 So. 2d 821,823-25 (Miss. 1990) (Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws §§ 258, 259, Interest in
Movables Acquired During Marriage, Removal of Movables by Spouse to Another State, Law of Forum Governs
Domicile, Respectively); Osborne v. Bullins, 549 So. 2d 1337, 1339 (Miss. 1989) (Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts § 360, Remedies for Breach of Promise to Purchase); Marter v. Scott, 514 So. 2d 1240, 1242-43 (Miss. 1987)
(Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228, Applying § 228 Test for Whether Conduct of an Employee is Within the
Scope of Employment); Allgood v. Allgood, 473 So. 2d 416, 421 (Miss. 1985) (Restatement (Second) of Trusts §
440, Trust Arising Where Transfer of Property Made to One Person With Purchase Price being Paid by Another).
The Restatements of Torts have been particularly influential. Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378, 382 (Miss. 1990)
(Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, Invasion of Privacy); Brocato v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 503 So. 2d
241, 244 (Miss. 1987) (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611, Official Proceedings Privilege); City of Jackson v.
Keane, 502 So. 2d 1185, 1188 (Miss. 1987) (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 930, Damages for Invasion of Real
Property); Fulton v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 498 So. 2d 1215, 1216 (Miss. 1986) (Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 558, Defamation); Prescott v. Bay St. Louis Newspapers, Inc., 497 So. 2d 77, 79 (Miss. 1986) (Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652E, Publicity Placing Persons in False Light); Candebat v. Flanagan, 487 So. 2d 207, 212
(Miss. 1986) (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652H, Invasion of Privacy); Thomas v. Global Boat Builders & Re-
pairmen, Inc., 482 So. 2d 1112, 1115 (Miss. 1986) (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 928, Harm to Chattels); An
Attorney v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 481 So. 2d 297, 299 (Miss. 1985) (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158,
Trespass); Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So. 2d 247,255 (Miss. 1985) (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, Intentional
Interference With Business Relations); Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 370 (Miss. 1985) (Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 429, Liability for Tort of Independent Contractor Where Services are Accepted From Independent Con-
tractor in Reasonable Belief that he is an Agent of the Employer); Rogers v. Huber, 239 So. 2d 333,334 (Miss. 1970)
(Restatement (Second) of Torts § 141, Affray or Similar Breach of Peace); Oden Constr. Co. v. McPhail, 228 So. 2d
586 (Miss. 1969) (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 392, Liability of One Supplying Chattels far Use of Others);
Thompson v. Reily, 211 So. 2d 537 (Miss. 1968) (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 408, Liability of Lessor for Chat-
tels); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 118 (Miss. 1966) (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A,
Products Liability), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967).
Yet there have been moments where the court has balked. See, e.g., Pugh v. Easterling, 367 So. 2d 935, 937-38
(Miss. 1979) (refusing to adopt Restatement of Torts § 667, Effect of a Judgment of Conviction on Question of Prob-
able Cause for Malicious Prosecution); Wilbourn v. Hardin, 234 So. 2d 606, 610 (Miss. 1970) (refusing to adopt
Restatement of Torts §§ 357, 362, Liability of Lessor to Lessee for Condition of Property).
All of this before us, we do not compromise our stance as unrepentant legal positivists when we resort generously,
although not blindly, to the recent Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition and the generation-old Restatement
(Second) of Torts. (We are not unaware that the American Law Institute has recently taken the first steps toward a
Restatement (Third) of Torts.) See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PI oixcrS LIABIUTY (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1994); APPORTIONMENT OF LiABUTY, PRosPECTus (1994).
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Natural law or no, it is an observable fact of human behavior that most of us
most of the time treat like cases alike, and different cases differently, and with ma-
turity the more so. We tend to think our decisions should make sense to an intelli-
gent layman and particularly to the parties to yesterday's case. When we fail in
these, we experience guilt and seek grounds for excusing or justifying our behav-
ior. This is why, over time, the law tends toward efficiency in policy and coherence
in principle. As elsewhere, gain attends respect for the evolutionary process. Yet,
what is actionable is a function of the positive law of the state and, by its nature, is
inherently arbitrary, and it will remain so in spite of our best efforts.
D. The Harness That Holds the Competitive Imperative
Our common practice is enterprise and competition and bargain and exchange,
the marketing of goods and services within a relatively free market economy, sub-
ject to the reasons for, and the realities of, the regulatory state. Each of the actions
and remedies noted above addresses one facet or another of the behavior of mar-
kets and of those persons and collections of persons who make up the private sec-
tor and who buy and sell and contest with one another at each level, horizontally
and vertically. As we will see, the policy judgment that tends to be found imbed-
ded within, and that best explains and justifies, the rules in each of these legal
compartments is that free market competition is good, that it serves the public in-
terest when it is vigorous and innovative, but that this is so only when it is pursued
by fair means.42 Experience has taught us certain market practices have harmful
effects in that they impair competition substantially. These range from the cartel
and the monopoly which tend to destroy competition altogether to the dirty tricks
that tend toward the law of the jungle. We have learned, if we are to pursue our
policy fully, we must attend to these practices and proscribe those with known
negative effects, although we debate passionately the means of doing so and the
proper instrument of proscription.
But market participants and their practices are regulated vis-a-vis consumers as
well and in no less important nor unrelated ways, and so we err when we limit the
field to laws addressing competitive practices."4 The positive law addresses many
forms of market behavior two-fold, by rules regulating competition, on the one
hand, and by rules governing the seller/buyer relationship, on the other. Decep-
tive marketing, for example, harms competitors and consumers. The same may be
said of other forms of unfair competition. We each may expect that the law address
us with a single voice, or, at least, that it not make of us simultaneous inconsistent
demands." We enhance the chance law will approach this end when it attends the
policy undergirding the field. Here, vis-a-vis consumers, the policy judgment that
seems to explain and justify the rules in the field is that freedom to contract and to
42. See generally I MCCARTHY, supra note 17, §§ 1.01-1.03.
43. Professor Myers states that "[tihe term 'business tort' describes a wide array of tort-based claims asserted
in the context of disputes between competitors, customers, or parties in vertical relationships." Myers, supra note
13, at 1107.
44. See FULLER, supra note 2, at 65-70.
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bargain and exchange is good, but only where the seller and buyer are competent
adults acting in absence of fraud, duress, unconscionability, or other conduct the
state's positive law has declared against public policy. There is potential for mis-
chief when we exclude from our thinking and from the field (some) consumer pro-
tection laws. There is like potential when we fail to pursue accommodation and
rational and productive coexistence of these laws and their underlying policies
with the law of unfair competition.
E. Commonality and the Search for Principle
Given the disparate legal pedigree and history of the assorted torts listed above,
it is not surprising few have come forward with an overarching principle unifying
the area. Certainly, no such offering has commanded general assent. Professor
McCarthy goes so far as to suggest that "no useful purpose is served by struggling
for a sweeping definition."4 But some have tried, and perhaps we can learn from
their failures.
From time to time, as we have noted, a view labeled "prima facie tort" has sur-
faced. The notion is usually traced back to Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor,
Gow, & Co. :46 "[I] ntentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary course
of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage another in that other per-
son's property or trade, is actionable if done without just cause or excuse."47
Holmes took a shot at it in Aikens v. Wisconsin:48 "It has been considered that,
prima facie, the intentional infliction of temporal damage is a cause of action,
which, as a matter of substantive law, whatever may be the form of pleading, re-
quires a justification if the defendant is to escape."49 The prima facie tort has been
less than successful,"0 if, for no other reason, its generality approaches abstrac-
tion. Professor Walker tried his hand a few years back: "A business tort provides
protection for one's economic expectancies. . . .[Tihese torts provide redress
when one's expectation of economic gain is thwarted by another.""1 This has the
advantage of including, in theory, both competitors and buyers/consumers as pro-
tected parties and potential plaintiffs. It tells us some things we must know about
the business tort but hardly enough. For example, we are told nothing of the law's
central preference for the protection of competition, not competitors,2 nor of the
deeper union between antitrust and tortious interference law as each seeks to pro-
tectfair competition. Walker fails in the end because, as he admits, "not every in-
terference with an economic expectancy will be sanctioned." 3 Some notion of
45. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 1.03, at 16.
46. 23 Q.B. 598 (1889).
47. Id. at 613.
48. 195 U.S. 194 (1904).
49. Id. at 204.
50. See ALEXANDER, supra note 30, § 6.1.
51. Walker, Business Torts, supra note 27, at 2.
52. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 1. 14[2], at 48; cf Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
320 (1962).
53. Walker, Business Torts, supra note 27, at 2.
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impropriety in the interference is needed. After all, it is difficult to imagine any
successful economic activity by any market participant that does not adversely af-
fect someone else's economic expectancies.' This is inherent in a market econ-
omy. We want some businesses to disappoint some of their competitors' economic
expectancies, to the end that the market will tend toward efficiency and consumers
will enjoy quality goods and services at reasonable prices. Professor Walker's defi-
nition omits this core concern and, in consequence, suggests no principled way of
distinguishing actionable acts and practices from those that are not. At the very
least, something must be said about the defendant's means or the likely effects of
his conduct. In point of fact, our law has much to say of means, as may presently
appear.
III. AN INTERPRETIVE STRATAGEM 55
A. An Overview
We may best answer the client's demand, "But what must I do?" if we under-
stand the law of business torts en grosse. And we may best understand the law of
business torts en grosse if we have well in mind a coherent approach to the interpre-
tation of legal phenomena. In summary form, first we identify the valid rules in
the field and the core content of each. We work our hardest to be good positiv-
ists. 6 Errors here are inevitable, but we hope to hold them to a bare minimum,
54. See I MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 1.12, at 40; Franck, supra note 18, at 164.
55. In bits and pieces I have over the years struggled to articulate an intelligible approach to the interpretation
of legal phenomena. Extrajudicially, I have done this through a series of articles. See, e.g., James L. Robertson,
Myth and Reality-Or, Is It "Perception and Taste"?-In the Reading of Donative Documents, 61 FORDHAM L. REv.
1045 (1993) [hereinafter Robertson, Myth and Reality] ; James L. Robertson, Of Bork and Basics, 60 Miss. L.J.
439 (1990) [hereinafter Robertson, Bork]; James L. Robertson, Discovering Rule 11 of the Mississippi Rules of
Civil Procedure, 8 Miss. C. L. REv. 111 (1988) [hereinafter Robertson, Rule 11]; Amy D. Whitten & James L.
Robertson, Post-Custody, Pre-Indictment Problems of Fundamental Fairness and Access to Counsel: Mississippi's
Opportunity, 13 VT. L. REv. 247 (1988) [hereinafter Whitten & Robertson, Mississippi's Opportunity]. Within
my more constrained judicial role, I often spoke to the point. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 578 So.
2d 644, 651-53 (Miss. 1991) (Robertson, J., dissenting); Thornhill v. System Fuels, Inc., 523 So. 2d 983, 1003-
09 (Miss. 1988) (Robertson, J., concurring); Cuevas v. Royal D'Iberville Hotel, 498 So. 2d 346, 357-58 (Miss.
1986) (Robertson, J., dissenting); Grisham v. Hinton, 490 So. 2d 1201, 1208-09 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J.,
concurring). Then there were the days when my efforts were more compromised by the need to command a ma-
jority of the court. See, e.g., Richardson v. Canton Farm Equip., Inc., 608 So. 2d 1240, 1250 (Miss. 1992);
Simmons v. Bank of Miss., 593 So. 2d 40, 43 (Miss. 1992); Mississippi Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Vaughn, 529 So. 2d
540, 542 (Miss. 1988); J.L. Teel Co. v. Houston United Sales, Inc., 491 So. 2d 851, 857 (Miss. 1986); In re
Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1039-40 (Miss. 1985). I seek here to build on the ideas expressed in these disparate
sources and settings.
56. The version of legal positivism we have in mind is that of Professor Hart in H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPr
OF LAw (1961). This is supplemented from time to time by references to Holmesean rhetoric. We regard positiv-
ism as the only tenable point of beginning if, as we hope, we may avoid charges of bias and prejudice. Alas, we
may not escape positivism's incompleteness, much of which we seek to fill with resort to Dworkinian principles
and integrity. See generally RONALD DwoR IN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE].
Because we do this as a matter of conscious secular choice, we stay within the tenets of legal positivism. Cf
General Motors Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 510 So. 2d 498, 500 (Miss. 1987) (no natural law in state tax case);
Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So. 2d 332, 342-47 (Miss. 1987) (positivistic approach to state separation of
powers doctrine); Trigg v. Trigg, 498 So. 2d 334,336 (Miss. 1986) (positivistic approach to participation action
between married persons); Neal v. State, 451 So. 2d 743,762 (Miss.) (positivistic approach to definition of miti-
gating circumstances in death penalty case), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1098 (1984).
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trusting those that remain will be seen as failures of eyesight, not integrity. 7 We
may not ignore any rules fairly within the field, nor the authoritative content of
any such rule, nor may we ignore the origin, nature, or life of those rules.
It is reasonably safe to proceed with the rules-the "business torts"-labeled
and listed in Part II above. They are the yield of a full and fair survey of the work in
the area. They seem the product of consensus. But, when we say this we must keep
in mind that by definition the field consists of all rules that regulate the competi-
tive practices of market participants vis-a-vis each other and their contractors and
buyers and ultimate consumers. We face an open field. New kids on the block are
as eligible to play as the veterans, an example being the emerging right of publicity.
Besides this, each business tort rule has its core (of certainty) and its penumbra (of
doubt), as does the field as a whole. Most judge-made rules are enmeshed in con-
siderable dicta, confusion of concept, and other barriers to essential statement. A
residual business tort inheres in the enterprise, as we have already seen.
We strive to understand the underlying principles which best explain these rules
in the aggregate and best cohere among each other, for these principles must serve
as our bedrock for filling the gaps 8 necessary to just adjudication in given cases,
and en route resolving the uncertainties inevitably a part of any system of legal
rules. These principles interact electromagnetically among each other. Their com-
bined electromagnetic force gives life to other principles and rules. The process of
interpolation and extrapolation is never-ending, for law is not something that is,
but "a continuous process of becoming." 9 Though the words may not change,
meaning inevitably will. 0
There is a central notion, common to all rules (and not just rules of law). Im-
bedded within each rule is a purpose-one or more reasons justifying its exist-
ence, and what we should seek in the beginning is not necessarily what its
author(s) had in mind, but the most sensible purpose and justification a hypotheti-
cal, omniscient, worldly and wise author drafting that rule may have in mind at the
moment. We lawyer best when we afford each rule that circumstanced external
reading that best fits and justifies that rule today. 1 Seeing this is essential to
law's success as an instrumental enterprise. No formalistic straight-jacket or
57. 1 trust further that these inevitable failures of eyesight and understanding will not impugn the viability of
the method I attempt here to present in summary form. No doubt there are others of greater perception and un-
derstanding who may apply the method to the field of business torts with greater effect.
58. But see Galloway v. Travelers Ins. Co., 515 So. 2d 678, 685-86 (Miss. 1987) (Robertson, J., concurring)
(discussing filling gaps in law by reference to economic realities).
59. Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holnes'Positivism -An Addendum, 64 HARv. L. REv. 929, 930 (1951). See also O.W.
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) [hereinafter HOLMES, COMMON LAW] ("In order to know what [the law]
is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become.").
60. See Andrews v. Lake Serene Property Owners Ass'n, 434 So. 2d 1328, 1332 (Miss. 1983). See discussion
of "malice" infra Part IV.
61. I have often borrowed Ronald Dworkin's notion of legal interpretation having two dimensions: the dimen-
sion of fit and the dimension of justification. See, e.g., Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So. 2d 332, 342 (Miss.
1987); Frazier v. State ex rel. Pittman, 504 So. 2d 675, 710 (Miss. 1987) (Robertson, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985). I do so again. As before, I make no promise that
I define or use these dimensions as Dworkin would.
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mathematical formula awaits. There is no escape from the lawyering job, and it is
important that we pause to assess the attitude we need bring to our task.
B. The Dimension of Fit
1. A First Approach
We begin by identifying the valid rules in the field and proceed by drawing with
as much precision as is reasonably practicable the positive core contours of each
discrete rule. The rules constructed and assembled, we place them in a vertical or-
dering: federal constitutional law (where it exists), then federal statutory law at the
top, and descending according to conventional rankings. Within state law, most fa-
miliar is that statute law trumps case law,62 as do duly authorized administrative
regulations. Many do not think of contracts and other private law species as law,
but they are, and make no mistake about it. A contract renders less optional what
you may do, if you are a party to it, as a statute that addresses you limits your
choices. Though less important than in other areas, privately-made law forms are
not an insignificant part of the law of business torts,63 particularly in the vertical
interactions of market participants.
In a field as historically balkanized as business torts has been, treating each as a
discrete tort and restricting interpretation of each to its literal language will invari-
ably prove unfortunate, and especially is this so with the non-statutory rules we
must somehow tease from the often confused rhetorical flourishes of appellate
judges, not to mention their often less-than-apt quotations from ambivalent ency-
clopedic authority. The law may not be a wholly rational and practicable con-
struct, nor a seamless web, but the people it affects are entitled to our best efforts
to make it so.64 Professor Ronald Dworkin has suggested a useful approach to this
end. We should "identify legal rights and duties, so far as possible, on the assump-
tion that they were all created by a single author -the community personified -
expressing a coherent conception of justice and fairness. '65 We think of the law of
business torts as an integrated whole, and we give that whole the most enlightened
and coherent reading that we may find. That reading must fit the language and
content of the rules, but it must not only fit; it must provide the best fit, and in
seeking this best fit, we must respect the electromagnetic force of other law.
We gather together all of the valid rules in the field and imagine they were given
us by a single author who took seriously his duty to enact a coherent, principled,
and practicable corpus juris. But this does not mean we seek the intent of any par-
ticular lawmaker or body of lawmakers. The law demands a circumstanced
62. 1 trust we are well past the point of that ultimate instance of judicial arrogance where sensible persons still
think statutes in derogation of common law should be strictly construed.
63. I realize the purist, the formalist, and those of limited imagination may shudder at the suggestion. I offer
only that it is undeniable that much market behavior is regulated by private agreements-contracts-and no
profit attends efforts to exclude these from the sources the lawyer should consult before advising the client what
he must do.
64. Robertson, Bork, supra note 55, at 489.
65. DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 56, at 225.
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external reading -the reading it would be given by a reasonably informed external
observer, given the text and the circumstances that have given it birth and nur-
ture6" and the legislative facts that best justify its existence today.67
There is another thought experiment I find helpful at the dimension of fit and
that I commend for inclusion in our interpretive arsenal.68 It is a sort of trial and
error tactic. In divining content and assigning meaning to a legal rule, particularly
in difficult cases, we first intuit the possible principles within the text of that rule.
We then take the principles we list and, one by one, in the case of each, ask
whether an author, intellectually honest and faithful to the dream of a coherent and
principled body of law, and who accepts the given principle and has pursued it
through concrete rules of law, could have produced the rule(s) at hand. However
congenial the principle, it must be discarded if it would not so yield the rule. For
example, you may find attractive the principle of Christian charity and order your
life by it in your relations with others. But you may not resort to that principle to
explain and interpret the law of business torts. No one who accepted the principle
of Christian charity and sought to implement his beliefs in writing the laws that
govern the marketplace could have given us the rules that make up the field of
business torts. The same may be said of social Darwinism at the other extreme,
for no true disciple of that view could have given us the fairness component we
find so prominent in each business tort. In the end, the principle prevails that best
fits and explains the valid rules in the field. That principle becomes our legitimate
and powerful resource for deciding the hard case when it arises.
2. The Concept of Legal Validity
To be a legitimate object of interpretation, a rule must be valid, and we must be
clear what we mean when we say this. To say that a rule has validity is to make a
foundational statement. It is a statement that may be made of any rule of any insti-
tution or practice, a statement that when true gives the rule its reality and enforce-
ability. It pretermits notions the untrained mind seems ever to want to bring to the
interpretive table, and ultimately frees the rule, in an aphorism familiar today in an
altogether different setting, to become the best it can be.
We must flesh out the point. When a person asserts a right or a remedy, he may
expect to be challenged, what rule confers that right, provides that remedy, and
whence that rule?69 Our duty to respect and enforce his claim hinges on his answer.
What counts as law, and thus becomes social fact and a fit subject for legal inter-
pretation, is only that which satisfies the criteria of legal validity [hereinafter
CLV].70 Those criteria are two-fold: (1) Did the person or persons who made the
66. I have elaborated this view in the case of wills and other donative documents. See Robertson, Myth and
Reality, supra note 55, at 1045; and in the case of constitutional texts, see Robertson, Bork, supra note 55, at 439.
67. See Cuevas v. Royal D'Iberville Hotel, 498 So. 2d 346, 357 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J., dissenting).
68. Here again, I learn from Professor Dworkin. DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 56, at 240-50.
69. One familiar example today is the media's persistent claim of "the public's right to know."
70. Thirty years ago, H.L.A. Hart refocused our attention on the centrality of the concept of legal validity,
and much of what follows flows from his work. HART, supra note 56, at 97-107.
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rule at hand, by virtue of some other valid rule of law, have authority to make the
rule?; and (2) Assuming the person or persons had rule-making authority, did they
make the rule in accordance with the procedures specified by other valid rules of
law?71 We must attend both to the existence of law-making power and, as well, to
its right exercise. These criteria are critical for all genera and species of law: the
public law, such as constitutions, statutes, common/case/judge-made law, and ad-
ministrative regulations; and also for the privately-made law, such as corporate
charters, collective bargaining agreements, contracts, trusts, and wills. The CLV
must be met in the case of each rule of whatever genera or species if that rule is to
have the power to render non-optional things we might otherwise want to do or to
generate rights that we may demand the state and its citizens enforce and respect.
For illustration, if a man dies and we ask whether his will is valid, we must first
ask whether when he made the will he was over a certain age and was of sound and
disposing mind, memory, and understanding. If we answer that question in the af-
firmative, we then ask, did this person who had by law been empowered to make a
will, act in conformity with the procedural requisites for so doing?72 And to this
end, we ask whether the will was in written form, whether it was subscribed by
the testator at the end, and whether it was properly witnessed; in other words,
whether it complied with the various formalities the law insists upon before a will
may be given effect.
The rules regarding the identification of persons with legal power to make
wills, contracts, statutes, and constitutions and prescribing the procedural formal-
ities requisite to each are customarily in written form. The case of statutes is illus-
trative and is particularly important in any inquiry into the field of business torts.
A bill becomes law when it follows a certain procedural course and is enacted by
the requisite majority of each house of the Congress or the state legislature, as the
case may be, and when it is approved by the President or the governor.73 Only that
which has received these approvals acquires the status of law.
3. The Import of Legal Validity
What then do we do with these valid rules we so identify? When we ask this
question, we are led immediately to a mistaken notion many otherwise sensible
persons perennially find attractive. Our public expressions suggest we believe,
when we interpret a valid rule regulating market behavior, or any other behavioral
phenomena, for that matter, we are in fact finding and enforcing the specific
wishes the lawmakers had in their collective minds at the time they made the rule.
The text is seen transformed into the lawgivers' thoughts and their product. We see
71. Hart calls these criteria "secondary rules," or sometimes "secondary rules of recognition." HART, supra
note 56, at 91-96.
72. Cf Williams v. Mason, 556 So. 2d 1045, 1048-49 (Miss. 1990) (listing procedural requisites for con-
tracts to bequeath property by will).
73. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,956-57 (1983) (House of Representa-
tives resolution ordering deportation of alien declared unconstitutional because not passed by Senate or signed by
President).
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ourselves, first, finding the legislative intent if it be a statute before us, and, then,
construing the statute in accordance with the intent so found,74 a process that at the
very least puts the cart before the horse. Worse, we see the act but a door between
the reader and legislators' intent. Once the door opens we enter into the world of
intent, and the textual door having served its purpose is laid aside. But this is all
wrong! Nothing is more certain than that elementary notions of legal validity
wholly preclude giving lawmakers' unexpressed intentions authoritative effect.
"Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions."75 We pro-
ceed, blithely oblivious to our inability to know but a part of a legislator's mind,
and that imperfectly at best. Vain is the search for actual intent in a world where
probable intent of a few, and at but one fleeting moment in time, is the most we
may ever know. The inescapable reality is that lawgivers' subjective intent may not
be known with sufficient certainty, completeness, and frequency that we may suc-
cessfully ground in it our jurisprudence of legal interpretation, even if it were oth-
erwise desirable that we should do so.
It is important to recall that no one votes for any extra-statutory "legislative in-
tent." The chief executive approves no unwritten expression of legislative intent,
and his approval is essential to the validity of the statute -a point we often over-
look. No court charged with interpretation may grant authority to notions of legis-
lative intent except insofar as that intent may be found embedded in the written
words upon which the lawmakers do vote. "[W]e are not free to replace [law] with
an unenacted legislative intent." 76 Nor do legislative committee reports, floor de-
bates, and the dozens of other items comprising the political history of a statute
emphatically bear the imprimatur of legal validity. "Judicial faithfulness to legisla-
tive will consists not in crude gropings into the consistently dark closets of legisla-
tive history but in a fine faithfulness to the mediating power of the legislative
word."
77
Yet, there is much mythology afoot about statutory interpretation, and few
ideas78 are as potentially pernicious as setting aside the text, and treating as au-
thoritative, sources such as legislative intent and legislative history that do not en-
joy the status of law. The former is ephemeral and the latter persuasive at best. The
rules we respect and enforce may legitimately be found only among those materi-
als satisfying the CLV. We have chosen the vessel of the written word to convey
74. We tend to do the same with all legal texts, including (to take an example far-removed) donative docu-
ments. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) ch. 10-scope note; § 10.1 cmt. d (Prelimi-
nary Draft No. 2, Sept. I1, 1992).
75. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., con-
curring). See also Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384,395-97 (1951) (Jackson, J., con-
curring).
76. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 453 (Scalia, J., concurring).
77. Kansas City S. Ry. v. McNamara, 817 F.2d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1987).
78. Almost as pernicious at the other end of the spectrum are the so-called "four corners" rule and the notion
that statutes (or, for that matter, any other species of legal texts) may or should be divided by whether they are
ambiguous or unambiguous. See Thornhill v. System Fuels, Inc., 523 So. 2d 983, 1006-07 (Miss. 1988) (Ro-
bertson, J., concurring).
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the law's directives, and we must sail those vessels as ably as we may. Judge
Thomas Gee has struggled with the point: "Our legislators are servants of the pub-
lic, and when they speak in statutory language-that most public form of dis-
course -their motives and desires are submerged into a public product intelligible
in a public context."79 Judge Gee then warns provocatively of our failure to attend
his admonition:
If we do not take a legislative body at its word, we run the risk,801 of substituting
our own normative (and inherently non-democratic) views, 811 of disrupting
the strange political trade-offs that make democracy possible ,121 of- worst
of all - polluting a public language of relatively fixed meaning and reference,
a language necessary for the public discourse we call self-government.
8 3
The point of all of this is to fix firmly in mind that each effort at interpreting a
rule of law begins with - and is ever subject to critique by reference to - the CLV-
approved text; that is, the language that has been enacted and thus formally made
a part of the law. Only that, and all of that, which has satisfied the CLV, forms a
part of the legal text so that it confers legal powers and rights and is a legitimate
object of interpretation, so that when a citizen sues it becomes a necessary object
of interpretation. Because of the highly generalized and at times even abstract lan-
guage used in rules of law, competent interpretation is imperative. The phrasing
may be fuzzy. The implicit policy judgments may be multiple and at odds one with
the other. Not even statutes of limitations are always susceptible of mechanical ap-
plication. The matter is more difficult at the level of common/case/judge-made
law, for there we must extract from each case the most narrow reading of the rule
which, applied to the facts, would yield the judgment of the court, and, then as-
similate a series of such rules into a coherent prediction of what the court will
likely do in fact in the next case." I may not refrain from working because the
draftsmen have made my work difficult.8" Judgment and discretion are inevitable.
The legal text is and must be our ultimate referent when questions of meaning are
presented, for fidelity to law demands nothing less than that any interpretation of a
legal text first and foremost must fit that text rather than some other text we may
wish had been enacted.
79. McNamara, 817 F2d at 373.
80. Judge Gee has drawn a line on these risks. "We will run these risks when the statutory language leads to
absurdities. . . but not when the language of the statute merely makes Congress look foolish." Id.
81. The same phenomenon occurs when a court refuses to take a testator at his word and begins interpreting a
will according to its view of the testator's intent. See Robertson, Myth And Reality, supra note 55, at 1051-52.
82. Here Judge Gee cites and quotes the colorful and less-than-reverent dissenting expression of Justice
George Ethridge in Crippen v. Mint Sales Co., 103 So. 503, 505 (Miss. 1925).
83. McNamara, 817 F.2d at 373.
84. Holmes, Path of Law, supra note 1.
85. One of the worst legal texts I have seen is Miss. R. Civ. P. 11. Using the methods I describe here, I like to
think I have made some sense of it. See Robertson, Rule 11, supra note 55, at I11.
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4. The Circumstanced External Approach to Legal Interpretation
I know of no mandate in the positive law concerning how we read rules of law.
Yet, it matters how we do so. Our lawmakers have selected the medium of the
written word within which to create, ratify, and preserve the rules we go by. Be-
cause that medium bears CLV sanction, we must in our interpretive enterprise ac-
cept and work with the properties of language, not to mention the human
condition. But when we approach difficult texts, we confront the fact that we have
no particular interpretive stratagem that enjoys legal validity. That is why we are
free - and duty bound - to fashion that approach to legal interpretation that makes
our law the best it can be.
I would have us accept that we pursue circumstanced external standards for
reading and interpreting legal texts. My suggestion has three dimensions: First, a
circumstanced external approach to interpretation of legal texts is theoretically
and practicably more satisfying. Perhaps it is a matter of taste, but by the nature of
language I feel more comfortable saying that a text made by particular lawgivers
under certain circumstances (insofar as we may know them) means this or that,
rather than saying I have found the lawgivers' actual intent and will force the text to
fit that intent. Second, and more pragmatically, the difficulty of finding lawgivers'
actual subjective intent with any acceptable level of confidence, comprehensive-
ness, or frequency leaves us no choice but to pursue external standards.86 Third,
and surely most important to any good legal positivist, a circumstanced external
approach to interpretation of legal texts affords a better explanation of what courts
have been doing in fact, for it is all they can do in fact, albeit they often protest
otherwise.
My idea is not original nor even of recent vintage. A hundred years ago,
Holmes spoke of external standards in the reading of legal texts. Contracts rested
"not on the parties having meant the same thing but on their having said the same
thing. "" Further, "nothing is more certain than that parties may be bound by a
contract to things which neither of them intended, and when one does not know of
the other's assent." 88 In the case of statutes, Holmes asked not "what the legislature
meant. . .[but] what the statute means."89 Of legal documents generally, he in-
sisted:
[W]e ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean in the mouth
of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were
86. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 102 (1990).
87. Holmes, Path of Law, supra note 1, at 464.
88. Holmes, Path of Law, supra note 1, at 464.
89. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECrED LEGAL PAPERS 207 (1921). See also Holmes, The Theory of Legal
Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899) [hereinafter Holmes, Legal Interpretation] (emphasis added). I
have often relied on this truism. See, e.g., Estate of Stamper, 607 So. 2d 1141, 1145-47 (Miss. 1992) (interpre-
tation of prior judgment of lower court); White v. Hattiesburg Cable Co., 590 So. 2d 867, 870 (Miss. 1991)
(Robertson, J., concurring) (statutory interpretation); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 578 So. 2d 644, 651
(Miss. 1991) (Robertson, J., dissenting) (constitutional interpretation); Bowe v. Bowe, 557 So. 2d 793, 795
(Miss. 1990) (interpretation of prior judgment of lower court).
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used, and it is to the end of answering this last question that we let in evidence as to
what the circumstances were."
Holmes then put it all in context: "But the normal speaker of English is merely a
special variety, a literary form, so to speak, of our old friend the prudent man. He
is external to the particular writer, and a reference to him as the criterion is simply
another instance of the externality of the law."91
The case for an external approach to interpretation has been made in the context
of a great variety of legal texts, from constitutions to contracts. 92 Of course, there
remain many who resist, who insist that we seek the will-o-the-wisp, and so we
continue to hear talk of the intent of "the Framers," 93 the intent of the legislature,94
the intent of the contracting parties,9" and the like. But even in the latter instance,
the contractor gives his assent to the other party's external symbols, not to some
unexpressed or imperfectly-expressed thoughts of the other, and he conveys that
assent with symbols of his own. The interpreting court must have resort to supple-
mental rules where the contract fails of full expression. That these may yield a
reading beyond the actual intent of the parties is seen necessary that we give co-
herence to the contract whether its makers did so or not. In the case of statutes the
point is even more potent, given the diverse persons voting for the new law, the
variety of thoughts each may have entertained as he activated the "aye" lever, and
the more widespread the potential for mischief if we do not resort to circumstantial
external interpretive standards.96 So also and the more so in the case of constitu-
tions. 9'
Notwithstanding our confident proclamations of our pursuit of lawgivers' in-
tent, we, all of us-hide-bound formalist to enlightened realist-have in practice
been using external standards through the years. We have in fact been imputing
intent instead of finding it. The search for intent is invariably a search of indicia of
intent, and so of its proof. A holding that a legislature intended this or that is not
and cannot be but a holding that a reasonable legislature providing this text under
these circumstances would most likely have meant this or that. And if I am correct
that this is what we have been doing all along, why should we not say so? Candor
90. Holmes, Legal Interpretation, supra note 89, at 417-18.
91. Holmes, Legal Interpretation, supra note 89, at 418.
92. See, e.g., Martin v. Maldonado, 572 P.2d 763,767 (Alaska 1977); C & M Realty Trust v. Wiedenkeller,
578 A.2d 354, 357 (N.H. 1990).
93. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,398 (1989); Hunt v. Hubbert, 588 So. 2d 848, 863 (Ala. 1991)
(concurring opinion).
94. See, e.g., Ladner v. Inge, 603 So. 2d 1012 (Ala. 1992); In re Klein, 585 N.E.2d 809,812 (N.Y. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1945 (1992). I think, for example, of the enormous energy combatants have expended
seeking the congressional intent behind the Sherman Act, much of which is outlined by Bill Page in his recent
article. See Page, Ideological Conflict, supra note 12. The venerable text is difficult, unknowable enough without
the foolishness of peering into the minds of less than economically sophisticated senators and congressmen a hun-
dred years ago.
95. Towle v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 130 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Mass. 1955); Pearce, Urstadt, Mayer
& Greer Realty Corp. v. Atrium Dev. Assocs., 571 N.E.2d 60, 63 (N.Y. 1991).
96. See, e.g., DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 56, at 318-27.
97. See, e.g., Robertson, Bork, supra note 55, at 460-65.
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seems to require such a confession, although a cherished myth be shattered. The
theoretical underpinning of the interpretive phase of our law of business torts
ought be declared what it has been, is, and will ever be: the reading of valid legal
texts by circumstanced external standards.
There is a bonus in the end. The circumstanced external approach centers on
the lawgivers' text, and when it does so it affords them a unique opportunity. With-
out sacrificing any of its benefits, this external approach affords our would-be
lawgivers one of life's rare occasions when they both eat and keep their cake. It
tells them that, to the extent they express well their lawful intent in writing, they
may expect that intent will be honored, for a long, long time. If their wishes be
complex and if they employ competent drafting, their skillfully-written legal text
will almost certainly win judicial approval and realize in fact their actual intent for
years to come. For all practical purposes, these well-written legal texts mean the
same under any approach to interpretation. Because they are well-written, they
seldom lead to litigation. Their meaning is seldom contested when parties do sue
over disputed facts or some other point of law. But where the text is not so well-
written, where the statute admits of ambiguity or mistake or its meaning is other-
wise problematic-aye, there is the rub. It is in these cases that our approach
matters most.
To be sure, there are critics on our other flank. Much rhetoric is offered today
that objectivity in law is illusory and no legal interpreter however skillful or honor-
able can ever escape "the prejudices . . . [they] share with their fellow-men."98
Some would see Professor Page's insightful description of competing ideologies in
antitrust interpretation99 as a case study proving the impossibility of objectivity in
legal interpretation external both to the lawmaker and the interpreter. I would be
the first to concede- and reply- we are in a realm where our "reach should exceed
• ..[our] grasp, or what's a heaven for."1"'
C. The Dimension of Justification
1. A Matter of Policy and Principle
Policy is most prominently a pre-rule phenomenon. It informs our making of
rules and their content. It informs our extending, amending, restricting, and re-
pealing of rules. Policy plays an important though conceptually different role in the
post-rule circumstanced external approach to legal interpretation. As we approach
each rule, we construct the most sensible policy our hypothetical lawgiver draft-
ing that rule may have had in mind had he given us that rule but today. But as we
say this, we know often there are several policies beneath a rule and they do not
always mesh as neatly as we would wish. Just punishment of offenders, prevention
98. HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 59, at 1.
99. Page, Ideological Conflict, supra note 12, at 1.
100. Robert Browning, "Andrea del Sarto," in THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF ROBERT BROWNING 452
(1930).
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of future offenses, holding the social cost of crime to its optimal level, promoting
the public security, and rehabilitation are among the many not necessarily consist-
ent policies imbedded within most of the rules of our criminal justice system.
They hardly point to the same judgment in a given case. And so our constructive
process has its accommodative dimension, which invariably means hierarchial
rankings where one policy must trump.
We (re)construct policy to understand why we have the rule, but once we find
the rule, policy must share the field. At the dimension of justification we must
ever test our reading of the rule by its policy base, but we must also do more. Rules
by definition are equally laden with language and underlying principles. For ex-
ample, policy explains why we have certain business subsidy programs, but mat-
ters of principle and fidelity to text help us more in deciding a particular business
entity's entitlement. Policy as well explains the existence of rules proscribing un-
fair competition, but we must resort to a circumstanced external reading of princi-
ple and text to aid our understanding and enforcement of a given rule in a given
case.
Of course, coherence in principle is one principal policy we pursue.101 No mat-
ter how sound our pre-legal policy judgments, a measure of our success in trans-
mitting those policy judgments into legal rules is whether over a given field they
are consistent in principle. And, no matter how adept we may be in positing our
legal rules, the whole enterprise founders if we apply those rules arbitrarily and
capriciously. Substantial congruence between declared rule and official action is a
sine qua non of legal justice." 2
2. The Purpose Implicit in Each Law and Why It Must Be Sought
We must elaborate. Each rule, whatever its source, necessarily implies and re-
flects certain core values and purposes, and it does this imperfectly. Rules of law
do not come into being willy-nilly. They are always created by one or more per-
sons having in mind some reason(s) for enacting and some end(s) believed worthy
and attainable, but at enactment the umbilical cords from the rules to their makers
are rent. We should read rules in a way that promotes the policies and purposes we
find imbedded in their language and their life. As we do this, we need to be sensi-
tive to the nature of law in the contemporary world. Law is a purposive endeavor
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules."' As such, it is a social fact
that affects us all, and, while law may or may not be an inexorable presence, it is
certainly a manipulable instrument. Because it is so, we should seek from our law
means to the end of a society in which we should all want to live.
We do know this: Each rule, each decision, each lawsuit is the product of
human choice. However and whatever we choose, each gives off incentives to
101. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUSLY].
102. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 81-83 (rev. ed. 1964).
103. See Warren County Bd. of Educ. v. Wilkinson, 500 So. 2d 455, 460 (Miss. 1986).
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behavior. That rules in statutory form have this etiology and effect is apparent.
The reason this is so in the case ofjudicial decisions is we accept the rule of prece-
dent, the fundamental principle of justice that like cases should be treated alike
and different cases appropriately differently, a principle we lawyers label stare de-
cisis. Yet stare decisis is hardly self-executing, nor is adherence to precedent.
Wise exercise of discretion inheres in competent judging. Because of stare decisis,
each decision will come to stand for one or more rules of law. However the court
articulates its judgment (so long as it is on the merits), the case will come to stand
more or less for the most narrow rule(s) which, when applied to facts, will yield
thejudgment the court rendered. Because of this and because of stare decisis, each
decision is an economic phenomenon the same as a new invention, a price change,
a flood, a plant closing, whatever. Though many discrete ripples be little noted, en
masse legal activity is a mighty force and markets move in its wake.
A metaphor may enhance the point. The law represented by each of the labels
listed above in Part II should be seen as rocks cast into a body of water, each
splashing at the first moment and affecting all around it and then generating waves
as concentric circles which gradually spread and weaken in force and effect the
more they expand.10 4 Yet perfect symmetry is an illusion. Judge Posner is right
when he reminds us that "there is no metric for determining the social, political,
or economic 'distance' between a prior, 'analogous' case and the present case.
105
The terrible truth is, once caught in the grip of these insights, we are forever
after laden with responsibility, with the knowledge that how we manage the law
really matters. The trick is to minimize our aggregate error so that we minimize
the harm our law does at once to our individual liberties and our social, eco-
nomic, and political health, and to do this in a real world where people disagree
what is good and what is bad.
The point may be put more graphically. Deciding a lawsuit is like shooting a
gun. The bullet is going to strike something. We surrender the alternative of hit-
ting nothing when we enter the courthouse. The first question is whether and to
what extent knowing this makes it worth the trouble to open our eyes and try to
figure out whom and what we are likely to hit. 10 The second question requires that
the gunman assess his alternatives and decide on balance whom or what it is best to
(try to) hit. As I was taught many years ago, it is one of the "objective facts of so-
cial existence-that the pie of social living [is dynamic and it] can . . . shrink
104. Chief Justice Hawkins states that "[wihen we have a case before us which we have the lawful authority to
decide, we have no authority not to decide it." Shewbrooks v. A.C. & S., Inc., 529 So. 2d 557, 560 (Miss. 1988).
Chief Justice Hawkins follows with numerous judicial expositions to like effect, beginning with Chief Justice
John Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,404 (1821). Shewbrooks, 529 So. 2d at 560-61.
105. POSNER, supra note 86, at 92.
106. Judge Posner offers a striking example. "The judge who analogizes oil and gas to rabbits and foxes may
think he is taking a small step; actually he is impeding the efficient exploitation of valuable resources." POSNER,
supra note 86, at 92. Posner's point is that the "rule of capture" for acquiring rights in certain things may be fine
when those things are plentiful, i.e., rabbits and foxes, but it creates considerable problems when applied to es-
sential and scarce resources, i.e., oil and gas. POSNER, supra note 86, at 92 & n.40.
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away to or toward nothing," that "[g]iven a minimum of material goods, 107 1 the
supplies of these and other intangible satisfactions depend mainly upon people
having the wit to avoid placing limits upon them by their own folly."1 8 This truth
obtains in the case of lawsuits as in legislation, and helps explain why we must af-
ford our law the reading that proceeds from the best justification we may find for
its present content in the world around us.
3. What Best Justifies This Rule Now, Not Then
At the dimension of justification, we focus upon the present, not the past. We
seek the best justification that may be found for the rule today,0 9 not the justifica-
tion that historically preceded its creation, although the latter may certainly in-
form the former. Justifying the rule today en route to giving it its best
interpretation seems intuitively plausible to my mind, but the dogged persistence
of (original) intent-based approaches to interpretation requires that we say more.
Our approach is best seen when we place ourselves in the position of ajudge of
the highest court of a jurisdiction called upon to overturn a settled case/common/
judge-made legal rule. If we look to the reasons that gave rise to the rule-and, by
all means, we should-we may find them wanting. We may find "the grounds
upon which it was laid down have long vanished since."''0 Of course, we may turn
the suitor away on stare decisis, but, if vested rights and reasonable and potentially
detrimental reliance are not likely to be disappointed, this may not suffice.
"[Bilind imitation of the past"" is hardly an attractive ground for decision.
It may be that in such a case new justification for the rule may be found. Why
should we discard a rule because it arose in times and for reasons far removed
from today's needs and thinking, if there be good reason now why we should want
to keep it? And, if the reason be good today, what possible difference could it make
that the reason was not thought of by those who made the rule?".2 A century ago
Holmes presented a powerful statement of this thesis in explaining why the mari-
time law maintained in rem process for vessels although the personification thesis
that was the genesis of the rule had come to be recognized for what it was - a meta-
physical fiction." 3 Today we have ways of thinking of the efficiency of rules not
107. The perpetual condition of relative scarcity of the (tangible and intangible) goods and services we desire is
one of the fundamental circumstances of justice. See, e.g., JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 128 (1971);
HART, supra note 56, at 192- 93.
108. HART & SACKS, LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 7, at 112-13.
109. See Cuevas v. Royal D'Iberville Hotel, 498 So. 2d 346, 357 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J., dissenting).
110. Holmes, Path of Law, supra note 1, at 469.
111. Holmes, Path of Law, supra note 1, at 469 (emphasis added).
112. We find this idea figures prominently in Equal Protection analysis. When a classification is being scruti-
nized under the familiar rational basis test, the court asks not what the lawmakers had in mind when the discrimi-
natory classification was enacted, but whether "any state of [legislative] facts reasonably can be conceived that
would sustain it." Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959). See also Federal Communications
Comm'n v. Beech Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096 (1993); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-64
(1957); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61,78 (1911).
113. HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 59, at 26-38. Of course, here, as so often, Holmes was at least a hun-
dred years ahead of his time.
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known when those rules were made, and it hardly makes sense we should not use
these new assessment tools when asked to change or modify a rule. If the new jus-
tification would suffice to make the rule if we did not have it, a fortiori it is
grounds for keeping it. More difficult is the case where the new justification is not
adequate in and of itself but couples with predictability and stability as reasons for
retaining a rule. If this be so, if the new justification be the best justification we
may find for the rule today -a better justification than that which originated the
rule- we should allow that new justification to inform our retention and reading of
the rule, although predictability and stability form a further part of our reason for
acting. We exhilarate in our opportunity to administer our law well and intelli-
gently as we have been freed from intent-based approaches.
4. The Stratagem Exemplified
A recent example may help make the point. This state has long adhered to the
doctrine of employment-at-will and its rule which provides
that a contract of employment for an indefinite term may be terminated at the will of
either party. The employee can quit at will; the employer can terminate at will. This
means either the employer or the employee may have a good reason, a wrong rea-
son, or no reason for terminating the employment contract." 4
This rule arose in an era when employer and employee were thought of as equals.
Personal autonomy was our primary value. Opportunity was seen limited only by
the drive and ingenuity of the individual. Formalistic symmetry was a cardinal
virtue in law, which came to be seen a perfectible science.
We see the world differently today. For six or seven years, there were rumblings
of discontent with the rule."' Most prominently, these cases recognized that
[s]uch contracts in form are reciprocal in that either party may terminate at will.
Still, we may not remain insensitive to the fact that the impact of termination upon
the employee is in general more adverse in a way that is qualitatively different than
what the employer experiences when it is the employee who walks off the job. We
approach this case cognizant of the force of Anatole France's pointed observation
that "the law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep un-
der bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." 1'
Three cases117 of late appear to have moderately modified but resettled the rule at
its core. The rule has been narrowed and is now clearly a default rule-the parties
114. Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874, 874-75 (Miss. 1981).
115. 1 have been among the rumblers. See the line of cases from Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So. 2d 247 (Miss.
1985) to Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So. 2d 1086, 1091 (Miss. 1987) (Robertson, J., concurring)
through and including Bobbitt v. Orchard, Ltd., 603 So. 2d 356 (Miss. 1992).
116. Shaw, 481 So. 2d at 254. See also Babbitt, 603 So. 2d at 361.
117. Hartle v. Packard Elec., 626 So. 2d 106, 108 (Miss. 1993); McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626
So. 2d 603, 606-07 (Miss. 1993); Rosen v. Gulf Shores, Inc., 610 So. 2d 366, 368-70 (Miss. 1992).
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may modify it by contract. And we have a number of public policy exceptions," '
whatever the parties agree. But otherwise the rule is unchanged. Though the ideas
that led to the rule in the first place now seem silly, reflection on actual practice
presents a different picture.119
To illustrate our method, we describe it at some length. Seldom in practice does
the rule insulate arbitrary or malicious or irrational firings, for no sensible em-
ployer goes around firing people at random. To be sure, experience has taught that
some employers are not so sensible and act for reasons we cannot sanction. We
have addressed these and proscribed firings where widely-shared public policy
persists. '20 These areas aside, the law allows economic self-interest to regulate and
incite the behavior of both employers and employees. It presumes that, however
imperfectly such self-interest may function as a regulator, it will work better than
judicial intervention. Economic self-interest provides a powerful incentive to em-
ployers that they shape and enforce personnel policies that develop and maintain a
stable, competent, and loyal work force of high morale. Self-interest enjoins em-
ployers from discharging competent employees, unless for some very good reason
they feel they must. The rule accepts what surely common sense says we must ac-
cept, that employers are granted a broad discretion to make personnel decisions
and to consider all legally permissible factors. And so no employer has a right of
action when it invests years of time and trouble in training an at-will employee,
only to have him/her quit for a better paying job elsewhere.
One important function the rule of employment-at-will performs in the real
world is it tells employers that their personnel decisions will not be subject to nit-
picking, second guessing, and Monday morning quarterbacking in courts of law. It
proceeds on the assumption that judicial (and, particularly, jury) review of dis-
charge decisions will almost certainly yield a harvest of injustice that will exceed
that which we may experience from the regulatory regime of economic self-inter-
est. The rule accepts the realities and inadequacies of the microscoping twenty-
twenty hindsight the trial process brings to bear, the utter impossibility of
I 18. Beyond the whistleblower-type exception added in the McArn case, a plethora of statutory exceptions have
excluded from the rule a number of practices we have found intolerable. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to - 17 (1988) (an employer may not terminate an employee because of his race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-11-111(9), - 117(2) (1994) (employees may not
be fired for being subject to a child support garnishment). Many federal statutes prohibit employers from dis-
charging employees who have exercised their rights to complain under a statute or have acted as a witness for
another employee who has complained. See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3),
(4) (1975); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(3), 216(b) (1975 & Supp. 1982); Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631, 633(a) (1975 & Supp. 1982); Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1975); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 793,794 (1975); Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140, 1141 (1975); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, -3(a) (1981).
119. The most prominent professional exposition of the good sense of the law of employment-at-will is Richard
A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984). See also Mayer G. Freed & Daniel
D. Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38 EmoRY L.J. 1097 (1989) (defending at-
will rule on efficiency grounds); Jeffrey L. Harrison, The "New" Terminable-at-Will Employment Contract: An
Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IowA L. REv. 327 (1984) (same).
120. See supra note 118. Of course, nothing said here suggests we have permanently perfected the rules in the
field.
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recreating for the trier of fact the details and nuances and contours of making per-
sonnel decisions, and, as well, the near certainty that any such fact-finder will
never quite fathom the full dimensions of that decision-making process.
Today the rule finds powerful justification in the expense of litigation. The ag-
gregate economic costs of litigating a wrongful discharge case- to the employee,
the employer, and the public providing the judicial resources- invariably ap-
proaches the realistic ad damnum dollars plaintiff and defendant fight over. The
game is seldom worth the candle. It is accepted wisdom that efficiency is an im-
portant dimension of justice and that the efficient rule is one that minimizes the
impact of transaction costs -in this case, the rule of at-will employment, a rule
that, as modified and restricted, appears today more sensible than when it first be-
came settled.121 It is true our law has decided to pursue paramount policies of re-
ducing discrete discrimination in the workplace. The existence of our many
statutory and case law public policy exceptions does not deny the transaction cost
problem, only that certain socioeconomic goals make it worth our while to endure
those costs.
Mississippi's present rule of employment-at-will is thus justified. I suggest the
best justification for the rule, at its core, runs along the lines just pursued, al-
though further thought might improve the presentation. What must be seen is, it is
no answer that what I have said above is value and opinion laden. 122 It is no answer
that others may offer other values and opinions and may passionately argue they
suggest a different rule.123 A CLV-sanctioned rule has been settled. As we seek to
interpret and apply that rule, we are met with the fact that its original justifications
are no longer very good ones. Moreover, we have tailored and refined the rule as
we have grown more sensitive to some of its nuances and inadequacies. But the
tailored and refined rule persists. So we seek the best justification(s) we may find
for today's rule today, and, when we do this, we see there are some pretty good
reasons why we would want the rule in our modern law, reasons much more per-
suasive than the rule's original reasons. Implicit in our method is that, given time
and exposure, these new justifications may be found wanting. Should this be so,
CLV-sanctioned means exist for further modifying the rule or even repealing it
altogether. If that day should come, once the new rule is in place, we should inter-
pret it according to the dimensions of fit and justification and, at the dimension of
justification, we should seek notjust what the new lawmakers had in mind, but the
best justification a Herculean124 lawmaker may imagine for that new rule on the
day of interpretation.
121. See Andrews v. Lake Serene Property Owners Ass'n, 434 So. 2d 1328 (Miss. 1983).
122. Compare Judge Gee's admonition in Kansas City S. Ry. v. McNamara, 817 F 2d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1987).
As (and to the extent) we have been faithful to the complex texts of the rules laid down, our justification is quite
congenial with Judge Gee's expression.
123. I have done so. See cases cited supra note 104.
124. I refer, of course, to Professor Dworkin's mythical Judge Hercules. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUSLY, supr note 101, at 105-30; DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 56, at 239-66.
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5. The Law and Its Reference to the Realities of the Phenomena It Regulates
It is demonstrable that we enhance the chance the law will well play its instru-
mental role when and to the extent we relate it to, and premise it upon, the empiri-
cal and social realities of the phenomena we seek to regulate. Those phenomena
are natural; they are behavioral; and they are economic. In today's context, "[l]e-
gal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market re-
alities are generally disfavored,"12 as well they ought to be. It is only common
sense that the court should give the back of its hand to a claim "that simply makes
no economic sense," '126 nor is there any legal sense in limiting this injunction to
antitrust cases. We should apply it throughout the business tort realm, as will pres-
ently appear.
These things said, there is no getting around the fact that very thoughtful and
well-intentioned people often study and reflect on these phenomena and see very
different landscapes. Some. persist in seeing the earth as flat, others are equally
convinced it is cubical. Nowhere is the contest so contentious as in our present
field where pragmatic instrumentalists debate interminably the effect of state in-
tervention in the market place.' 27 Our approach to legal interpretation proceeds on
the assumption these debates, at least in theory, have intelligible answers, if not
necessarily "right" answers, and that we can and will listen to the debate and at the
very least narrow the ground between the combatants. Fortunately, the success of
our present enterprise turns on how well we see the rules in the field and how
much sense we can make of the way we use those rules, all to the aid of the lawyer
facing the client's question, "What must I do?"
6. The Best Justification for the Law of Business Torts: Herein of the Competition
Imperative in Its Horizontal Dimension
What is (are) the best justification(s) for the law of business torts as we know it
today? One general theme we may divine, a theme that seems to cover much of the
field, is this: Conduct tends to be held actionable if, and only if, due investigation
may yield the finding of legislative fact 28 that, should such behavior be pursued by
an economically significant number of market actors, it would be substantially in-
imical to the efficient functioning of a free market economy, the competitive
125. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (1992).
126. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,587 (1986). This, of course, assumes
that courts and the judges who serve them accept their duty to inform themselves so that they have a pretty good
idea what does and what does not make economic sense. See also Nichols v. Tri-State Brick & Tile Co., 608 So.
2d 324, 330-31 (Miss. 1992).
127. Again, see Professor Page's work in Page, Ideological Conflict, supra note 12, at I.
128. 1 use the term "legislative fact(s)" as it is used in the Official Comment to FED. R. EVID. 201. That use is
traceable to Professor Kenneth Culp Davis' seminal distinction in his article, AnApproach to Problems of Evidence
in the Administrative Process, 55 HARv. L. REV. 364 (1942). The reader should consult the closely related concept
of "premise facts" in Judge Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Premise
Facts, 73 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1988), and Professors John Monahan & Laurens Walker's "social authority" in their
article, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477
(1986).
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forces inherent therein, and the social advantages thought to flow therefrom.129 It
is the theology of the moment that success in the marketplace should turn on the
relative merits of the goods or services a party offers to the public, and his effi-
ciencies en route, and our law tends to reflect and be ever sensitive to these value
judgments.
Today, however, we stop short of the oft-repeated declaration of times gone by
that "[t]he public policy of the state of Mississippi, as evidenced by its legislation
and the decisions of its courts, is undoubtedly one which. . . encourages free and
untrammeled competition,"3 for implicit in our law today is the firm belief there
is a darker side, that transactions cost, that information costs as well, and is invari-
ably imperfect, and, more globally, that markets do fail. Transactions we need do
not take place. Monopoly has an ultimate winner, and, however harmless that may
be in the parlor game, it yields not inconsiderable human misery in the real world.
It is the sad lesson of history that untrammeled competition inevitably yields mar-
ket failures that ultimately destroy competition. My good friend Lawrence J.
Franck is on target when he reminds us of the view explaining and justifying much
of our law in the field: "[Allthough competition is seen as a positive social value, it
must be kept within bounds, else it will self-destruct ... "131 Yet Franck misses
the mark when he suggests we confront here a conflict of values, "one that
preaches the merits of competition, while erecting intricate barriers to its unfet-
tered exercise." 32 This is not a conflict at all, but a single policy choice imbedded
in our law of business torts, balancing pro-competitive benefits and anti-competi-
tive costs. All that encourages fair competition "on the merits" is seen in the public
interest. All that inhibits such competition is thought harmful, and this includes
uninhibited market behavior.
To be sure, we have before us a value judgment, one which has its detractors,
but it is not ours. The fair competition value judgment undergirds the law of busi-
ness torts and is thus a vital resource in our interpretive arsenal, not because any
lawmaker intended it or because it is demonstrably valid, but because it is demon-
strably implicit in what all lawmakers in the field have collectively done. It is an
inexorable presence in the law of business torts because it is there, because reason-
ing backward, we may start with the rules in the field and find that, on the whole,
it fits and justifies them. The correctness of this choice would be difficult to prove
empirically or otherwise, although experience suggests there is a case to be made,
but correctness is a matter we approach only if we are thinking of making a future
change. For the moment, for better or for worse, our law has opted for the view
that competition is good, but unfair competition is bad.
129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (Tentative Draft 1994); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 768 (1979).
130. Mississippi Power Co. v. City of Starkville, 4 F. Supp. 833, 836 (N.D. Miss. 1932).
131. Franck, supra note 18, at 149.
132. Franck, supra note 18, at 132.
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Hear the oft-quoted passage from Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United
States: 
133
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic lib-
erty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests
on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and
the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment con-
ductive [sic] to the preservation of our democratic and social institutions. But even
were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is
competition. 
134
We proceed on the premise - on the faith - that fair "[c] ompetition among those
who market goods or services creates an incentive to offer quality products at rea-
sonable prices and fosters the general welfare by efficiently allocating our eco-
nomic resources ."135 And if this be the law's premise, it is at once imperative that
our interpretation and enforcement of the law of business torts enhance and not
retard fair competition. In consequence we declare our freedom to compete, but
not unfairly. So seen, "[a] primary function of the law of [business torts] is the
identification and redress of business practices that hinder rather than promote the
efficient operation of the market." 35
The law of business torts or, more specifically, unfair competition, is not a re-
lief program for failed business enterprises. It is a rational outgrowth of our law's
view that this is the way to assure that the public enjoys an efficient allocation of
economic resources and the availability of the products we want at prices reasona-
bly related to value. And so, when we encounter talk of the desirability of allowing
market participants to compete to the maximum extent possible by reference to the
relative merits or demerits of their goods or services, we must understand this is
but the law's means to the end of the general welfare.
7. The Competition Imperative in Its Vertical Dimension
There is a second policy imbedded in the field. Competent adults have been tra-
ditionally held free to bargain, agree, and contract among themselves. Sellers and
buyers thus contend with one another, the seller seeking to peddle his goods or ser-
vices for as much of the buyer's pocketbook with which the former can persuade
the latter to part, and the buyer seeking to get the best value for his money. This
pro-competitive policy appears prominently in the law regulating market partici-
pants in their vertical interactions, albeit over time our law has evolved to take ac-
count of inequalities in market power and access to information. Sales to
non-consumers are subject to a regime of commercial reasonableness 137 and an
133. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
134. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § I cmt. a (Tentative Draft 1994).
136. Id. at cmt. g.
137. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-201 (1981).
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implied warranty of merchantability138 and a general duty of good faith and fair
dealing.139 The law is more demanding when the market participant sells to a con-
sumer. He is held to truth-in-labeling and truth-in-advertising. The consumer may
of right expect reasonable access to instructions regarding use and warnings of
dangers. He may expect the goods reasonably fit for particular purposes and free
of manufacturing defects, failing which the seller must pay damages. And sales are
subject to the general contract defenses: incapacity, fraud, duress, unconscionabil-
ity, or other grounds we have by law declared contrary to public policy.
But at the fundamental points of price and product quality and whether to buy
and sell at all, the law stays its hand in favor of competitive forces. Free, but fair,
bargain and exchange and the choice between Cadillacs and Chevys remain the
core policy with the law of business torts as it addresses vertical relationships in
the marketplace.
D. Beyond Fit and Justification
1. Inevitable Imperfections in the Interpretive Enterprise
Our field posited, plowed, and pruned, we move beyond principle and policy.
There is more we need to know of the nature and limits of law if we are to under-
stand how it functions in the real world of business torts.
Interpretation must also regard the life of the law. We may no more freeze
meaning and purpose of a legal text at the moment of enactment or promulgation
than we may freeze a living being at the moment of birth. We may extend the met-
aphor: A man bears his parents' genes and may never escape their imprint. A law
bears a like link to its makers. A man bears as well the moral and behavioral teach-
ings of his parents and the milieu in which he matures. And so of laws, and in their
maturity they flourish insofar as they adapt to the imperatives of life in inevitably
ambiguous and ever-changing times. I am a part of all that I have met and so is our
law, and so we must interpret its life as well as its language. 140
We have noted above and we will discuss below a number of rules, but the read-
ing that the rules require is not one we may literally or fully give them. In writing
rules, we may never wholly escape our relative ignorance of fact nor correct the
relative indeterminacy of our aim.141 Open-texturedness is and will remain the or-
der of the day,142 as our quiver is found filled with arrows bent by attitude and in-
determinacy. This is so in both making and interpreting law, and it serves well to
explain our preference for a circumstanced external approach to reading rules of
law. Over- and under-inclusiveness attend all efforts to produce within law hard-
edged, case-decider rules and inevitably infect the system with more than a mea-
sure of official arbitrariness. "Rules make dichotomous cuts in continuous
138. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-314 (1981).
139. Cenac v. Murry, 609 So. 2d 1257, 1272 (Miss. 1992).
140. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 56, at 348.
141. See HART, supra note 56, at 125.
142. Even more so than Hart imagined. HART, supra note 56, at 121-32.
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phenomena." '143 Yet when we see this and move to avoid it by moving to a more
generalized form of legal directives, the inexorable results are inconsistencies,
lack of predictability, and ad hoc judgments"'- results no less arbitrary and unde-
sirable that we label them unofficial arbitrariness. These thoughts reinforce our
view that it is well we seek what the law means, not what the lawmaker meant.
Our legal process at its very best seldom yields but a crude approximation of jus-
tice. And it seldom functions at its very best.
Still, levees are built and revetment laid with effect. There is within our faith
and perception the possibility of a process of reasoned elaboration 4' that generally
should be employed in divining and articulating the controlling rules or principles
which when applied aid an adjudication. All of this is a part of the process lawyers
will employ to reconstruct a judicial opinion, its holding and rationale, whether or
not the court consciously or competently employed it. A case enacts the most nar-
row policy-grounded rule that could have produced the decision, so long as that
rule is susceptible of principled expression and application in the field. All else
said en route has only the power of reason behind it.
We fear judicial discretion at the macrolegal level and so often demand more of
the legal process than it may yield. The principles of reason and precedent are not
to be confused with such scientific principles as Einstein's gravity or even
Boltzmann's thermodynamics, although attractive physical analogues may be
found in quantum mechanics 1" and chaos.147 We cling to widely-shared beliefs
that the legal system will better serve society if it is founded upon justice qua rea-
son and stare decisis. That it will be ever thus is not a function of scientific postu-
late but of thought of the alternative. A social order in which no respect is given
precedent and in which irrationality in the decision-making process is acceptable
will soon be one without a legal system, as the late Lon Fuller so well explained. 1"
2. A Trichotomy that Aids Understanding
Incorporating the realm of private law adds a touch of complexity best under-
stood when we see the behavioral and economic phenomena of the field in three
general categories: (1) those left entirely to private ordering, i.e., contract;
143. POSNER, supra note 86, at 46.
144. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1687-1701 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rav. 379 (1985).
145. The idea ofa process of reasoned evaluation, of course, is the centerpiece of HART & SACKS, LEGAL PROC-
Ess, supra note 7, at 160-79, 486. Notwithstanding the critiques to which it may be vulnerable as an explanation
of what courts do or ought to do, see Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraints in Adjudication: A Critical Phe-
nomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986), the process retains its importance as a description of what the great
majority of the bench and bar think courts and lawyers ought attempt. It remains a benchmark by reference to
which many critique the judicial effort. For today it is enough that some such process exists as a means by which
many thoughtful lawyers identify inarticulate and incompetent legal craftsmanship.
146. FRED ALAN WOLF, TAKING THE QUANTUM LEAP (1981). Quantum theory instructs us of the impossibility
of determining at once the exact location of a particle and exactly where it is going. Substitute "law" for "particle"
and the idea becomes quite telling. Whitten & Robertson, Mississippi's Opportunity, supra note 55, at 274.
147. JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987); James P. Crutchfield et al., Chaos, Sci. AM.,
Dec. 1986, at 46-57.
148. FULLER, supra note 2, at 34, 46-49.
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(2) those where the state enters the field, but in the form of background and default
rules which parties are free to trade by reference to and to avoid altogether by con-
tract; and (3) those where private agreement is preempted and the positive public
law of the state says what market participants must and must not do, and with what
consequence.
This trichotomy is a familiar part of the legal landscape, though we often are
embarrassingly inarticulate in explaining it. Our law holds an implicit preference
for private ordering. Individual autonomy and human dignity demand no less.
Each of us is ordinarily a better judge of his/her needs than the wisest of sover-
eigns. Experience has taught markets are often better regulators than laws and that
society succeeds when we see ourselves as rational wealth maximizers even when
some of us are not. Where transaction is practicable to advance individual and ec-
onomic interests, and vigilance a feasible means of protecting those interests, the
state stays its hand save only to make us keep the promises we make. And the same
where transaction costs are prohibitive.
There is a second broad sphere of endeavor where we again respect individual
autonomy but where, because others are affected, it is important that everyone
knows where he stands if the individual exercises his right not to function. And so
we think of our laws of inheritance. Each person is afforded a dozen ways he/she
may direct disposition of his/her property before and at death, but not everyone
takes the time to make a will. We have statutes of descent and distribution as rules
that control the estates of such persons in default. In the vertical dimension of the
marketplace, rights of waiver and informed consent play an important role. Most
prominently, market actors are free to bargain and sell rights in trade secrets and in
one's identity and to negotiate terms, conditions, and price.
Fundamentally, historically, we have a law of torts because transaction is not
always possible. The drivers of cars that collide have no chance to bargain regard-
ing their rights and duties and the same of companies that compete. There are
times when people are helpless to help themselves. The state steps in and imposes
duties and provides remedies and will not take no for an answer. There are times
when the sovereign's least ineffective way to respect individual autonomy and hu-
man dignity is to bring to bear its lawmaking machinery in all of its cumbersome
crudity and costly compliance mechanisms.
3. The Integration of Laws of All Genera and Species
One important step in our interpretive stratagem is understanding that we give
much too much weight to differences in the genera and species of law. We should
read rules by reference to their form, their level of generality or specificity of ex-
pression, and the observable external circumstances of their conception, birth,
and life. Much of the law of business torts is statutory. If the same rules were em-
bedded in common law precedents, we would know how to use them. We would
not hesitate to extend them and enforce them in cases functionally analogous to
those which have given rise to and fall within the coverage of those rules. Such
is the nature of the common law process. That the rules are of statutory species
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compels no change in process. Instead of precedent and case law analogies, the
statutes are available. The difference - the only difference - lies in the species and
not the substance of the materials employed as the basis of deliberation and adjudi-
cation. This is a difference to which we should pay no heed.
"Statutory rules, like . . . common law rules, [are] only points of departure,
only analogies, although exceptionally informative and persuasive and illuminat-
ing analogies." '149 The second Justice Harlan stated it well and famously a genera-
tion ago: "It has always been the duty of the common-law court to perceive the
impact of major legislative innovations and to interweave the new legislative poli-
cies with the inherited body of common-law principles -many of them deriving
from earlier legislative exertions."'' 50 The fact that statutory rules emanate from
the political organ with primary power and responsibility for setting the public
policy of the state can only mean the courts should, if anything, take them more
seriously than judge-made common law precedents. It takes but one enactment to
give a statute all the legal validity it needs. A series of decisions over a period of
time is generally necessary to settle a point of judge-made case law. Differences in
genera and species matter only when we seek the locus of the authority to make
changes or when we have need of vertical orderings to decide which of two con-
flicting rules trumps the other. Of course, the statutory rule trumps, making it all
the more imperative that we search out the policy judgments imbedded in each
statute so that we may enforce them in analogous circumstances and see that they
shape the developing common law.
The counter-argument often heard is that the legislature, had it wished, could
have passed a broader act. Of course, this is so, and it is always so, but the argu-
ment does not carry us far, for it proceeds from the familiar fallacy of the omni-
scient, indefatigable legislature.15' Legislatures address problems presented to
them, much as courts do. The squeaking wheel gets the grease. What we must see
is that after the legislatures have acted, it makes no sense that the courts, faced
with legally analogous cases, should feel they have to wait until another legislature
comes along to fill a perceived legal gap. Again, Justice Harlan states that "[iun
many cases the scope of a statute may reflect nothing more than the dimensions of
the particular problem that came to the attention of the legislature, inviting the
149. J.L. Teel, Inc. v. Houston United Sales, 491 So. 2d 851, 857 (Miss. 1986); Grisham v. Hinton, 490 So.
2d 1201, 1209 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J., concurring). See also McCluskey v. Thompson, 363 So. 2d 256,
262-64 (Miss. 1978).
150. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 392 (1970). This was hardly anything new. See James
McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, HARV. LEGAL EssAYs 212, 221-27 (1934); Roscoe Pound,
Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REv. 383,388 (1908) ("In other words, statutes are taken to be parts
of the law for all purposes. The courts reason from them by analogy the same as from any other legal rules.");
Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REv. 4, 12-16 (1936); see also HORACE E.
READ ET AL., MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 43-48, 891-93 (4th ed. 1982). See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). See also Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 23, 27
(1990).
151. The fallacy perennially persuades an odd lot of strange bedpersons: the ostrich who would deny to courts
their subordinate role as interstitial lawmakers and the arrogant who would limit legislative law to literal lan-
guage, e.g., those dinosaurs who still believe statutes in derogation of common law should be strictly construed,
a myth most effectively dispatched in McCluskey, 363 So. 2d at 261-63.
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conclusion that the legislative policy is equally applicable to other situations in
which the mischief is identical."" 2 Principled decisions of the highest court of the
jurisdiction set a tone lower courts dutifully implement in legally analogous cases.
Legislative decisions should have a like force that is even more powerful.
Legislatures have the power to limit the coverage of their enactments, and to do
so quite arbitrarily - as in the case of statutes of limitations, the age of majority, a
threshold number of employees before an employer is subject to a certain enact-
ment, and in setting speed limits. 5 At times it is not so important where the line is
drawn as that there be one - it hardly matters whether we drive our automobiles on
the right or the left side of the road, as long as everyone follows the same rule. But
where the legislature has provided no arbitrary line of demarcation, it makes no
sense that the court should provide one, absent some strong policy reason apparent
from the field that there needs to be such a line. There is no greater virtue in arbi-
trary and capricious adjudications where they are induced by artificially limiting a
statutory rule than where the rule is of common law origins.
A further dimension of this limited role of the various legal genera and species
is our seeing all law as a part of, and as making up, a principled and integrated
whole. This integration has both horizontal and vertical dimensions. Horizontally
we seek, for example, the commonality that can join the law of deceptive market-
ing with the law of trade secrets with the law of interference with economic advan-
tages. Vertically we seek to fuse federal and state law, statutory and case law,
public and private law, respecting all the while established hierarchal orderings,
from the Supremacy Clause on down, and, as well, those areas designated for pri-
vate ordering.
To be a bit more concrete, it is less than helpful to address a trademark problem
and say the Lanham Act provides thus and such, stopping there. It is as well inade-
quate to address a deceptive marketing problem and say the Mississippi Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act [hereinafter MUTPCPA] says so-
and-so and add no more. In each of these, respecting, of course, the supremacy of
federal law to conflicting state law, the supremacy of statute to case law, and the
like, we need to pursue an approach wherein each market participant, his lawyer,
his advocate, and ultimately his judge may say the law of trademarks is thus-and-
such, or the law of right of publicity is so-and-so.
As important as it is to understand these conceptual distinctions, we must not in
practice accord them undue importance. Conceptually, federal law is supreme
over state law, yet in practice each often influences the other. Judge Charles E.
Clark gave practical expression when he stated:
152. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 392.
153. Judges make an arbitrary law as well. Could there be a more arbitrary rule than the traditional Rule
Against Perpetuities? See In re Estate of Anderson, 541 So. 2d 423 (Miss. 1989). And no legislative enactment
provides that child support terminates at age 21, even though the child is an unemployed college student a semes-
ter away from graduation. See Nichols v. Tedder, 547 So. 2d 766, 769-70 (Miss. 1989).
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[Tihe issue is really whether we shall apply our regurgitation of the state redistilla-
tion of federal precedents or go more directly and realistically to the sources them-
selves. Actually, as far as I can discover, we have never found any difference in
ultimate result, and so quite often lump federal and [state] law together .... 15
IV. THE DECLINE OF MALICE AND INTENT: HEREIN OF THE CIRCUMSTANCED
EXTERNAL MEANS-CENTERED APPROACH TO THE LAW OF BUSINESS TORTS
A. The Fundamental Focus on Means and Effects
You may safely bet the family farm the Supreme Court of Mississippi will not
any time soon say, "But, I did not mean to hurt anybody" is a defense to a tort
action. Equally certain, the court will hold liable the tort defendant who reasona-
bly should have foreseen his actionable conduct would cause harm, though he
plead, "I did not know I was going to hurt anyone." This leads to an interpretive
problem that pervades the field. In its traditional form, it challenges the law that
we do something sensible with the word "malice" and its derivatives that so con-
found and defy all attempts at expulsion. More important is whether at its core the
law of business torts addresses at all an actor's intentions, his motives, and his pur-
poses, or whether it focuses upon his conduct, his means, and the effects he
causes.
I will answer at once. The primary substantive rules of positive law of business
torts in Mississippi consist exclusively of objective, external standards, except
when considering the assessment of civil penalties or punitive damages."'5 It is
easy to show no statutory business torts make reference to subjective, internal
standards - malice, purpose, intent, and the like. The case law is more difficult,
for there is no getting around the fact that loose talk there abounds. But if you de-
fine case law as the positive law defines it - a case enacts the most narrow reading
of the rule which, applied to the facts, would produce the judgment of the court-
you will see all the rhetoric of malice and intent and the like fall as the leaves of a
ginkgo tree. It matters not that the court may say it is holding the defendant liable
because of his intent, his purpose, or his malice, because he is a bad man. My
view is threatened only if in such a case the defendant would be exonerated for lack
of actual intent, where it is shown he employed demonstrably unfair or improper
means, means which harmed the plaintiff (whatever else they may have done),
and, that, when he did what he did, the defendant reasonably should have foreseen
those effects. No such case can be found.
B. The Rise and Fall of Malice in the Law of Business Torts
The word "malice" has a place and history in the law worthy of independent
study. We think of murder as killing another with malice aforethought. There is an
154. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 545 (2d Cir. 1956) (concurring opin-
ion).
155. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §§ It-1-65(l)(a), 75-24-19(2) (1994).
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action for malicious prosecution. The First Amendment forms a psychogenic
overlay on the law of libel and emits its own unique brand of "actual malice."1"6
Talk of malice abounds in the law of business torts. Perhaps this is understandable
in the case of citizens and litigants, as survival in one's chosen life's work-not to
mention the family's life savings-is often at stake. Exuberance in pleadings
reaches the heights in business tort actions, as, for whatever reason, lawyers love
to charge the opposing party acted maliciously.
Courts as well get caught up in the rhetoric and seem unable to see the mischief
in the making in all this malice talk."5 7 We would expect to find "malice" liberally
sprinkled among the opinions of days gone by. In Lumley v. Gye, ' 8 for example,
Justice Crompton announced he would hold a defendant liable who "maliciously
procures a party" to breach her contract.159 Older Mississippi cases condemned
market participants who acted "maliciously and wantonly." 6 Yet as recently as
1992 we have seen the Supreme Court of Mississippi reiterating, as if by rote,
"malicious interference" with business relations of another is an actionable tort. 61
That is certainly so, but surely it has long been clear that less-than-malicious inter-
ference may be actionable as well, and more broadly. Should we not have seen by
now the greater includes and subsumes the lesser? What is curious is that malice is
hardly mentioned in the legislation, which sensibly and in sharp contrast focuses
on means and effects, a point to which we will return.
However much it may remain a favorite of lawyers in their pleadings and courts
in their judgments, no sensible person today treats malice in the sense of spite or ill
will or mean or evil thoughts as something the business tort plaintiff must prove to
make his case. More than a century ago, Holmes showed intent subjects a defend-
ant to "the same consequences [i.e., liability] as intent with malevolence super-
added."' 62 The Restatement advises us that "[tihe context and course of the
decisions make it clear that what is meant is not malice in the sense of ill will but
merely 'intentional interference without justification.' "163 The Supreme Court of
the United States has recently ruled that "[e]ven an act of pure malice by one busi-
ness competitor against another does not, without more, state a claim under the
156. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
157. I have long thought the matter of Freudian dimensions, but discretion counsels I should not pursue the
point (at least, not here).
158. All E.R. Rep. 208 (Q.B. 1853).
159. Id. at 213.
160. Memphis Steam Laundry-Cleaners, Inc. v. Lindsey, 5 So. 2d 227, 232 (Miss. 1941); Wesley v. Native
Lumber Co., 53 So. 346, 346-47 (Miss. 1910); Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 52
So. 454, 455 (Miss. 1910).
161. Nichols v. Tri-State Brick & Tile Co., 608 So. 2d 324, 328 (Miss. 1992). See also Protective Serv. Ins.
Co. v. Carter, 445 So. 2d 215, 216 (Miss. 1983) ("a wrongful or a malicious interference"); Irby v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 121 So. 2d 118, 119 (Miss. 1960) ("malicious interference"); Bailey v. Richards, Ill So. 2d 402, 407
(Miss. 1959) ("wrongful or malicious interference").
162. HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 59, at 130.
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 766 cmt. s (1979); !d. ch. 37 introductory note at 5.
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federal antitrust laws. 1 64 Nor does it state a claim under any other variant of the
law of business torts.
Professor Walker tackles the problem in Mississippi and acknowledges that
"malice has long been associated with intentional interference with economic ex-
pectancies. ''161 As he sees it, some still hold malice to mean and contemplate the
defendant market participant's "acting out of spite or ill-will."166 Walker goes on to
recognize that there are, notwithstanding, occasions when the defendant may be
held liable "when ill-will malice is clearly absent from the facts."167 Indeed, the
well-known Memphis Steam Laundry-Cleaners, Inc. v. Lindsey1 68 case that talks so
much of malice defines it in the end as "the intentional doing of a wrongful act
without just cause or excuse." 69 Irby v. Citizens National Bank.7 seemingly says
the same thing when it sees the malicious act as one" 'done with the unlawful pur-
pose of causing damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of
the defendant.' "17 At best, charging malice gilds the lily; at worst, it adds need-
less confusion which may lead to mistaken and costly adjudication. But rather than
abandon the word, we have redefined it. For those whose predisposition preter-
mits good sense, we hold to "malice" but define it to mean what would cause Mis-
ter Webster and the literate non-lawyer to shake their heads in disbelief. 72
Professor Walker would go further and tuck the spite or ill-will variant of mal-
ice within the notion of non-legitimate ends and means. He would strip all thought
of an adjectival description of the defendant's bent of mind from the concept of tor-
tious malice. No longer would malice address the attitude with which the defend-
ant acts. Walker offers what I take to be a mixed standard, part internal and part
external. He would have malice (accepting that we cannot get rid of it) mean "[1]
seeking non-legitimate ends in general, and [2] using inappropriate means to
achieve the ends sought." 73 The former imports a subjective, internal standard,
164. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2589 (1993). For a further
discussion of this case, see G. Everett Sinor, Note, The Belated Demise of Utah Pie, 15 Miss. C. L. REv. 249
(1994). See also Myers, supra note 13, at 1132 & n. 128.
165. Walker, Common Law Protection, supra note 21, at 341.
166. Walker, Common Law Protection, supra note 21, at 342.
167. Walker, Common Law Protection, supra note 21, at 342.
168. 5 So. 2d 227 (Miss. 1941).
169. Id. at 231.
170. 121 So. 2d 118 (Miss. 1960).
171. Id. at 119 (quoting 30 AM. JUR. Interference § 55 (1958)). The Irby-quoted definition has been followed-
the blind leading the blind-in Merchants & Planters Bank v. Williamson, No. 91-CA-00615, 1995 WL 11209
(Miss. Jan. 12, 1995); Cenac v. Murry, 609 So. 2d 1257, 1268-69 (Miss. 1992); Nichols v. Tri-State Brick &
Tile Co., 608 So. 2d 324, 328 (Miss. 1992); Galloway v. Travelers Insurance Co., 515 So. 2d 678, 682-83
(Miss. 1987); and Protective Service Life Insurance Co. v. Carter, 445 So. 2d 215, 217 (Miss. 1983).
172. See Holmes, Path ofLaw, supra note 1, at 52-53, 130. That the law may define a term any way it wishes,
see, e.g., Gunn v. Principal Casualty Ins. Co., 605 So. 2d 741, 743 (Miss. 1992); McLaurin v. Mississippi Em-
ployment Sec. Comm'n, 435 So. 2d 1170, 1171-72 (Miss. 1983), hardly suggests there is virtue in straying too
far too often from accepted dictionary definitions.
173. Walker, Common Law Protection, supra note 21, at 342. Lawrence J. Franck digests the Walker analysis
and suggests its acceptance "would go a long way toward alleviating the confusion resulting from the court's
mechanistic repetition of'malice' as an essential element of proof in an action for wrongful interference." Franck,
supra note 18, at 154.
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the latter an objective, external standard. These Walker equates with "im-
proper" - the 1979 Restatement's original contribution toward doctrinal expres-
sion. He concludes the defendant should be held liable if he intentionally interfered
with the plaintiffs economic expectancies and if the defendant sought "to accom-
plish some non-legitimate (improper) purpose by doing so. . .or use[d] wrongful
(improper) means in seeking to accomplish the interference. '1 74 He says these
things in the context of announcing the Mississippi law of interference with pro-
spective contractual relations to be "generally consistent with the Restatement
rules on this subject.' 7 His service would be no less worthy had he taken the next
step and done us the favor of removing malice from the business tort lexicon alto-
gether, something the courts have done for all practical purposes.
C. The External Standard Emerges
Professor Walker has advanced the ball. Using the Restatement, he has helped
us to see that talk of malice brings nothing but confusion to our subject. Morally-
laden terminology seldom enhances the clarity of the law, and the present instance
is no exception. But what Professor Walker has done lays bare another knot, if
anything more difficult to untie. I refer here to whether we have in fact subjective
internal standards that are necessary requisites of business tort liability, whether
thought of pursuit of "non-legitimate [improper] purposes [ends]" plays a role in
the law of business torts at all. Does purpose, intent, end sought, conscious reason
for acting - call the actor's wish what you will - in fact form a necessary part of the
most narrow reading of the rules of business torts? And, if it does not (as I believe
it does not), surely there is no reason why we should wish it otherwise. Our law
better serves its instrumental ends when we do away with any thought of purpose
and ask instead - and only - whether the defendant's means were improper and
whether their reasonably expected effects are on the whole inimical to the public
welfare, that is, the benefits believed to flow from a freely and fairly competitive
marketplace and from fair bargain and exchange. Seeing this helps us, while in-
quiring into intent or purpose or actor's ends but serves to confuse the familiar with
the necessary.
The idea implicit in and best justifying the law in this area is that we allow mar-
ket participants the chance to compete by reference to the quality of the goods and
services they offer the public and the efficiencies with which they make those of-
ferings. 176 The state does not intervene absent substantial anti-competitive macro-
or microeconomic effects, or the reasonable probability thereof, nor should it.
The point is fundamental, not only in theory but as a matter of practical necessity,
given the inevitable crudity of the state's tools for intervention. Experience has
taught that certain business practices predictably inhibit fair competition and pro-
duce anti-competitive effects, many of which we discuss below. We promote fair
174. Walker, Common Law Protection, supra note 21, at 347.
175. Walker, Common Law Protection, supra note 21, at 347.
176. Myers, supra note 13, at 1140-41.
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competition by enacting laws tailored to proscribe predictably disadvantageous
business practices. We have established and manned within our legal order a
structure designed to prevent inefficient and unfair business behavior. We award
damages so that the law's "threats may continue to be believed"177 and that of-
fended parties may have a measure of compensation for their losses. This is the
point implicit in the enterprise, and, as this is so, it gives little thought to intentions
and purposes but focuses upon effects and the means to those effects. However
much in the moral world I may wish my neighbor to love me, I look to the law to
keep him off my back and not waste its time worrying what he thinks of me.
To be sure, "malicious motives make a bad case worse, but they cannot make
• . . wrong . . . [what] is in its essence lawful."178 And so proof of malice, pur-
pose, intent, and actor's ends are still relevant in the Rule 401179 sense, but they are
relegated to a role more modest and non-essential, though at times quite helpful -
that of aiding in identifying actionable conduct, in reducing the risk that we may
hold a defendant liable in error. '80
D. The External Standard Explained, As
We Meet the Memphis Steam Laundry Case
A tour of the case law tests and adds flesh to the point. Here we find, as we did
with malice, talk of impermissible purposes prominently displayed. We have
noted Irby v. Citizens National Bank,18' in which the court lists two elements of a
prima facie case of tortious interference with a contract: that the defendant's acts
"[1] were intentional and wilful. . . [and 2] were done with the unlawful purpose
of causing damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the
defendant (which constitutes malice)."182 This language, of course, is hopelessly
confusing, if not indecipherable. Market activity is by definition wilful and inten-
tional. Every competitor, if he knows enough to compete, knows he is likely to
177. Cf HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 59, at 46.
178. 2 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 9.14, at 74
(4th ed. 1982). See also Myers, supra note 13, at 1131-32.
179. See FED. R. EvID. 401; Miss. R. EvID. 401.
180. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § I cmt. c (Tentative Draft 1994) ("Although a
malicious motive is not sufficient to subject the actor to liability, a competitor motivated by ill will may be
tempted to pursue impermissible means of competition in order to insure or enhance the harm to another. Evi-
dence of such ill will may therefore justify close scrutiny of the actor's methods under the various rules enumer-
ated in this Section. The actor's motives may also be relevant to the application of other rules of liability,
including state and federal laws relating to unlawful restraints of trade."); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597 (1986), discussed in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112
S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (1992) ("Because the defendants had every incentive not to engage in the alleged conduct
which required them to sustain losses for decades with no foreseeable profits, the Court found an 'absence of any
rational motive to conspire.' "); see Nichols v. Tri-State Brick & Tile Co., 608 So. 2d 324, 330-31 (Miss. 1992).
181. 121 So. 2d 118 (Miss. 1960).
182. Id. at 119. The entire quotation reads:
A prima facie case of wrongful interference with a contract [or prospective economic advantage] is made
out if it is alleged (1) that the acts were intentional and wilful; (2) that they were calculated to cause dam-
age to the plaintiffs in their lawful business; (3) that they were done with the unlawful purpose of causing
damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the par of the defendant (which consists malice);
and (4) that actual damage and loss resulted.
Id. (quoting 30 AM. JUR. Interference § 55 (1958)).
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cause damage or loss, and are not all actors held to intend the natural and probable
and reasonably foreseeable consequences of their actions? And these problems en-
gulf the mind before it can begin to engage the (re)definition of malice.
An equally problematic, but in a sense far more revealing, approach to purpose
appears in the Memphis Steam Laundry case:
While it is true that competition in business, though carried to the extent of ruin-
ing a rival, is ordinarily not actionable, unless the dominant purpose to inflict injury
is established, we are of the opinion that the jury was warranted in finding that the
purpose to injure or destroy the business of the plaintiff was dominant throughout
the period complained of .... 183
This language is illuminating in that it recognizes the freedom to compete fairly as
the value and policy best explaining and justifying business tort law, thought of
which so effectively undermines the court's use of the defendant's purpose as a rea-
son for holding it liable.
In the Memphis Steam Laundry case, the plaintiff and defendant were competi-
tors in "the dry cleaning and pressing business" in Lee County and parts of Prentiss
County, Mississippi.184 It seems Memphis Steam Laundry saw this market area as
having a significant profit potential and set its prices accordingly."'5 Lindsey, op-
erating out of Booneville, saw this as his opportunity and set his prices for clean-
ing and pressing men's suits and ladies' dresses at roughly one-half what Memphis
Steam Laundry was charging.186 In time, four other local cleaning and pressing
establishments in Tupelo felt the pinch and dropped their prices to a level competi-
tive with Lindsey's.187 Memphis Steam Laundry was quite unhappy with this turn
of events and approached Lindsey, telling him that unless he raised his prices it
"intended to break him."'88 Lindsey refused, and, true to its word, Memphis Steam
Laundry promptly dropped its prices in the Tupelo area to one-half of what Lind-
sey was charging and even moved into Booneville where it offered direct head-on
competition with Lindsey in his hometown, again charging but one-half what
Lindsey was charging. 89
Memphis Steam Laundry was pricing below cost and took a considerable loss,
but one it was big enough to withstand, at least in the short run, as it maintained
much higher prices in areas outside Lindsey's reach.190 Over the same period of
time, Lindsey suffered significant losses and ultimately brought suit.19 Not sur-
prisingly, a Prentiss County jury found for Lindsey, and on appeal the Mississippi
183. Memphis Steam Laundry-Cleaners, Inc. v. Lindsey, 5 So. 2d 227, 232 (Miss. 1941).
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Supreme Court affirmed. 192 The court recognized that "[t]he reduction of prices is
an act lawful in itself; it is an absolute right of the owner of a business." '93 The
reason this is so is one of the benefits thought to flow from fair competition is
holding down prices to the consumer. The Supreme Court of the United States has
observed that" '[I]ow prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are
set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competi-
tion.' "194 Indeed, " 'cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very
essence of competition.' "195 The Memphis Steam Laundry Court turned, however,
to the paradoxical premise that" 'at least as respects interference with a trade or
calling. . . an act which is not of itself actionable may become so when done mali-
ciously, wantonly, or without reasonable cause.' "19 The court added that "instead
of enlarging or dignifying its privilege to cut prices for the purpose of promoting
its own business, it degraded the same into a wilful wrong when employing it as a
weapon for the ignoble purpose of inflicting upon the plaintiff a wanton injury.
197
Without question, representatives of Memphis Steam Laundry had made some
rather indiscrete remarks, viz, "that they had a couple of million dollars and would
spend the last dollar of it or break him." '98 It is difficult to have much sympathy for
Memphis Steam Laundry, as the Prentiss County jury surely did not, socking it
with an assessment of punitive damages. 99 The problem is this: Think of how the
court, accepting its world view, would have approached the case if it had had no
evidence of Memphis Steam Laundry's purpose. Suppose Memphis Steam Laun-
dry's officials had had enough sense to keep their mouths shut, or that they had
sought advice of counsel and were instructed, "Set your prices at whatever level
you think sufficient to ruin Lindsey, but for heaven's sake, do not tell him or any-
one else what you are about." If the Mississippi Supreme Court may be taken at its
word and had faithfully applied the law it announced, it would have had to exoner-
ate Memphis Steam Laundry. But surely this does not follow. Business tort liability
does not turn on the defendant's oral discretion.
An oft-quoted opinion from another jurisdiction puts it well:
[I]f the search for intent means a search for documents or statements specifically re-
citing the likelihood of anticompetitive consequences or of subsequent opportunities
to inflate prices, the knowledgeable firm will simply refrain from overt description.
192. Id. at 233.
193. Id. at 231. See also wagley v. Colonial Baking Co., 45 So. 2d 717, 722 (Miss. 1950).
194. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2588 (1993) (quoting Atlan-
tic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990)).
195. Id. at 2589 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)).
196. Memphis Steam Laundry-Cleaners, Inc. v. Lindsey, 5 So. 2d 227, 231 (Miss. 1941) (quoting 30 Am.
JUR. Interference § 39 (1958)).
197. Id. at 232.
198. Id. at 229. Compare Professor Myers' perceptive analysis of the Fifth Circuit's clearly erroneous (except
in the narrow sense that it may have been Erie-bound to enforce clearly bad Texas law) decision in Deauville
Corp. v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 756 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1985). Myers, supra note 13, at 1128-29 &
n.156.
199. Memphis Steam Laundry, 5 So. 2d at 228.
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If it is meant to refer to a set of objective economic conditions that allow the court to
"infer" improper intent ... then, using Occam's razor, we can slice "intent" away.
Thus, most courts now find their standard, not in intent, but in the relation of the
suspect price to the firm's costs.
200
The point is sharpened when we distinguish knowledge from purpose. The
court made clear that Memphis Steam Laundry could have cut its prices with im-
punity for the purpose of promoting its own business even though it did so with the
knowledge that this would result in economic harm to Lindsey. The court said it
was holding Memphis Steam Laundry liable, however, because it cut its prices for
the purpose of inflicting economic harm on Lindsey, though it acted with the
knowledge that this would aid its own business. Having liability turn on such a se-
mantic distinction seems dubious even in theory. It is more so in practice when we
understand the difficulty inherent in the fact-finding process, in having third per-
sons (judge or jury) decide reliably the defendant's purpose as distinguished from
what he merely knew.2"1 As noted above, in a wide variety of contexts, the law
presumes a man intends the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary
acts, knowingly performed.22 In the context of a charge of burglary, we take this
view out of practical necessity, because we know the "intent of a defendant, dwell-
ing in his mind, invisible to the outward sight, can never be proven by the direct
testimony of a third person."2"3
An illustration from another arena where fair competition is our dominant con-
cern helps us see the point. I speak of the sport of football. Every team goes
through some sort of pre-game process designed to motivate its players to give
their very best efforts in the game-to give a hundred and ten percent, it is often
said. In this pre-game course, not uncommonly a team leader may exhort, "Let's
go out and destroy those guys!" to the agreeable cheers of his mates. I have even
heard it urged that we "humiliate them so badly they will never show their faces on
a football field again, ever!" The players may really mean it, and they may in fact
play as hard and as roughly as possible, and exchange many a mid-game growl in-
tended to intimidate those across the line. But the officials care only whether they
play by the rules, more generally, whether they play fairly. And, the other team of
right has no complaint of its opponent's destructive intent, or of the accomplish-
ment of that intent, if done fairly and by the rules. We can easily move to a market
participant's meeting to motivate the members of its sales force and replicate the
example -and think how silly a court would seem if it let such statements affect its
judgment.
200. Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).
201. Finding what a person intends is difficult enough, even when he is trying to give us carefully written evi-
dence of his intent. See Robertson, Myth and Reality, supra note 55, at 1045.
202. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 461 So. 2d 1288, 1293-94 (Miss. 1984); Hydrick v. State, 150 So. 2d 423,
424 (Miss. 1963); Fosterv. Wright, 127 So. 2d 873, 875 (Miss. 1961); Standard Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 2d
298, 301 (Miss. 1956).
203. Lee v. State, 146 So. 2d 736, 738 (Miss. 1962).
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And, so it is more sensible that Memphis Steam Laundry be read by reference to
the defendant's means - predatory price cutting - and the known predictable ef-
fects of those means, and forget about the defendant's purposes. Indeed, when we
do this, we find that Memphis Steam Laundry's means and their predictable ef-
fects are quite likely condemned by the antitrust laws.24 Section 2 of the Sherman
Act condemns predatory pricing when it poses a threat of monopolization. 0 ' The
Robinson-Patman Act2"6 condemns Memphis Steam Laundry-style predatory
pricing where there is a reasonable possibility of substantial injury to competi-
tion.2"7 The law of business torts goes a step further. It affords no market partici-
pant a preferred status predicated on market position and power. The antitrust laws
aside, predatory practices are actionable at the hands of a market participant fore-
seeably injured thereby. Is this not the most narrow reasonable reading - indeed,
the only sensible reading- of the rule of Memphis Steam Laundry?
E. Doing Essentially the Same,
But with a Lot Less Market Power
There is a further perspective from which we see the problem with a purpose-
oriented approach to actionable conduct. A market participant may act with every
hope, desire, and wish to harm his competitor-the putative plaintiff-but may be
unable to do so by reason of lack of market strength, skill, position, whatever. The
defendant in such a case may even be actuated by spite and ill will, but in many
such cases it would make no sense to suggest imposition of liability. Quality Stamp
Co. v. Page's Supermarkets °8 makes the point. Page had been distributing Quality
Stamps at its supermarket. 09 It terminated its contract with Quality and began
giving S&H Green Stamps to its customers.21 Quality responded by mailing out
coupons to Page's customers redeemable for one hundred Quality Stamps with the
purchase of certain designated grocery items at food stores giving those stamps. 211
Page retaliated by offering to redeem the same coupons with S&H Green
Stamps.212 The court rejected Quality's claim, holding Page "was justified in offer-
ing to redeem the coupons mailed out by [Quality] as a defensive measure to
204. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § I cmt. c (Tentative Draft 1994). We use the qualifier
"quite likely" in that the Memphis Steam Laundry Court, without the Sherman Act or Robinson-Patman Act or
state antitrust claims before it, did not state the facts as precisely as it no doubt would have done were it deciding
claims under any of those acts. See, e.g., I MCCARTHY, supra note 17, §§ 1. 14[2], [3], at 48-50; Myers, supra
note 13, at 1102-03.
205. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884 (1993).
206. 15 U.S.C. § 13(2) (1988).
207. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2586 (1993); Falls City In-
dus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 434 (1983).
208. 149 So. 2d 348 (Miss. 1963).
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prevent serious loss of customers at a critical time when he was changing over to
the use of a new stamp."213
In a very real sense, Page's Supermarkets and Memphis Steam Laundry were
doing the same thing. Each was trying to protect and expand its customer base.
Arguably, the only difference between the two cases is that Memphis Steam Laun-
dry had sufficient economic strength to inflict considerable harm upon Lindsey,
while Page's Supermarket was merely struggling to survive with but a modest
profit. 21 4 It may be that in the larger world, "[w]here a defendant maintains sub-
stantial market power, his activities are examined through a special lens: Behavior
that might otherwise not be of concern. . . or that might even be viewed as pro-
competitive - can take on exclusionary connotations when practiced by a monop-
olist."21 But we still focus on means and effects, not purposes or intentions.
I do not doubt the final judgment in Quality Stamps was the correct one, as was
the case in Memphis Steam Laundry. An objective, external analysis of the defend-
ant's behavior in each case makes this clear. To the contrary, a purpose-oriented
approach to market impropriety only serves to confuse the core holding of both
cases. Reflective thought suggests a purpose-oriented approach to market impro-
priety has never been necessary in this jurisdiction to explain a final judgment in a
business torts case. As a child does his father, we should attend to what the courts
do and not what they say.
V. ANTITRUST
A. The Statutory Scheme and Underlying Policy
1. The Federal and State Statutes
As a business tort, antitrust law derives almost entirely from federal statutes:
the Sherman Act;2 ' 6 the Clayton Act; 217 and the Robinson-Patman Act amend-
ments to the Clayton Act.218 In 1892, two years after the passage of the Sherman
Act, Mississippi passed, as did many other states, its own "baby Sherman Act."219
Both the federal and state statutes provide private causes of action. As will be
seen, the Mississippi Act serves primarily as an intrastate reflection of, or "supple-
ment" to, the Sherman Act. It picks up where the federal act leaves off. Mississip-
pi's baby Sherman Act addresses intrastate activities that do not "affect interstate
commerce"; prohibits only the specific forms of unfair competition enumerated in
the Act and may not reach, according to some courts, all of the types of "unfair
213. Id. at 350.
214. We know Memphis Steam Laundry was selling below cost sufficient that we may fairly label its practices
"predatory." We do not know about Page.
215. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 3
PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 813, at 300-302 (1978)).
216. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
217. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-18, 19-26 (1988).
218. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)-(f) (1988).
219. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1 to -39 (1988).
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competition" covered by the federal statutes;220 and provides less relief to the ag-
grieved party.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits any "contract, combination. . . or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade," 221 and section 2 would punish any person "who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States. "222 To this statutory skeleton the courts have added the
flesh of the antitrust torts. This discussion will be limited to sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, the private right of action and remedies provided by the Clayton
Act, and the corresponding Mississippi law.
Within this realm of "judge-made law," as elsewhere in the field, we find a se-
ries of interrelated objective standards by which a market actor may measure its
conduct or the conduct of another. While some cases may speak of "motive" or
"intent" and the significance of those states of mind to antitrust law, 223 the law it-
self, as reflected in the narrow necessary holdings of the opinions, focuses upon
one's conduct, her methods, and the effects of her actions. Courts seldom have
available to them, or see the need for, the secret memo or overheard statement that
reveals the defendant's subjective "intenf - though courts or juries certainly may
jump on such "smoking gun" evidence, when available, to bolster evidence of con-
duct and effect. Consistent with the principle presented in Part IV above, the ab-
sence of such evidence of subjective intent, by itself, has never kept a court from
finding an antitrust defendant liable.
220. Main St. Publishers v. Land Mark Communications, 701 F. Supp. 1289, 1291 (N.D. Miss. 1988). Other
courts have treated the federal and state laws as "analytically identical," or recognized that the parties regarded
them as such. Walker v. U-Haul of Miss., 734 F.2d 1068, 1070 n.5 (5th Cir. 1984). See also Hardy Bros. Body
Shop v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F. Supp. 1276, 1290-91 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
222. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). The basic Mississippi statute is somewhat more specific, proscribing any "trust or
combine," defining that to be
a combination, contract, understanding or agreement, expressed or implied, between two or more per-
sons . . . when inimical to public welfare and the effect of which would be:
(a) To restrain trade;
(b) To limit, increase or reduce the price of a commodity;
(c) To limit, increase or reduce the production or output of a commodity;
(d) To hinder competition in the production, importation, manufacture, transportation, sale or purchase
of a commodity; . . . or
(e) To unite or pool interest in the importation, manufacture, production, transportation, or price of a
commodity, contrary to the spirit and meaning of this chapter.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-21-1 (1988).
In early decisions, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the phrase "inimical to the public welfare" is not
an additional element to the described offenses; rather, the court held that the use of this term meant merely that
the legislature had declared all of the described acts to be inimical to the public welfare and, hence, unlawful.
Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. State Attorney Gen., 48 So. 1021, 1024 (Miss. 1909) (citing Barataria Canning
Co. v. Joulin, 31 So. 961 (Miss. 1902)).
223. See, e.g., Walker, 734 F.2d at 1071.
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2. Private Actions and Remedies
a. Federal Law
Sections 4224 and 16225 of the Clayton Act provide for private rights of action for
violations of the antitrust laws. Under section 4, a successful plaintiff is entitled to
an award of "threefold the damages by him sustained."225 Section 16 provides for
injunctive relief for a person threatened with loss or damage from a violation of the
antitrust laws.
The "antitrust laws" subject to this regime of private enforcement include,
among others, the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and section 2 of the Robinson-
Patman Act, which is an amendment to the Clayton Act.
To maintain an antitrust action, of course, one must have standing to sue. The
private action for money damages presents a special standing issue. Section 4 of
the Clayton Act limits relief to "any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."227 This "by reason
of" language has led to the requirement that the plaintiffs injury, in order to be ac-
tionable, must have been caused by the antitrust violation and be of a type the anti-
trust laws were designed to prevent. In addition to the developing law, there is a
substantial body of commentary discussing how antitrust claims and remedies
should be shaped, or should "evolve," in order best to achieve the economic and
social efficiencies implicit in the acts.228 For example, some debate has revolved
around whether competitors of the alleged antitrust law offenders should be al-
lowed to sue to recover treble damages, since such a suit and recovery might not
properly reflect, or help to avoid, the various costs, losses, or inefficiencies result-
ing from the offense.229
A key Supreme Court decision concerning "antitrust injury" is Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.230 In that case, several bowling alley operators
charged that Brunswick had acquired failing bowling alleys as part of a monopolis-
tic practice, in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.231 Plaintiffs complained
that, but for Brunswick's acquisition, those competing alleys would have gone out
of business and the plaintiffs' profits would have been higher.232 While the Su-
preme Court acknowledged that Brunswick's saving the failing competitors caused
the plaintiffs' injury, the Court found that the acquisitions did not cause "antitrust
224. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
225. 15 U.S.C. §26 (1988).
226. This is usually referred to as "treble damages."
227. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) (emphasis added).
228. See, e.g., Page, Antitrust Penalties, supra note 41; William Page & Roger Blair, Controlling the Competitor
Plaintiff in Antitrust Litigation, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 111 (1992).
229. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1989); Page, Antitrust Penalties,
supra note 41; Page & Blair, supra note 228.
230. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
231. Id. at 479-80.
232. Id. at 481.
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injury."23 The Court noted that the same loss of profits would have been suffered
whether the alleys had been purchased by Brunswick, had arranged refinancing to
stay in business, or had been purchased by someone else.2"4 The Court concluded
that an award of damages would be "inimical to the purposes of these [antitrust]
laws," because recovery under the plaintiffs' theory was "designed to provide them
with the profits they would have realized had competition been reduced.""23 The
Court found that the antitrust laws would not support an award of "windfall
profits" that would have resulted from a loss of competition, i.e., the competing
centers' being allowed to fail.
2 36
The concept of "antitrust injury" has also been applied to preclude recovery by
a retail gasoline marketer who claimed it lost sales to competitors that were partic-
ipants in a refiner's "vertical, maximum price fixing scheme;"23 7 by one seeking to
block the acquisition by one competitor, which was the second largest firm in the
market, of the third largest firm in the market;238 by a takeover target which was
challenging the proposed acquisition based upon claimed "loss of independent de-
cision making" authority;239 and by a stadium owner who sought to challenge a de-
cision by the National Football League to prohibit the public sale of shares by the
stadium's tenant team.24 °
One who is suing under the federal antitrust laws faces a further "standing"
problem if she is claiming damages as an "indirect purchaser." In such a case, a
retailer might complain that she had been required to pay higher prices to purchase
from a distributor who was merely "passing on" the artificially high prices set by
the antitrust-law-violator manufacturer. In a 1977 decision, Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois,24 1 the Supreme Court held that an indirect or "remote" purchaser may not
maintain a claim for damages against a seller from whom she did not purchase, for
unlawful overcharges she claimed were passed down to her through the distribu-
tion chain.
The Supreme Court gave several reasons for barring recovery by such indirect,
though ultimate, purchasers. First, if both direct and indirect purchasers were al-
lowed to recover for an antitrust violation, the defendant might face the risk of
multiple liability. 242 Second, the Court felt it would put too great a burden on the
lower courts to have to engage in the difficult task of apportioning damages among
233. Id. at 487-88 (quoting Wyandotte v. United States, 389 U.S. 191,202 (1967)).
234. Id. at 487.
235. Id. at 488.
236. Id. at 488-89.
237. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
238. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
239. Anago, Inc. v. Tecnol Medical Prods., 976 F2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1992) (the loss of such independent
decision-making authority did not constitute "antitrust injury" because it was not injury "related to the anti-
competitive effects of the merger").
240. Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 828 F. Supp. 114 (D. Mass. 1993).
241. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
242. Id. at 730.
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purchasers at different levels of the distribution chain.2 Third, the Court found
that it should lead to more effective enforcement of the antitrust laws to concen-
trate the full recovery of the overcharges in the hands of the direct purchasers.2
The Court noted that there could be an exception, thus allowing indirect purchaser
recovery, for fixed quantity, cost-plus contracts, because the seller who is passing
on the price increase does not risk any decrease in sales when its customer is com-
mitted to buying a set quantity regardless of price.24 But note that recovery by in-
direct purchasers is specifically allowed in Mississippi under Mississippi Code
section 75-2 1_9.246
b. State Law
As noted above, the Mississippi antitrust law basically mirrors and provides an
intrastate supplement to the Sherman Act. There are several important differ-
ences, however, in the remedies available and the standing of certain potential
plaintiffs.
The private right of action and available recovery are provided, and limited, by
Mississippi Code section 75-21-9:
Any person, natural or artificial, injured or damaged by a trust or combine as
herein defined, or by its effects direct or indirect, may recover all damages of every
kind sustained by him or it and in addition a penalty of five hundred dollars
($500.00), by suit in any court of competent jurisdiction .... Such penalty may be
recovered in each instance of injury. All recoveries herein provided for may be sued
for in one suit.
247
Unlike the federal laws, there is no provision for recovery of treble or other spe-
cial damages, other than the single penalty of $500, and no provision for the award
of attorney's fees to the successful plaintiff. Actual damages, such as lost profits,
may be proved as in other cases. Wholly conjectural or speculative damages may
not be awarded."
In contrast to the federal law of Illinois Brick,249 an indirect purchaser may sue
under state law to recover increased costs allegedly passed on to him. Section
243. Id. at 731-32.
244. Id. at 734-35.
245. Id. at 736. However, this cost-plus exception is a narrow one, and the direct purchaser is the proper plain-
tiff in almost every case. In Kansas v. Utilicorp United Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990), the plaintiffs were states that
had sued as patens patriae on behalf of their states' consumers and state agencies that purchased natural gas from
the defendant utility. The states alleged that certain gas producers had conspired to inflate the natural gas price
and that the utility had passed along the overcharge in the form of increased rates, rates which were based upon
the utility's cost of gas. The Supreme Court held that, although "any economic assumption underlying the Illinois
Brick rule might be disproved in a specific case," it would be "unwarranted and counterproductive" to litigate a
list of exceptions. The Court stood by its rule in Illinois Brick. Id. at 216.
246. See discussion infra Part V.A.2.b.
247. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-21-9 (1991).
248. Ready-Mix Concrete & Concrete Prods. Co. v. Perry, 123 So. 2d 241, 246 (Miss. 1960).
249. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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75-21-9 provides a right of action for damages to any person who is damaged by an
antitrust violation, "or by its effects, direct or indirect."
2 50
Federal law does not preempt such a state law that allows recovery by indirect
purchasers .251 Prior to the Illinois Brick decision, there apparently were only two




Following Illinois Brick, a number of states adopted such provisions.25 3 In
Mississippi, only one decision has mentioned this aspect of Mississippi law. In
Hughes Construction Co. v. Rheem Manufacturing Co. ,254 the court noted the
plaintiffs, who claimed to represent a class of indirect purchasers of water heaters
in Mississippi, apparently had carefully drawn their complaint to involve only a
claim under section 75-21-9, not federal law.255 There is no further discussion of
recovery under Mississippi law.
3. Observations on Objectives of Antitrust Law
In passing the federal antitrust laws, "Congress was dealing with competition,
which it sought to protect, and monopoly, which it sought to prevent." 256 Obvi-
ously, both Congress and the state legislature wanted to prevent large "trusts,"
"combines," or other business "combinations" from using their size or collusion to
strangle their (usually smaller) competitors or would-be competitors or otherwise
force their higher prices upon consumers. Undoubtedly, given the timing of the
federal and state enactments, there was a healthy dose of populist sentiment be-
hind the statutes. But what are the best justifications for these laws today? What
are the guides the courts use to shape their decisions? What makes one competi-
tor's method of "competing" a violation, while another's escapes judicial disdain?
When can an individual company's decisions on how it will "compete" be deemed
a violation of the antitrust laws, thus opening it to a civil action by someone claim-
ing to be injured thereby? How can a vigorous competitor know when it is about to
overstep the line between intense, effective competition and a law violation?
The case law provides the objective guidelines for lawful business behavior.
And there are economic and social principles and objectives guiding this evolu-
tion. The economic objective of a pro-competition policy, the policy best explain-
ing and justifying the antitrust laws as we know them today, is in keeping with
250. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-21-9 (1991).
251. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989) (reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision in In re Cement
& Concrete Antitrust Litigation, 817 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1987)).
252. See, e.g., Crown Oil Corp. v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. Rptr. 164 (Ct. App. 1986); Tip Top Farms, Inc.
v. Dairylea Coop., Inc., 497 N.Y.S.2d 99 (App. Div. 1985), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987).
253. New York v. Cedar Park Concrete Corp., 741 F. Supp. 494,497 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Union Carbide Corp.
v. Superior Court, 679 P.2d 14, 28 (Cal. 1984) ("There is little applicable precedent governing the interplay of
federal and state law on the subject. Several congressional proposals to overrule Illinois Brick have been unsuc-
cessful. Six other states by statute have adopted a rule permitting, as does California, actions by indirect pur-
chasers under state antitrust provisions.").
254. 487 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
255. Id. at 346 n. 1.
256. PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 103 (1978) (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. Fed-
eral Trade Comm'n, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951)).
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classical economics: "To maximize consumer economic welfare through effi-
ciency in the use and allocation of scarce resources."" 7 At the same time, a pro-
competition policy also promotes populist goals, in that it broadens
entrepreneurial opportunities, limits business size, disburses wealth, and "substi-
tutes the impersonal forces of the marketplace for the economic power of private
individuals or groups to exploit or coerce those with whom they deal."258
In recent years, many commentators have argued that efficiency is the only
goal of antitrust law. If the antitrust law would, by its overinclusive requirements
or excessive penalties, discourage competitive behavior that is efficient, the law
should be trimmed back or the remedies reduced.259 Indeed, Professors Page and
Blair and those of the "Chicago School" see the Sherman Act as the opportunity
and means by which courts both learn how best to promote market efficiencies and
shape the law to promote those efficiencies:
The development of antitrust law - including the antitrust injury doctrine-is evolu-
tionary. As one commentator has noted, "the Sherman Act can be regarded as 'ena-
bling' legislation -an invitation to the federal courts to learn how businesses and
markets work and formulate a set of rules that will make them work in socially effi-
cient ways."2'
Regardless of the debate, the courts have given the economic arguments, or "ef-
ficiency," priority over the "populist" goals, such as objections to business size or
concentration. For example, size alone is no offense, and even a monopoly, if pur-
sued and obtained consistent with principles of efficiency, does not violate the an-
titrust laws.261 Furthermore, the antitrust laws promote the opportunity for
competition "on the merits"; they do not protect businesses from the harsh reality
of the competitive marketplace. The judicial utterance, so frequently heard in
business torts, that the laws "protect competition, not competitors,"282 originated
in the field of antitrust.
B. Restraints of Trade Prohibited
by Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes "[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
257. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 256, § 103.
258. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 256, § 103.
259. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); Frank H. Eas-
terbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & ECON. 445 (1985); William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and
Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 467 (1980); Page, Antitrust Penalties,
supra note 41; Page, Scope of Liability, supra note 41.
260. Page & Blair, supra note 228, at 112-13 (quoting HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS & FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST LAW 52 (1985)).
26 1. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 256, § 104 ("Monopoly resting on economies of scale or obtained by 'skill,
foresight and industry' does not violate the antitrust laws." (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.
563, 570-71 (1966))).
262. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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the several States, or with foreign nations. "283 The Sherman and Clayton Acts pro-
vide criminal and civil sanctions for violations of section 1. A person who is in-
jured in her "business or property" by reason of a section 1 violation may recover
treble damages, i.e., three times actual damages, plus attorney's fees under sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act.264 By its terms, section 1 might appear to prohibit all
contracts or other coordinated actions of two or more people that "restrained
trade." Of course, many accepted business practices may be seen as "restraining"
trade. For example, a contract by which one agrees to buy 1000 widgets from an-
other over the period of a year "restrains" the buyer from changing suppliers after
six months and 500 widgets.
The Supreme Court very early found section 1 to proscribe only the restraints
of trade that "unreasonably" limit competition. 265 Over the years, courts have
found violations that fit within one of a number of categories, depending upon
such things as whether the "unreasonable restraint of trade" is the result of the col-
laborative action of direct competitors- deemed a "horizontal" restraint-or
between firms at different market levels, such as restraints imposed by a manufac-
turer on its distributors - deemed a "vertical" restraint.2 6 Within these categories,
the courts also have grouped restraints by a requirement of proof-whether one
must prove the effect on commerce or trade would be unreasonable. Certain re-
straints are deemed always to have pernicious effects upon competition and are
deemed "per se" violations, being conclusively presumed unreasonable without
much, if any, analysis of why the conduct unreasonably restrains commerce. All
other restraining conduct requires more analysis - and proof- of how the conduct
might hurt competition, analysis conducted under the "rule of reason." We will
deal with these in turn.
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Mississippi has applied the state statutes to
prohibit only "unreasonable" restraints - those that are, in the words of section 75-
21-1, "inimical to public welfare."267 Over seventy years ago, the court observed:
It will be seen that this court in construing our statute prohibiting monopolies has
applied the rule of reason, as has the Supreme Court of the United States in constru-
ing the federal statute against monopolies, as have also the courts of other states in
passing on co-operative marketing contracts substantially the same as the one here
involved. There must be an unreasonable or undue restraint of trade. It must be such
a restraint of trade as is detrimental to the public interest.268
To be actionable, conduct generally must fall within one of the judicially recog-
nized categories. There is no general cause of action, under Mississippi law or
263. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
264. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
265. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,58 (1911).
266. Futurevision Cable Sys. v. Multivision Cable TV Corp., 789 R Supp. 760, 765-66 (S.D. Miss. 1992).
267. State ex rel. Knox v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 115 So. 598, 605 (Miss. 1928) (not all restraints are
unreasonable); Brown v. Staple Cotton Coop. Ass'n, 96 So. 849, 855 (Miss. 1923).
268. Brown. 96 So. at 855.
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otherwise, for "restraint of trade." If the challenged conduct does not fit within
one of the judicially recognized forms or categories, the complaining party is
probably out of luck.26
1. Requirements of a Section 1 Violation
There are three requirements of a violation under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a contract, combination, or conspir-
acy between or among at least two separate parties;27 (2) that unreasonably re-
strains trade; 27' and (3) affects interstate commerce. 27 2 These are requisites for
each type or category of antitrust offense or tort. Each will be discussed briefly
below. It is again worth noting that no subjective analysis of a defendant's motive
or intent, as distinguished from his conduct or the results of his conduct, is re-
quired or even very helpful.
a. Proof of Contract, Combination, or Conspiracy
Section 1 of the Sherman Act by its terms requires a "contract, combination
.or conspiracy."273 The existence of collective action is a requirement for both
horizontal and vertical restraints actionable under section 1.274 Section I does not
reach independent action by a single person or company, regardless of its possible
purpose or effect on the competition. 275 The Supreme Court has made it clear that
section 1 does not reach a single firm's conduct that is "wholly unilateral." 276 A
single individual or business may, for instance, unilaterally select those with
whom it will deal, and refuse to deal with any others.277 If a plaintiff cannot
present evidence tending to prove the existence of an agreement or conspiracy with
269. See, e.g., Hardy Bros. Body Shop v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F. Supp. 1276, 1290 (S.D.
Miss. 1994). There, the plaintiffs challenged business practices as an unlawful "restraint of trade." But the court
found the conduct was not one of the judicially recognized and prohibited "restraints" under state law - such as
trademark infringement, monopolization by use of a trademark, or a restrictive covenant in an employment
agreement- or an antitrust violation under state or federal law.
270. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1,58 (1911); Futurevision, 789 F. Supp. at 765; AT&T v. Delta Communications Corp., 408 F.
Supp. 1075, 1088 (S.D. Miss. 1976).
271. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 175-84 (1911); Consolidated Metal Prods. v.
American Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1988).
272. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 785 (1975). Some courts cite a fourth requirement, neces-
sary to private civil actions for damages, that there be an injury to the plaintiff. Abadir & Co. v. First Miss.
Corp., 651 F.2d 422, 424 (5th Cir. 1981); Futurevision, 789 F. Supp. at 765.
273. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58.
274. See Ancar v. Sara Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 1992) (alleged conspiracy and joint action of
plasma purchasers to reduce the prices paid to plasma donors); Gulf States Land & Dev., Inc. v. Premier Bank,
956 F 2d 502, 508 (5th Cir. 1992) (alleged conspiracy by a bank and its officers and directors); Walker v. U-Haul
of Miss., 734 F.2d 1068, 1071 (5th Cir. 1984) (alleged vertical refusal-to-deal or dealer termination by manufac-
turer and its distributor).
275. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250
U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
276. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-68 (1984).
277. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307. See also Walker, 734 F.2d at 1071; Futurevision Cable Sys. v. Multivision Cable
TV Corp., 789 F. Supp. 760, 766 (S.D. Miss. 1992).
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a second market actor, there is no claim.278 Of course, few antitrust defendants de-
liberately provide the proverbial smoking gun. The question is what the court
should do in the absence of a contract or other plain evidence of agreement. In
1984, the Supreme Court attempted an answer.
The correct standard is that there must be evidence that leads to exclude the possibil-
ity of independent action by the [defendants]. That is, there must be direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that [the defendants] had a
conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objec-
tive. "9
While one would prefer direct evidence to establish concerted action, one may,
and more often must, rely upon circumstantial evidence scrutinized under the
standard of Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. The Supreme Court added
practical flesh to that standard in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp. ,280 when it described the plaintiff's burden of proof to avoid summary judg-
ment or a directed verdict when the allegation of concerted action rests solely on
circumstantial evidence:
To survive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seek-
ing damages for a violation of Section 1 must present evidence "that tends to exclude
the possibility" that the alleged conspirators acted independently.... [Plaintiffs] in
this case, in other words, must show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in
light of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that could
not have harmed [plaintiffs].281
In determining whether circumstantial evidence of concerted action is suffic-
ient, the Matsushita Court mentioned the "motive" of a defendant, but we see that
this consideration requires no subjective determination, no determination of de-
fendant's state of mind. The Court found that there are two inquiries relevant to the
sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence: (1) whether the defendant had "any ra-
tional motive" to join the alleged conspiracy; and (2) whether the defendant's con-
duct "was consistent with the defendant's independent interests."282 The Court
concluded that if the defendant "had no rational motive to conspire, and if [its]
conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible explanations, the conduct does
not give rise to an inference of conspiracy. In other words, the Court is apply-
ing an objective standard, a "does it make any sense for someone to act this way"
test, together with an evaluation of defendant's conduct, and objective interests, in
determining whether there may be sufficient evidence to support a claim.
278. Gulf States, 956 F.2d at 508 (granting summary judgment because, in response to affidavits in support of
summary judgment, plaintiffs had "not responded with any evidence, direct or indirect, tending to prove the ex-
istence of a conspiracy" between a bank and its officers and directors).
279. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 768.
280. 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
281. Id. (quoting Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 768).
282. Id. at 587.
283. Id. at 596-97.
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b. Proof That Restraint Is in or Affects Interstate Commerce
Section 1 requires that the challenged conduct be "in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several states or with foreign nations." '284 While at first this was
seen as limiting the Sherman Act to activities actually "in" interstate commerce,
285
it is now clear that an actionable restraint of commerce may be proven by showing
only that the questioned activities "affect" interstate commerce. 286 This broader
"affecting commerce" test is easier to satisfy. The Fifth Circuit recently reversed a
district court's conclusion that a plaintiff had failed, in his allegations of price-
fixing, adequately to plead federal jurisdiction. 287 The Fifth Circuit, perhaps ap-
plying an even broader, or lower, standard for such per se offenses, observed: "In
cases involving agreements to fix prices, a showing that the alleged conspiracy
would impede a specified measure of interstate commerce is not necessary; one
need only show that an impediment to competition would occur in the market-
place. "288
c. Proof That the Restraint Is Unreasonable
As noted before, section 1 of the Sherman Act has been held to prohibit only
unreasonable restraints of trade, or restraints that unreasonably restrain trade.289
Whether a restraint is "reasonable" is determined only by its effects on competi-
tion.29" Proof of this element revolves around two standards, the "per se rule" and
the "rule of reason."
The types of conduct to which the Supreme Court has applied the per se rule are
seen as always, or almost always, harmful to competition. Justice Scalia recently
restated the reasons for subjecting certain types of conduct to the per se rule:
Per se rules of antitrust illegality are reserved for those situations where logic and
experience show that the risk of injury to competition from the defendant's behavior
is so pronounced that it is needless and wasteful to conduct the usual judicial inquiry
into the balance between the behavior's pro competitive benefits and its anticom-
petitive costs.
291
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Supreme Court limited the forms of conduct to which
the per se rule applies. Still, the types of conduct that courts have found warranted
per se prohibition include "horizontal and vertical price-fixing agreements,
284. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
285. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
286. McLain v. Real Estate Bd., Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1980); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex
Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976).
287. Ancar v. Sara Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1992).
288. Id. at 469.
289. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60-70 (1911); Consolidated Metal Prods. v. American
Petroleum Inst., 846 E2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1988).
290. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731 (1988).
291. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2092-93 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the allocation of geographic territories or customers by direct competitors, certain
tying arrangements, and certain concerted refusals to deal."292
The application of the per se rule renders unnecessary an in-depth analysis of
the reason or justification for the restraint2 93 as well as the nature, degree, and ex-
tent of market effect.294 When the per se rule is applicable, the plaintiff generally
will not have to prove that the challenged conduct has or is likely to have an ad-
verse impact on competition. Likewise, in per se cases, the defendant will not be
allowed to raise defenses based upon factors unrelated to the effect upon competi-
tion or the argument that competition may not be necessary or reasonable.
If the plaintiff does not have the benefit of a per se characterization of defend-
ant's conduct, she must prove that the challenged practice "unreasonably" restrains
commerce pursuant to some analysis of the probable purpose of the conduct and its
actual effect on competition. Under the rule of reason, the defendant is not re-
quired to show that the practice is reasonable (under the per se rule, the defendant
is not allowed to show that the practice is reasonable); rather, the plaintiff bears
the burden of showing that a particular arrangement unreasonably restrains
trade.29 The plaintiff must show injury to competition, not just to a competitor,
i.e., the plaintiff: "[P]laintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the chal-
lenged action has had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the rel-
evant market; to prove it has been harmed as an individual competitor will not
suffice."296 If and when the plaintiff meets this requirement, the burden shifts to
the defendant to provide evidence of the pro-competitive "redeeming virtues" of
the combination or concerted action. If the defendant can make such a showing,
the burden returns to the plaintiff "to demonstrate that any legitimate collaborative
objectives proffered by the defendant could have been achieved by less restrictive
alternatives, that is, those that would be less prejudicial to competition as a
whole."297
As an example, in Capital Imaging Associates v. Mohawk Valley Medical Associ-
ates, Inc. ,298 a group of radiologists claimed that a health maintenance organiza-
tion and a physicians' association had conspired to exclude the radiologists from
membership in the association. 29 In applying the rule-of-reason analysis to these
292. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANNUAL REVIEW OF 1993 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 17 (1994) (citing
Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 542-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 388 (1993)). Cf United States Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 593 & n.2 (1st
Cir. 1993).
293. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,422 (1990); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,221-22 (1940).
294. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
295. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 374 n.5 (1967); Muenster Butane, Inc.
v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292,295 (5th Cir. 1981); Cawley v. Braden Indus., 613 F.2d 751, 754-55 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980); Northwest Power Prods. v. Omark Indus., 576 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
296. Capital Imaging Assocs., 996 F.2d at 543.
297. Id. (quoting 7 PHI LLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW § 1052, at 371 (1986)).
298. 996 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 388 (1993).
299. Capital Imaging Assocs., 996 F.2d at 539.
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facts, 300 the Second Circuit found that the plaintiff had failed to meet its initial bur-
den of showing that "the defendants' conduct or policy has had a substantially
harmful effect on competition."3 1 The court found that summary judgment for the
defendants was appropriate because the plaintiff failed to meet its burden either by
establishing that the defendants held market power in the relevant market or by
presenting direct evidence of any harmful effects flowing from the defendants'
conduct. 3 2 The court emphasized the importance of market power in rule-of-rea-
son analysis "because market power bears a particularly strong relationship to a
party's ability to injure competition. 30 3 Since the evidence showed that the de-
fendants provided service to just over two percent of all HMO subscribers in the
relevant market, the court concluded that the defendants "lacked the power to in-
jure competition or force consumers to accept supracompetitive health care pre-
miums or lower quality medical care. '"304 Likewise, the court found that the
plaintiff did not show that its exclusion from the physician's association had actual
detrimental effects on competition- on the quality or quantity of health care avail-
able in the relevant market.305
This is but an example. The proof required by rule-of-reason analysis may be
complex, extensive, and expensive. Injury to a competitor is insufficient. In re-
cent years, the courts have sometimes used the "quick look" variation of the rule of
reason to provide a shortcut analysis, either to determine whether the conduct
should sufficiently harm competition so as to be deemed a per se violation, or to
provide injunctive relief without going through all of the rule-of-reason analysis.
2. Horizontal Restraints
Sometimes it is not altogether easy to determine whether a restraint is horizon-
tal or vertical, and courts have struggled to make the proper determination. Con-
sider, for example, the case of a retail dealer who complains that the manufacturer
terminated him at the direct request of a competitor-dealer who was upset that the
first dealer would not agree to stop his price-cutting practices. This might appear
to be simply a variation of a price-fixing arrangement between competitors, itself
a horizontal arrangement. However, the Supreme Court determined that the cate-
gorization as horizontal or vertical is based only on the relationship between the
parties to the agreement, not on the purpose or effect of the restraint. 306 According
300. Many courts have dealt with physician exclusion, such as by exclusive contract, as "exclusive dealing," to
be evaluated under the rule of reason. Prior to a Fifth Circuit decision in 1982 and the Supreme Court's reversal
in 1984, all courts had characterized exclusive hospital-physician contracts as "exclusive dealing" and analyzed
the arrangements under the rule of reason. The case that changed this treatment was Hyde v. Jefferson Parish
Hospital District, 686 F2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). See David W. Clark, Ties That May
Bind: Antitrust Liability for Exclusive Hospital-Physician Contracts After Jefferson Parish Hospital District v.
Hyde, 54 Miss. L.J. 1, 16-17 (1984) [hereinafter Clark, Ties That May Bind].





306. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988).
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to the Court, the test is whether or not the restraint is the product of a horizontal
agreement. 7 In other words, is the challenged "contract, combination or conspir-
acy" between direct competitors, or between actors at different levels in the mar-
ket?
308
The characterization of a concerted action as either "horizontal" or "vertical" is
quite important. If the conduct involves agreement or coordinated action of com-
petitors, i.e., a horizontal arrangement, it is much more likely to be seen as unrea-
sonable, with no redeeming justification .3' Thus, the conduct is more likely to be
evaluated under the per se rule. We shall review the elements of several horizontal
restraints deemed to violate section 1.
a. Price-Fixing or Other Arrangements Affecting Price
Perhaps no horizontal arrangement is seen as more damaging to competition,
and less likely to have any redeeming social value, than price-fixing by competi-
tors. Any arrangement which has the effect of stabilizing prices is prohibited, re-
gardless of whether the parties use direct or indirect means to achieve the result. A
significant and illustrative decision is United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. ,310
which held that an agreement to stabilize market prices by indirect means repre-
sented a per se violation of section 1, even though no prices were actually fixed:
"Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect
of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in
interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se."'31 The Supreme Court found that
the defendant gasoline refiners' attempts to stabilize market prices, albeit indi-
rectly, were prohibited even if the defendants did not have the market power to fix
prices in a particular market. 12 Any such horizontal agreement affecting price is
prohibited, and the defendant is not entitled to show how the practice might be
"reasonable" for some other purpose.
The courts have applied the per se rule to a variety of direct horizontal price-
fixing arrangements. These include "conspiracies to submit noncompetitive
rigged bids and thereby allocate successful bids among competitors[,] agreements
to adhere to a price book[,] and, in certain circumstances, agreements among
competitors to engage in cooperative price advertising."313 Other agreements di-
rectly affecting price, but not setting the ultimate price, have been held to be vio-
lations. These include agreements to limit production or set quotas; 314 to limit
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. ("Restraints imposed by agreement between competitors have traditionally been denominated as hori-
zontal restraints, and those imposed by agreement between firms at different levels of distribution as vertical re-
straints.").
310. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
311. Id. at 223.
312. Id. at 221.
313. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 63-64 (3d ed. 1992) (citations omitted).
314. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 406-07 (1945).
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discounts;31 to establish uniform costs and minimum mark-up percentages; 316 to
discontinue free service; 317 to use specified accounting methods when making res-
idential mortgage loans;318 to utilize standard cash down payment requirements;
319
or to fix any other component of price. 20
Section 1 of the Sherman Act also proscribes arrangements that may affect
price only indirectly, although the more remote the probable effect upon price the
more likely that rule-of-reason analysis, rather than the per se rule, will apply.
Some practices that have been held to be improper means of indirectly controlling
prices include agreements among competitors to set quotas or limit production,321
to limit business (showroom) hours ,322 and to restrict price advertising .
3
However suspect an agreement that affects price may be, if the practice is suffi-
ciently removed from direct effect on price, it may escape per se treatment. In
United States v. Brown University,324 the court dealt with an agreement by the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology [hereinafter MIT] and other universities to es-
tablish the amount of financial aid to be provided to applicants who were accepted
by more than one of the participating schools. The district court used a "quick
look" rule-of-reason analysis, finding that financial aid incentives were an impor-
tant feature of student recruitment and found "abundant and uncontroverted evi-
dence that the fundamental objective of the Ivy Overlap Group was to eliminate
price competition among the member institutions."325 While the district court de-
clined to apply the per se rule, it also refused to analyze the actual economic ef-
fects of the concerted action. However, the Third Circuit reversed and
remanded the case for a more complete assessment of MIT's arguments that the
challenged practice, the "overlap plan," served several beneficial objectives, such
as promoting competition for qualified applicants on non-price criteria and im-
proving competition by expanding the educational choices for certain applicant
groups.327 The court of appeals felt the complete rule-of-reason analysis was
315. United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 185-88 (3d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
316. California Retail Grocers & Merchants Ass'n v. United States, 139 E2d 978 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
322 U.S. 729 (1944).
317. United States v. Acquafredda, 834 F.2d 915, 917 (1 1th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 980 (1988).
318. Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 487 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1973).
319. Plymouth Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 279 F.2d 128, 134 (9th Cir. 1960).
320. See, e.g., Ancar v. Sara Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 1992) (alleged conspiracy among
blood plasma suppliers to "keep the purchase price of plasma artificially low" by "agreeing not to set the price
based on market demand"); United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,092
(D.D.C. 1992) (use of ATP's computerized fare dissemination services to propose, and thus broadcast or negoti-
ate, fare adjustments, among other practices).
321. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 406-07 (1945).
322. In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, 955 F.2d 457 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 461 (1992).
323. United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961).
324. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993) (all defendants other than MIT had entered into a consent decree before the
trial).
325. 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,942 (E.D. Pa. 1992), rev, 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cit. 1993).
326. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 664.
327. Id. at 678-79.
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appropriate because the challenged "overlap plan" might be justified by its ten-
dency to increase applicant choice and because the participating schools did not
have the degree of economic self interest that might otherwise cast suspicion on
their stated public interest rationales for the financial assistance collaboration.328
b. Division of Markets or Customers Among Competitors
Following close behind price-fixing schemes as likely candidates for per se pro-
hibition are agreements by actual or potential competitors to divide or allocate
markets. Like price-fixing agreements, such horizontal agreements are held un-
reasonable per se.329 It is now clear that unlawful agreements to divide markets-
i.e., agreements that each competitor will not sell in the other's designated
territory -are not limited to agreements between actual competitors to divide up a
market in which they already do business. The prohibition of market division also
extends to potential competitors who agree not to enter each other's territory.330
Agreements between or among competitors not to sell to specified customers are
very similar to agreements to divide sales territories. In both situations competi-
tors are agreeing to divide, and not compete against each other for, the available
business. Similarly, arrangements have been held per se unlawful when a potential
competitor agrees not to sell a particular product or product line to specified cus-
tomers. All of these types of arrangements have been held to be per se violations of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.
331
c. Horizontal Refusals to Deal ("Group Boycotts")
If competitors agree among themselves not to deal with other competitors, cus-
tomers, or suppliers, this concerted action may be subject to per se liability as a
"group boycott" or "concerted refusal to deal." Some courts in recent years have
declined, however, to apply the per se rule and have, instead, analyzed the ar-
rangement under the rule of reason.
Earlier in this century, a horizontal refusal to deal was found in cases such as a
group of retailers, as a group, refusing to deal with wholesalers who sold directly
to consumers.332 Then, in 1959, the Supreme Court treated as a per se offense an
328. Id. at 677.
329. See Palmer v. BRG, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972);
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
330. Palmer, 498 U.S. at 46.
331. See, e.g., TopcoAssocs., 405 U.S. 596; Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Johnson, 123 F2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1941).
332. See, e.g., Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 433 (1910) (affirming Mississippi Supreme
Court decision at 48 So. 1021); see Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914). For example, in Grenada Lumber, a group of retail lumber dealers agreed not to deal with any lumber
manufacturer or wholesale dealer who sold direct to consumers. The State of Mississippi brought suit for injunc-
tive relief under a Mississippi antitrust statute, the predecessor of section 75-21-1. The Mississippi Supreme
Court affirmed an injunction to dissolve the association of agreeing retailers. Similarly, in Retail Lumber Deal-
ers' Ass'n v. State Attorney Gen., 48 So. 1021, 1023 (Miss. 1909), the Mississippi Supreme Court dealt with an
association of retail lumber dealers who agreed "to buy only from manufacturers and wholesalers who do not sell
direct to customers." The court found that it did not need to inquire into the reasonableness of the conduct-
whether or not it was designed to prevent "unfair" competition - because the legislature must have considered
such a possibility and provided no such exception.
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alleged conspiracy among manufacturers and distributors not to sell to Klor's, a
retail competitor of a store that had approached the manufacturers and distribu-
tors, or to sell to it only at higher prices or on unfavorable terms. The Supreme
Court rejected defendants' arguments that there was no "intent" to affect prices
since there were other stores in the area selling the same products. 334 The Court
said these types of joint conduct, "[g]roup boycotts, or concerted refusals by trad-
ers to deal with other traders," were forbidden, regardless of any actual effect on
competition.335
Numerous lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead in Klor's, Inc.
v. Broadway-Hale Stores in treating group boycotts as per se violations of section
1. In 1985, however, the Supreme Court found that the defendant Wholesale Pur-
chasing Cooperative, which had expelled one of its members without explanation
or hearing, did not possess sufficient market power to affect competition .33 Thus,
no injury to competition will be presumed if the excluding or boycotting busi-
nesses do not have such market share and do not control exclusive access to some-
thing the excluded business must have to compete.
Also, a refusal to deal may not be horizontal, but vertical, such as a challenged
agreement between a health maintenance organization and its participating physi-
cians. One court has found that per se treatment for group boycotts "is principally
reserved for cases in which competitors agree with each other not to deal with a
supplier or distributor if it continues to serve a competitor whom they seek to in-
jure."337 This arrangement is more of a vertical arrangement, not a horizontal re-
fusal to deal, and would not be subject to per se condemnation.
38
Finally, in an important case from Mississippi, the United States Supreme
Court held that there could be no common law liability for consumer boycotts of
business that are politically motivated and designed to use economic force to ef-
fect political change. InNAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. ," retail merchants of
Port Gibson and Claiborne County sued the NAACP and other organizations and
individuals for a conspiracy to boycott their businesses. The merchants alleged,
among other things, that the defendants' activities constituted a secondary boycott
in violation of Mississippi Code section 75-21-1, as an unlawful horizontal boy-
cott. 3' The merchants also claimed the defendants' conduct constituted an unlaw-
ful common law boycott effected by violence or threats of violence.341 The
Mississippi Supreme Court held that the facts provided no claim under the Missis-
sippi antitrust law, because that law "has no application to boycotts to achieve
333. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 209 (1959).
334. Id. at 210.
335. Id. at 210-12.
336. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,294-96 (1985).
337. United States Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 593 (1st Cir. 1993).
338. Id.
339. 458 U.S. 886, 920-24 (1982), rev g 393 So. 2d 1290 (Miss. 1980).
340. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 920-24.
341. Id.
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political goals."342 However, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the use of
force, violence, or threats made the boycott illegal, "regardless of whether it is pri-
mary, secondary, economical, political, social, or other."
343
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that "all of respondents'
losses were not proximately caused by violence or threats of violence."s" Rather,
the evidence showed this was a political boycott and any random acts of violence,
if indeed there were any - "[t]he chancellor made no finding that any act of vio-
lence occurred after 1966"-did not cause the alleged damages .3' Rather, the de-
fendants were exercising their constitutional right to free speech under the First
Amendment, and the state had no authority to compensate the merchants for "the
direct consequences of nonviolent, constitutionally protected activity. "346
3. Vertical Restraints of Trade
Vertical restraints arise out of agreements between buyers and sellers operating
at different levels in the chain of distribution of the same product or service -
between, for example, a wholesaler and a retailer, or a manufacturer and a distrib-
utor. Whether a particular vertical agreement is proscribed under section 1 of the
Sherman Act depends upon the existence of concerted action and on the type of
restraint. A manufacturer's independent action has always been recognized as pro-
tected from liability under section 1.3" Likewise, there may be a variety of pro-
competitive reasons for arrangements between, for example, manufacturers and
retailers; thus, almost all vertical arrangements are analyzed under the rule of rea-
son. The only vertical restraints that are per se violations, thus requiring no proof
of the unreasonableness of the restraint (i.e., any actual effect on competition),
are agreements to fix the purchaser's resale price or price levels. After brief con-
sideration of vertical restraints that involve some agreement on price or price lev-
els, we turn to some of the more common vertical non-price restraints.
a. Vertical Price Restraints
Vertical price restrictions may come in a number of forms, all of which are sub-
ject to the per se rule. The per se prohibition had its origin in a 1911 decision, Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.3" In that decision, the Supreme
Court held that the agreement between a drug manufacturer and its customers to
observe a minimum resale price was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman
342. Claiborne Hardware, 393 So. 2d at 1304.
343. Id. at 1301. The court found that this conduct violated Mississippi Code § 97- 23-83, which makes a crim-
inal offense any threatening, intimidating, or coercing a person to prevent him or her from doing business with
another. Id.
344. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 922.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); Walker v. U-Haul of Miss., 734 F.2d 1068, 1071
(5th Cir. 1984); Aladdin Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 608 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1979).
348. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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Act. The Court stressed that this maintenance of resale price infringed on the free-
dom of the dealers to sell products that they own.349
Even an agreement setting maximum resale prices is a per se violation. 3" This
prohibition of a vertical agreement regarding maximum prices is just as much a
violation, and a possible civil action, as a horizontal agreement, one among com-
petitors, to fix maximum prices. 351 Further, a dealer termination or other vertical
refusal to deal may be a per se violation, if it involves "some agreement on price or
price levels."" 2 However, even if a manufacturer and a distributor agreed that the
manufacturer would terminate another distributor because of that other distribu-
tor's pricing practices, there would be no per se violation unless there was some
understanding of what the prices or price levels would be by the remaining distrib-
utor.3
53
b. Tying and Exclusive Dealing Arrangements
A tying arrangement occurs when the seller of a product or service in one prod-
uct market will sell his product or service to a buyer only if the buyer agrees to
purchase, in addition, a second, distinct product or service. Tying has been pro-
hibited on the ground that a manufacturer or other seller should not be able to use
her power or position in one product market to advance her position in a different
product market on a basis other than the competitive merits of both products. 5
Some arrangements do not have all of the critical characteristics of a tying ar-
rangement and may simply be characterized as an" 'exclusive dealing' agreement
or contract," in which a buyer agrees to deal with or obtain all of its requirements
from only one seller or supplier. 5 Exclusive dealing arrangements foreclose a
certain amount of competition in the market for the seller's product or service,
but courts have long recognized that there may be a variety of justifications
349. Id. at 407-08. Later, there were efforts to avoid this decision by use of consignment arrangements, by
which the retailer never actually owned the products he was selling at the agreed minimum price. The Supreme
Court reached differing results in the two cases, depending upon whether the Court saw the consignment ar-
rangement as serving a legitimate business purpose, or whether the arrangement was a "sham." See United States
v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926) (upholding consignment arrangement); Simpson v. Union Oil
Co., 377 U.S. 13, 20-21 (1964) (finding the consignment system served "no legitimate business purpose" but
was only a cover for a price-fixing scheme).
350. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968) ("[Algreements to fix maximum prices 'no less than
those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance
with their own judgment.' " (quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213
(1951))).
351. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (reaffirming Kiefer-Stewart Co.,
340 U.S. at 213).
352. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1988).
353. Id. In a recent case one district court and the court of appeals imposed sanctions on a plaintiffs counsel for
failing to observe the Business Electronics holding that there is no per se illegality unless there is actual agreement
on price or price levels. In A-Abart Electric Supply v. Emerson Electric Co., 956 F2d 1399 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 194 (1992), the plaintiff complained that Emerson stopped selling its new line of ceiling fans
to plaintiff because a competing dealer said it would not carry Emerson's new fan line if Emerson also sold to the
plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged a horizontal restraint and a per se violation of§ 1 of the Sherman Act. Both the district
court and the court of appeals noted the absence of any alleged agreement on price or price levels, said plaintiff s
case "flies in the face" of Business Electronics, and imposed sanctions on plaintiffs counsel. Id.
354. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
355. See, e.g., Clark, Ties That May Bind, supra note 300, at 11-15.
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warranting such arrangements. For example, a car manufacturer may decide in a
particular year to buy tires for its automobiles only from Goodyear. This decision
could be based on considerations of quality, competitive bidding, or administra-
tive convenience.
If such an arrangement were prohibited, the auto manufacturer might simply in-
tegrate its operations forward into the tire manufacturing industry and make its
own tires. The antitrust laws are not seen as encouraging such partial vertical inte-
gration of operations - and the resulting increased concentration of industry - by
discouraging what would seem like a perfectly reasonable business decision to
deal, for some limited time, with only one seller or supplier.
Because the buyer in an exclusive dealing contract is ordinarily not itself selling
the product that it is purchasing- except as a part of the resulting package, such as
an automobile with tires - such exclusive arrangements are seen as strictly vertical
ones. Exclusive dealing arrangements have been held to have less potential for
misuse of market power than tying arrangements, in which the tying product seller
may use its power in one product market to profit and affect competitive condi-
tions in a completely different product market. 56 Because of this lessened poten-
tial for abuse of power in a particular product market, courts have responded less
harshly to exclusive dealing arrangements than to tying arrangements. Courts are
more willing to consider the possible justifications for an exclusive arrangement
and will examine the purpose for the arrangement and its actual effects on compe-
tition - i.e., a rule-of-reason analysis. "'
On the other hand, tying arrangements have not been seen as having the same
potential for redeeming justification and have been subjected to the per se rule.
Unlawful tying is said to have no purpose or effect other than the unfair intrusion
into, and unfair profit and competition in, the market for the tied product. While
some commentators have questioned this presumption of harm to competition, 3 8
courts consistently have found tying to be so offensive to the values underlying the
antitrust laws that unlawful tying has been held to be a per se violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act.
35 9
Four explicit characteristics of unlawful tying arrangements are generally rec-
ognized by courts: 1) two separate products, the tying product and the tied prod-
uct, are involved; 2) the sale of one product or service is "conditioned" on the
purchase of another; 3) the seller has sufficient market power in the tying product
market to coerce purchase of the tied product; and 4) the arrangement affects a
"not insubstantial amount" of interstate commerce. 60
356. Clark, Ties That May Bind, supra note 300.
357. Clark, Ties That May Bind, supra note 300, at 14-15.
358. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 259, at 365-81; see Clark, Ties That May Bind, supra note 300, at 15-21.
359. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
360. See, e.g., Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,498- 99 (1969) [hereinafter Fortner
1]; Clark, Ties That May Bind, supra note 300, at 23.
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Some courts also require a plaintiff to establish an anti-competitive effect in the
market for the tied product; 36 ' however, other courts have held that this proof of
effect is part of the rule-of-reason inquiry and need not be addressed if the ar-
rangement in question is determined to be a per se violation.6 2
An additional characteristic also has been recognized as implicit in unlawful
tying arrangements: competition by the seller of the tying product in the market
for the tied product, either by selling the tied product itself or through an entity in
which it has an interest, or by receiving direct rebates or profits from another sale
of the tied product.36 3
There are no Mississippi state court decisions addressing tying arrangements.
However, the Mississippi Supreme Court has described as "monopolistic prac-
tices" a case where a defendant lumber company agreed to provide credit advances
to a ready-mix concrete company in return for the concrete company's agreeing to
purchase all of its cement from the lumber company and at a specified price.364 In
that decision, however, the Mississippi Supreme Court did not bother to analyze
whether the lumber company owner had any market power in the market for the
"tying product," i.e., the extension of credit. Indeed, on the facts of the case, the
lumber company owner would not appear to have any distinctive credit product,
and certainly none that could not also be offered, perhaps at even better rates, by
someone else, such as a local bank.365
c. Vertical Refusals to Deal
Vertical refusals to deal usually relate to a manufacturer's terminating an exist-
ing distributor or refusing to enter into a relationship in the first instance with a
distributor. If the manufacturer's action is used to enforce another antitrust vio-
lation, such as a tying arrangement, that violation would be held to the same
361. See, e.g., Crossland v. Canteen Corp., 711 F.2d 714, 722 (5th Cir. 1983).
362. See, e.g., Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486, 1503 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
363. Keener v. Sizzler Family Steak Houses, 597 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1979); Griffing v. Lucius 0. Crosby
Memorial Hosp., 1984-I Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,854 (S.D. Miss. 1984); Clark, Ties That May Bind, supra note
300, at 23-30. A recent decision misread Jefferson Parish as "disproving" such a "phantom fourth element" of a
per se tying violation. In Action Ambulance Service v. Atlanticare Health Services, 815 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass.
1993), the district court rejected the defendant's argument for dismissal on the ground that a firm cannot commit
a per se tying violation unless that firm participates as a seller in the markets for both the tying and tied products.
Id. at 36-37. The court seriously misread Jefferson Parish, however. As noted by the Fifth Circuit in Jefferson
Parish, the hospital, as the seller of the tying product or service, plainly was participating in and profiting from
sales in the tied product market. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 686 F2d 286, 291 (5th Cir. 1982).
The Fifth Circuit noted that the defendant hospital in reality was contracting with a small group of anesthesiol-
ogists and letting those physicians supervise a larger group of lower-priced anesthetists, but billing the patients
the higher fee which an anesthesiologist would have charged if he or she, rather than the hospital's anesthetist,
had provided all of the professional services. Id. at 287-88. Since the hospital and anesthesiology group billed
jointly and split the fees evenly after deductions, this led to the hospital's realizing a substantial profit from the
sale of the tied product, anesthesia services. Id. at 287-88, 291.
364. Ready-Mix Concrete & Concrete Prods. Co. v. Perry, 123 So. 2d 241, 244-45 (Miss. 1960).
365. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 620- 21 (1977) [hereinafter Fortner
1/] (Defendant had conditioned the grant of loans at quite favorable rates on Fortner's agreement to purchase de-
fendant's prefabricated homes; the Supreme Court found insufficient evidence in the record that the defendant,
U.S. Steel, had sufficient economic power in the market for the tying product; "the question is whether the seller
has some advantage not shared by his competitors in the market for the tying product.").
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standard as the underlying violation, a per se violation of section 1."' In other sit-
uations the refusal to deal may accompany or be used to enforce such restraints as
territorial or customer restrictions, or exclusive dealing arrangements, and would,
like those restraints, be subject to analysis under the rule of reason.36 7
In a recent Mississippi case, a new cable system operator that was seeking to
"overbuild" areas already served by other cable service providers claimed that ex-
clusive contracts between the existing cable companies, ESPN and the Learning
Channel, constituted a conspiracy to prevent overbuilders from entering certain
cable services markets. 38
The district court deemed the effect of the exclusive agreements to be "insignif-
icant" and found that the plaintiff-overbuilder had arranged alternative sources of
programming. Indeed, the exclusive contracts may have increased interbrand
competition by forcing overbuilders to seek alternative programming suppliers
and providing business for those suppliers.370
Dismissing the complaint, the district court rejected Futurevision's contention
that the elimination of all intrabrand competition would be a sufficiently anti-
competitive effect to survive a motion to dismiss.371 The court noted that under the
Supreme Court decision in Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. ,372 a distrib-
utor who is complaining about his elimination in favor of another distributor must
allege an anti-competitive effect at the interbrand level of competition. 73
The district court also did not buy the plaintiff-overbuilder's argument that it
need not prove that the two cable suppliers, ESPN and the Learning Channel, had
market power in the interbrand market for cable programming if plaintiff could
show that its ability to compete in the interbrand cable services market was signifi-
cantly restricted as a result of the two exclusive contracts .3" The court held that it
must analyze the market power of those two programming suppliers and the pro-
gramming market to determine whether the exclusive contracts had anti-competi-
tive effects on interbrand competition, i.e., competition between and among
programming suppliers ." The plaintiff did not offer proof regarding the market
shares of ESPN and the Learning Channel, and the court dismissed the claims.
While some lower court decisions have looked at whether the purpose or "mo-
tive" behind a manufacturer's decision to terminate a distributor might be
366. See, e.g., Barbara & Ross Co. v. Lifetime Doors, Inc., 810 F.2d 1276, 1280(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 823 (1987).
367. See, e.g., Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-59 (1977); Mendelovitz v.
Adolph Coors Co., 693 F.2d 570,576-78 (5th Cir. 1982); Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268,272-73
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954).
368. Futurevision Cable Sys. v. Multivision Cable TV Corp., 789 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. Miss. 1992).
369. Id. at 769.
370. Id. at 770.
371. Id. at 766.
372. 433 U.S. 36, 52 (1977).
373. Futurevision Cable Sys. v. Multivision Cable TV Corp., 789 F. Supp. 760, 768 (S.D. Miss. 1992).
374. Id.
375. Id. at 768-69.
376. Id. at 768-71.
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anti-competitive,377 the Supreme Court emphasizes an examination of the actual
anti-competitive effect of such purpose or "intent."378 Some courts have suggested
that, in the absence of any anti-competitive effect, an anti-competitive "motive" or
"intent" will not make a refusal to deal unlawful under the rule of reason.
379
C. Monopolization and Attempt to Monopolize Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Mississippi Law
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or per-
sons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states,
or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ....
Mississippi's corresponding statute is Mississippi Code section 75-21-3, which
provides in relevant part:
Any corporation ... or individual, partnership, or association of persons what-
soever, who, with intent to accomplish the results herein prohibited or without such
intent, shall accomplish such results to a degree inimicable to public welfare, and
shall thus:
b) ... monopolize or attempt to monopolize the production, control, or sale of
any commodity, or the prosecution, management or control of any kind, class or de-
scription of business;
d) or shall destroy or attempt to destroy competition in the manufacture or sale of
a commodity, by selling or offering the same for sale at a lower price at one place in
the state than another or buying or offering to buy a commodity at a higher price at
one place in the state than another, differences of freight and other necessary ex-
penses of sale and delivery considered;
. e) or shall destroy or attempt to destroy competition by rendering any service or
manipulating, handling, or storing any commodity for a less price in one location
than in another, the differences in the necessary expenses of carrying on the business
considered, shall be deemed and held a trust and combine within the meaning and
purpose of this section, and shall be liable . as in case of other trusts and com-
bines.
It shall be sufficient to make out a prima facie case of a violation of subdivision
(e) of this section to show lower charge for the service therein mentioned in one lo-
cality than another, or to show a higher price paid for a commodity in one location
than another, differences of freight and other necessary expenses of operating busi-
ness considered.38 1
377. See, e.g., Aladdin Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107, 1115-16 (5th Cir. 1979).
378. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-95 (1986).
379. See, e.g., Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 1988); H&B Equip. Co. v.
International Harvestor Co., 577 F.2d 239, 246 (5th Cir. 1978).
380. 15 U.S.C. §2 (1988).
381. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-21-3 (1991).
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The monopolization cases in Mississippi have related almost entirely to the use
of significant price reductions in one or some (but not all) locales to maintain a
company's dominance or monopoly in a market. As is clear from the relevant stat-
ute, section 75-21-3, one's "motive" or "intent" is not really relevant. It is one's
conduct and its effects that count.82 The decisions bear this out.
Above in Part IV and later in Part XI, we discuss most of the relevant decisions,
although not in an antitrust law context. Thus, for example, Memphis Steam Laun-
dry-Cleaners v. Lindsey383 was not brought under the antitrust statutes perhaps for
purposes of venue." As discussed above in Part IV, the defendant in that case
plainly ran afoul of the pricing prohibitions of section 75-21-3(d) or (e). It does
not take any evidence of overt threats to divine an anti-competitive objection from
the defendant's pricing far below its own costs. 1
8
A later decision, dealing specifically with the state antitrust laws, helps make
the point. In Wagley v. Colonial Bakery Co. ,386 the Mississippi Supreme Court
made it quite clear that one can be held liable for his conduct alone. Proof of words
or other expressions of intent is quite unnecessary.
In Wagley, the plaintiff sued certain competing bakeries for conspiring to de-
stroy competition by, among other things, charging lower prices, including prices
below the cost of production, in areas where they competed with the plaintiff.387
The court noted that one begins with the right to charge whatever prices he
chooses .388 However, this right to charge or reduce one's own prices becomes un-
lawful where one's conduct shows that "the exercise of the right [the reduction of
prices] was [done] with the object of injuring the third person rather than primar-
ily of benefitting the person exercising the right." '389 The court noted that all three
defendants, one of which had never cut its prices before, set their price of bread in
Jackson, where they competed with plaintiff, at a price which was "below the cost
of production," and which obviously was lower than their prices outside Jack-
son. 
390
Just as a court need not have overt evidence of a party's intent or motive, a court
may infer conspiracy (agreement) from conduct-"from the things actually
382. As a start, § 75-21-3 specifically provides that one will be liable for the proscribed conduct whether he is
with "or without such intent." Id.
383. 5 So. 2d 227 (Miss. 1941).
384. The court in that case rejects a challenge to its jurisdiction, "the suit not having been brought under any
anti-trust law so as to render it necessary that the same be filed in the county where the defendant has a domicile
or place of business or its agent may be found, as provided for by Section 3445, CODE OF 1930 [Section 75-21-19
(1972)]." The suit could not have been brought in Prentiss County under that statute because the nonresident
corporate defendant's resident agent for the service of process lived in Tupelo, Lee County. Memphis Steam Laun-
dry, 5 So. 2d at 229, 230.
385. Id. at 232.
386.45 So. 2d 717 (Miss. 1950).
387. Id. at 718.
388. Id. at 720.
389. Id. at 722.
390. Id. at 719.
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done. "391 As discussed later in Part XI, circumstantial evidence - such as charging
a price which would ultimately lead one to bankruptcy -is sufficient to establish
that an action was taken with the objective of monopolizing or attempting to de-
stroy competition.392 Memphis Steam Laundry simply had proof of the facts that
are not found in many cases and are not necessary for liability: "[Memphis Steam
Laundry is] the only case we can find where proof was made by evidence of ex-
press threats." 3
Finally, the court in Wagley made it clear that the phrase "inimicable to public
welfare," contained for example in sections 75-21-1 and 75-21-3, does not add an
element of proof.394 That phrase, in Mississippi antitrust law, means simply that all
of the conduct prohibited by the statute was determined by the legislature to be "in-
imicable to the public welfare. 395
VI. DECEPTIVE MARKETING
A. A Federal Statute, a State Statute, a Sprinkling
of Case Law, and a New Restatement
By reason of the Supremacy Clause, any understanding of the law of deceptive
marketing in this state must begin with and may never escape the Lanham Act.
396
There we find section 43(a) 391 prohibiting "false designation of origin, or any false
description or representation" which is generally understood "to proscribe the
passing off of goods and services."' 9 Historically, the courts read section 43(a)
rather restrictively. Some thought it did little more than codify the common law.399
Today the Act is seen as covering much more than conventional "passing off' and
its reach has been extended to areas such as false advertising and misrepresenta-
tion through false description."'
Our most prominent source of state law is the MUTPCPA,4 °' the liability
standards of which give considerable if clumsy flesh to the general proscription of
the Lanham Act. Before inquiring of these, there is a broader point we need note.
Marketing imports communications and communications import speech, and the
39 1. Id. at 722 ("[Clonspiracies are seldom capable of proof by direct testimony.").
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 720-21.
395. Id. at 721. See also Harvey v. State, 116 So. 98 (Miss. 1928) (monopolist in ice business in Water Valley
dropped retail prices to only slightly over previous wholesale price, what the court found to be "one-half of a
reasonable price to be paid for ice at that time," in order to undercut, not meet the prices of, a potential competi-
tor).
396. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988).
397. Id. at (a).
398. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4 cmt. b. (Tentative Draft 1994).
399. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923 (9i-h-Gi.-1954)-
400. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2 cmt. b. (Tentative Draft 1994); ALEXANDER, supra
note 30, at 67-71.
401. The MUTPCPA is codified at MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-1 to -131 (1991 & Supp. 1994), and in relevant
part mirrors the Federal Trade Commission's REVISED UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES & CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW
(1966) [hereinafter FTC's REVISED UTPCPL]. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 29 1970 SUGGESTED
STATE LEGISLATION 141, 146-47 (1969) (published in Lexington, Ky.).
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First Amendment limits the law's prerogatives in regulating speech. Though be-
low the exalted plane of the political, commercial speech enjoys First Amendment
protections and may be proscribed only where found false, deceptive, or mislead-
ing. 402
Initially, the MUTPCPA is similarly general, prohibiting "unfair methods of
competition" and "unfair or deceptive trade practices. 40 3 Thereafter, the
MUTPCPA declares as "prohibited" eleven loosely-worded and obviously some-
what overlapping categories of "unfair methods of competition and unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices. '4 4 As a matter of positive description, these fall into two
generic categories: (1) misleading trade identification; and (2) false or otherwise
deceptive advertising. Each adds a bit of flesh to the highly generalized proscrip-
tions of the federal and state law. Prudent lawyering blends the two, treating the
MUTPCPA as providing (at least) eleven spokes for the Lanham Act's umbrella.
We need to take a moment with each of these.
B. Passing Off
Section 75-24-5(2)(a) proscribes "passing off [one's own] goods or services as
those of another."40 One court long ago called passing off "a convenient name for
the doctrine that no one should be allowed to sell his goods as those of another."406
"Passing off originally denominated unauthorized use of trade identification, but
today [1966] the term is also applied to cover substitution of a different brand of
goods for the one requested by a customer."407 Also known as "palming off," this
form of unfair competition was prohibited and made actionable under pre-
statutory Mississippi law.408 In Cockrell v. Davis,40 9 we find that" '[a] man must
use his own name honestly and not as a means of pirating upon the good will and
reputation of a rival bypassing offhis goods or business as the goods or business of
his rival who gave the name its reputation and value.' "410 There are two dimen-
sions to the "passing off' evil. At one level, the offender deceives consumers and
other buyers and interferes with their ability to distinguish among the goods and
services of competing suppliers. Vis-a-vis the competitor, the "passing off'
402. See, e.g., Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Business & Professional Regulation, 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
403. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(1) (1991).
404. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(2) (1991).
405. The FTC's REvISED UTPCPL § 2(1) (1966) ("Alternative Form No. 3") is verbatim identical.
406. Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F 509, 512 (6th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 706
(1926).
407. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 2(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 277 (1966).
408. See discussion in Walker, Common Law Protection, supra note 21, at 364-71; Walker, Business Torts, su-
pra note 27, at 6-11.
409. 23 So. 2d 256 (Miss. 1945).
410. Id. at 259 (quoting Carter v. Carter Elec. Co., 199 S.E. 737 (Ga. 1923) (emphasis added)).
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offender diverts trade and unjustly enriches himself as he seeks to enjoy the bene-
fits of favorable public perception of the competitor.411
A simple example may suffice. Bobby Baker runs a bakery of considerable re-
nown and sells breads, cakes, and pastries to local supermarkets which in turn sell
them to the public. Sheldon Schmuck operates a supermarket and for years sold
Baker's products. Baker, seeking to take advantage of its favorable market reputa-
tion, raises its prices. Most of Baker's customers accept the price increase, passing
them on to the consumer, but Schmuck refuses, in consequence of which Baker
discontinues supplying bakery products to Schmuck. Thereafter, Schmuck con-
tinues to represent falsely to its customers that its bread and bakery products have
been baked by Baker. In this example, Schmuck's passing its bakery products off
as Baker's products violates section 75-24-5(2)(a).412 The law labels and declares
what Schmuck is doing an unfair means of competition.
Following subsection (a)'s proscription of "passing off," section 75-24-5(2)
then continues to prohibit
(b) Misrepresentation of the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of
goods or services ;[413l
(c) Misrepresentation of affiliation, connection or association with, or certifi-
cation by another;[4141 [and]
(d) Misrepresentation of designations of geographic origin in connection with
goods or services.41
But a moment's reflection, and we see these three species of misrepresentation -
(b) through (d) - are each subspecies of the general sin of "passing off." Subsection
(e) in many ways is redundant. It proscribes "[r]epresenting that goods or services
have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quanti-
ties that they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affil-
iation, or connection that he does not have."416 A subsection (e) representation
"that goods or services have sponsorship [or] approval. . . that they do not have"
strikes me the same as a subsection (b) misrepresentation of the "sponsorship [or]
approval. . . of goods or services." A subsection (e) representation that a person
has an "affiliation or connection that he does not have" is the same as a subsection
(c) "misrepresentation of affiliation [or] connection . . . by another." The
411. Others have made the same points. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4 cmt. a (Tenta-
tive Draft 1994); Walker, Common Law Protection, supra note 21, at 364.
412. This example is an elaboration upon RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4 cmt. f (Tentative
Draft 1994).
413. The FTC's REVISED UTPCPL § 2(2) (1966) reads: "[Clausing likelihood of confusion or of misunder-
standing as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services." Id.
414. The FTC's REVISED UTPCPL § 2(3) (1966) reads: "[Clausing likelihood of confusion or of misunder-
standing as to affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by, another." Id.
415. The FTC's REVISED UTPCPL § 2(4) (1966) reads: "[Ulsing deceptive representations or designations of
geographic origin in connection with goods or services." Id.
416. The FTC's REVISED UTPCPL § 2(5) (1966) is verbatim identical.
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draftsmen of the statute were no doubt lawyers and, like the present author, would
never use one word when two or three would do just as well.
The new Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition provides certain organiz-
ing principles, and, while the Restatement has no power to amend the statute, it
may, with profit, be brought to bear on our reading of the statute and our efforts to
see meaning and coherence in it. We have studied the Restatement with care and
have compared it with the Lanham Act and the MUTPCPA, reading the statutes
together and treating the latter as an elaboration of the former. When we do this,
we find the new Restatement carries us well along the way to that reading of the
law of deceptive marketing that best fits and flows from the best justification of its
texts.
Restatement sections 4 and 5 offer helpful insights regarding "passing off."4 7
First and foremost, the Restatement lets us see the commonality between and
among the statutorily-prohibited acts and practices. Subsections (a) through (e) of
section 75-24-5(2) are so similar that they could and probably should be coalesced
into a single standard, although experience teaches we need a bit more than the
highly generalized phraseology of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The Restate-
ment combines these into a single standard that it then subdivides along lines more
sensible and illuminating and quite different from the form of the statute, yet con-
sistent with its substance. The Restatement helps us see that passing off and mis-
representation of source, and the like, take on two forms and are best seen as a
coin both sides of which are easily grasped and understood. Section 4's direct
"passing off" occurs when the market participant markets his goods or services so
as to pass them off as the goods and services of another. Section 5 addresses the
converse circumstance, reverse passing off, if you will. It occurs when the market
participant markets another's goods and services so as to pass them off as his own
or those ofa third party. By reference to the statute, whether the market participant
claims another's goods are his or whether he attributes his goods or services to an-
other, we still have a case of "passing off goods or services as those of another."4"8
All of this is easily "false designation of origin, or any false description or repre-
sentation" within the Lanham Act.4"'
417. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4 (Tentative Draft 1994) reads as follows:
One is subject to liability to another if, in marketing its goods or services, it makes a representation
likely to deceive or mislead prospective purchasers by causing them to believe falsely that its business is
the business of the other, or that it is the agent, affiliate, or other associate of the other, or that the goods
or services that it markets are produced, sponsored, or approved by the other.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5 (Tentative Draft 1994) reads as follows:
One is subject to liability to another if, in marketing goods or services manufactured, produced, or oth-
erwise supplied by the other, it makes a representation likely to deceive or mislead prospective pur-
chasers by causing them to believe falsely that it or a third party is the original manufacturer, producer, or
supplier of the goods or services, if the representation is also to the likely commercial detriment of the
other under the rule stated in § 3.
Id.
418. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(2)(a) (1991).
419. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
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The Restatement adds more. It helps us see the law provides no per se rule.
Misrepresentations are actionable only if they are "likely to deceive or mislead
prospective purchasers." 42' Not only this, to be actionable a misrepresentation
must deceive or mislead in a particular way directly related to the misrepresenta-
tion; that is, it must be likely to lead prospective customers to believe the particu-
lar, misrepresentation. Restatement commentary makes clear "proof of actual
deception is not required." 21 Rather, what the plaintiff must show is that the mis-
representation "creates a likelihood that a significant number of prospective pur-
chasers will be deceived or misled with respect to the identity or commercial
affiliation of the actor or the source or sponsorship of its goods or services." '422 Put
otherwise, "[i]t is sufficient if the representation is likely to deceive or mislead a
significant portion of its audience."423
This standard has its precursors in the Lanham Act.424 We may find it in this
state's case law as well. In Dollar Department Stores v. Laub,42 the court said it
was "concerned with whether it is likely that the public will be misled and whether
the complaining party is likely to be injured. 426 Dollar Department Stores was a
trade name case. The plaintiff proved prior use of the name, and the court en-
joined the defendant's use of similar names likely to mislead or confuse the public,
without regard to defendant's intent.427 The principle on which the decision rests is
at least broad enough that "passing off' and other misrepresentation cases fit
within it.
The Restatement finds and sharpens this "likely to deceive" standard in cases
where a market participant is suing a said-to-be-offending competitor for "passing
off." The standard is also imbedded in the best reading of the MUTPCPA. For
example, section 75-24_9428 empowers the Attorney General to seek an injunction
to proceed against persons engaging in prohibited acts or practices and provides
that these proceedings may be had when the Attorney General first determines
420. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 4, 5 (Tentative Draft 1994). The Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, which, again, has not been enacted in Mississippi, uses a "likelihood of confusion or of mis-
understanding" standard. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 2(a)(2), (3), 7A U.L.A. 277 (1966). This
test is noted in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 729 cmt. a (1988), as "a phrase which has long been used in
statutes, Federal and State, and in court opinions. . . ." Id. Cf Dixieland Food Stores, Inc. v. Kelly's Big Star,
Inc., 391 So. 2d 633, 636 (Miss. 1980) (factually erroneous advertisement actionable only if proximate cause of
damages suffered by plaintiff).
42 1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4 cmt. c (Tentative Draft 1994).
422. Id.
423. Id. § 5 cmt. b.
424. See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821 (1 Ith Cir. 1982); Frisch's
Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982); Chevron
Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126
(1982). The Second Circuit, however, has taken a different view. Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique,
Inc., 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982).
425. 120 So. 2d 139 (Miss. 1960).
426. Id. at 142.
427. Id. at 143.
428. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-9 (1991).
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"that proceedings would be in the public interest."429 The "likely to deceive" inter-
pretation is a perfectly sensible one for giving flesh and content to the statutory "in
the public interest" standard. To the point, it proceeds from the bestjustification of
that standard. It is hard to see how such a proceeding would be in the public inter-
est if the otherwise actionable conduct is not reasonably likely to deceive a sub-
stantial portion of its audience. Conversely, "likely to deceive" seems a more
realistic reading of the rule than actual deception, particularly for prospective in-
junctive relief.
On the other hand, "likely to deceive" does not fit the law regarding a pur-
chaser's action for damages under section 75-24-15(1).430 That statute provides a
right of action for losses the consumer sustains "as a result of' the vendor's use of
an act or practice prohibited by the statute.431 If the consumer has not in fact been
deceived, it seems only sensible to say that his loss has not been a result of the ven-
dor's act or practice.
In Part IV we massaged the perennial problem whether proscribed conduct
must have been intentional before the law will treat it as actionable. Neither the
Lanham Act nor the MUTPCPA proscription of "passing off"' 2 mentions intent.
A review of the different statutory formula fails to yield any limitation of the tort to
"intentionally passing off." Restatement commentary articulates the point. While
noting that "fraudulent intent" was an essential element of the traditional common
law action for deceit, we are told this view has been abandoned. Specifically, the
commentary notes that "[s]tate and federal legislation, including § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act. . . have. . . dispensed with the necessity of establishing an intent
to deceive in connection with misrepresentations of source and other deceptive
misrepresentations relating to the actor's goods and services.""' The Restatement
commentary goes on to make clear the rule at hand is to be regarded as presenting
an objective or external standard. "Liability under this section is determined by an
evaluation of the probable consequences of the actor's conduct and does not de-
pend on subjective intent." '434 The Restatement view seems wholly consistent with
settled Mississippi case law in the field. 35 In Dollar Department Stores, 43 the
court said: "[I]f the use of similar names results in confusion or unfair compe-
tition, the use is constructively fraudulent even though the act may be done
429. See also Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-21 (1991) (empowering district attorneys and county attorneys to pro-
ceed alone or in concert with or in assistance of the Attorney General).
430. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
431. Id.
432. See, e.g., UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICEs AcT § 2(l)-(5), 7A U.L.A. 277 (1966).
433. RESTATEMENT (ThIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4 cmt. d (Tentative Draft 1994). See also Walker, Busi-
ness Torts, supra note 27, at 6.
434. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4 cmt. d (Tentative Draft 1994). The commentary adds
the practical observation that evidence of intent to deceive "may justify the inference that deception is likely." Id.
Moreover, the presence of subjective intent to deceive may affect the relief awarded. The Restatement provides an
illustration to the effect that an unintentional "passing off" may be the predicate for prospective injunctive relief
but may not justify an award of actual damages or any other monetary relief. Id.
435. See supra Part IV.
436. 120 So. 2d 139 (Miss. 1960).
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innocently."437 That Dollar Department Stores was a trade name case imports no
difference in principle.
There is a related point, though it concerns another subsection of section 75-
24-5(2). With one exception438 not relevant here, nothing in the statute requires a
showing of intent before acts or practices may be actionable. Yet, Deer Creek
Construction Co. v. Peterson39 superficially construes the statute as identifying
eleven species of fraud. While it appears that in a fit of pleading excess the plaintiff
had charged the defendant with fraud, citing the statute, this was hardly necessary
to a successful action." 0 If the statute does not require intent, it certainly does not
require a showing of fraud- defining fraud as intent-plus. Deer Creek, an opinion
hardly marked for its clarity, rejects the plaintiffs claim on alternate grounds but
does so "first" on the ground "that there was no fraud proven by clear and convinc-
ing evidence."4 1 To the extent that this is a construction of the statute, it is simply
wrong," 2 and that it just does not fit the legal text is only one of the reasons it is
wrong.
C. Puffing
The next two specifications of prohibited acts or practices within the
MUTPCPA fall into a different category. These are:
(f) Representing that goods are original or new if they are reconditioned, re-
claimed, used, or secondhand;["3 1[and]
(g) Representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or
grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of an-
other."4
Here, rather than addressing misrepresentations regarding the source or origin of
goods or services, the Act addresses false statements regarding condition or qual-
ity. Indeed, some parts of subsection (e) fall within this category: "Representing
that goods or services have . . . characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or
quantities that they do not have."44'
437. Id. at 143 (citing Cockrell v. Davis, 23 So. 2d 256 (Miss. 1945); Meridian Yellow Cab Co. v. City Yellow
Cabs, 41 So. 2d 14 (Miss. 1949)).
438. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(2)(i), 0) (1991).
439. 412 So. 2d 1169 (Miss. 1982).
440. Id. at 1171.
441. Id. at 1173.
442. The opinion reflects that in "Count II," the plaintiff charged the defendant with "fraudulently" representing
certain facts and, "finally, that defendants committed a deceptive act as defined in . . . Section 75-24-5." Id. at
117 1. It is not clear from the summary of the complaint whether the plaintiff charged and treated his § 75-24-5
claim as one importing fraud or whether he was charging fraud independent of the statutory claim. To the extent
that plaintiff was proceeding on an independent fraud claim, of course, the clear and convincing evidence stand-
ard would apply. See McGory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 So. 2d 632, 637-38 (Miss. 1988).
443. The FTC's REvISED UTPCPL § 2(6) (1966) is identical, except that "deteriorated, altered" appear there
between "are" and "reconditioned." Id.
444. The FTC's REVISED UTPCPL § 2(7) (1966) is verbatim identical.
445. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5 (1991).
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The sort of representations proscribed here must have been made with some
level of specificity. It is generally regarded that sales talk or mere "puffing" about
the general virtues or vague merits of a product is not actionable. In Thomas v.
Mississippi Valley Gas Co. ,"6 the court quoted with obvious approval:
[T]he rule is well settled that mere general commendations of property sought to be
sold, commonly known as "trade talk," "dealer's talk," "seller's statement," or "puf-
fing," do not amount to actionable misrepresentations where the parties deal at arm's
length and have equal means of information and are equally qualified to judge the
value of the property sold." 7
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act also addresses the point, albeit in language
more general and vague than that of the MUTPCPA. Misrepresentations as to the
condition or quality of goods fall within "any false description or representation"
proscribed and made actionable under section 43 (a). Again, intent to misrepresent
is not required." As before, however, a section 43(a) misrepresentation action
must establish the materiality of the false or misleading statement and that the
statement has a tendency to mislead or deceive a substantial portion of the in-
tended audience. Again, as before, consumers lack standing under section
43(a)."' Considering the remedial provisions of the MUTPCPA, however, this is
not of great consequence.
The new Restatement addresses this category of deceptive trade practice, again
from the point of view of a competitor and not a consumer, and provides:
One is subject to liability to another if, in marketing goods or services of which
the other is truthfully identified as the manufacturer, producer, or supplier, it makes
a representation relating to those goods or services that is likely to deceive or mislead
prospective purchasers to the likely commercial detriment of the other under the
rule stated in § 3.45
In elaborating upon types of misrepresentations within this rule and by way of
distinction from the rules prohibiting "passing off," Restatement commentary pro-
vides:
The misrepresentations described in this Section are typically made in an attempt
to sell goods that the actor has on hand and are thus generally laudatory rather than
derogatory. The seller may assert, for example, that the goods are fresh when in fact
they are stale or deteriorated, that they are the manufacturer's latest style or highest
quality when in fact they are outdated or seconds, or that they are warranted by the
manufacturer in respects that exceed its actual undertaking ....
446. 113 So. 2d 535 (Miss. 1959).
447. Id. at 538 (quoting 23 AM. JUR. Fraud and Deceit § 33 (1958)).
448. Burndy Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 584 F Supp. 656 (D. Conn.), affd, 748 F2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984).
449. Colligan v. Activities Club, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
450. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6 (Tentative Draft 1994).
451. Id. § 6 cmt. b.
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Before a competitor may obtain relief, by way of injunction or damages, under this
section, he must show likely commercial detriment.
Commercial detriment to the party identified as the source of the goods or services
is likely if the misrepresentation threatens to divert trade from that party to the actor,
such as a misrepresentation by a seller that its used goods manufactured or supplied
by the other are new. A misrepresentation is also to the likely commercial detriment
of the manufacturer or supplier if it is likely to tarnish the reputation of the goods
among prospective purchasers. Indeed, the manufacturer's good will may some-
times suffer even among prospective customers who do not in fact purchase the
goods from the seller, but instead inspect and reject them under the false impression
that they represent the manufacturer's current output or highest quality merchan-
dise.452
D. Trade Libel
An arguably discrete form of unfair competition is defamation of product or
producer, traditionally known as commercial disparagement or trade libel or,
more recently, since the Restatement (Second) of Torts, injurious falsehood.
45 3
The Lanham Act does not expressly address the practice. Yet, the courts have re-
cently expanded their reading of section 43(a) to include claims for unfair compar-
ison advertising. Disparagement of a competitor's product may be integral to the
primary misrepresentation claim. 454 The MUTPCPA expressly prohibits "[d]is-
paraging the goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading repre-
sentation of fact."
455
Professor Walker has analogized trade libel to the more aged common law tort
known as slander of title, one element of which has always been that the false state-
ment have been published "with malice."45 Professor Walker goes on to consider
the several quite different definitions of malice employed by the Supreme Court of
Mississippi over the years and concludes, arguably correctly, that if malice is to be
required, it be held to mean "scienter (knowledge of falsity or acting in reckless
disregard of truth or falsity)" and not "the presence of ill-will (spiteful motive)."
But as we have seen, all of this begs the question whether malice, scienter, intent,
or whatever one wants to call it need be shown at all. 458 It is certainly true that inju-
rious falsehood within the Restatement (Second) of Torts requires, before liability
may be imposed for pecuniary loss, that the defendant has:
(a) [intended] for publication of the statement to result in harm to interests of
the other having a pecuniary value, or either recognizes or should recognize
that it is likely to do so, and
452. Id. § 6 cmt. c.
453. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1979).
454. ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 166.
455. The FTC's REVISED UTPCPL § 2(8) (1966) is verbatim identical.
456. Walker, Common Law Protection, supra note2l, at358. See, e.g., Phelps v. Clinkscales, 247 So. 2d 819,
821 (Miss. 1971); Walley v. Hunt, 54 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1951).
457. Walker, Common Law Protection, supra note 21, at 359.
458. See supra Part IV.
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(b) he knows that the statement is false or acts in reckless disregard of its truth
or falsity.4"9
Yet nothing in the Lanham Act requires a showing of intent before recovery may
be had under section 43(a) for deceptive marketing in the form of commercial dis-
paragement. Beyond this, the structure of the MUTPCPA precludes imposition of
any intent or malice standard. Section 75-24-5(2) sets forth the various prohibited
acts or practices and makes no requirement that they be shown to have been done
intentionally or with malice before they may be actionable.46 Section 75-24-9
empowers the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief against a practice pro-
scribed in section 75-24-5(2) upon a showing "that any person is using, has used,
or is about to use any method, act or practice prohibited by Section 75-24-5 ."4"1
Nothing is said about intent. Section 75-24-15(1), which authorizes consumers to
bring private rights of action, says nothing about intent. Only section 75-24-
19(l)(b) which empowers the court to award a civil penalty not to exceed ten thou-
sand dollars ($10,000.00) per violation requires the court to find that the
defendant has acted willfully. 462 The apt analogy here is the law of punitive dam-
ages, which has always addressed intentional conduct.4"3
No doubt we should consider seriously that the action for trade libel or injuri-
ous falsehood is the analogue of the common law action for slander of title. With-
out doubt, slander of title is regarded as an intentional tort with proof of malice or
intent a prerequisite to recovery. Moreover, we take quite seriously Restatement
formulations, because the Supreme Court of Mississippi so often takes them seri-
ously. On the other hand, there is no reason why either the common law analogies
or Restatement formulation should be taken to engraft an intent requirement onto
the MUTPCPA's subsection (h) disparagement, much less onto section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act. No case or other reason appears that a court would correctly ex-
onerate a trade libelant if plaintiff proves what the statutes require but stops short
of proof of malice, intent, or scienter. The better interpretation is that there is no
such intent requirement and that unintended disparagement at the very least may
be enjoined.
E. False Advertising
Deceptive marketing by definition involves communications of facts that are
erroneous, untrue, or otherwise misleading. These misrepresentations take two
general forms: misrepresentations made directly to a prospective consumer or
other purchaser, on the one hand, and, on the other, misrepresentations made to
459. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1979).
460. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(2) (1991 & Supp. 1994).
461. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-9 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
462. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-19(1)(b) (1991 & Supp. 1994).
463. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65 (1991); Independent Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Peavy, 528 So. 2d
1112, 1115 (Miss. 1988); Colonial Mortgage Co. v. Lee, 525 So. 2d 804, 807 (Miss. 1988); Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Estate of Wesson, 517 So. 2d 521, 528 (Miss. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043 (1988).
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the public at large, or a given segment thereof. These latter claims are commonly
known as false advertising. The differences in the several kinds of deceptive mar-
keting are differences of degree, and not kind.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act offers competitors a remedy for false advertis-
ing. The Act provides: "Any person who shall ...use in connection with any
goods or services. . . any false description or representation" shall be liable in an
action brought by a competitor upon proper proof." 4 Established interpretations
expand "false" to include "misleading" but require that the misrepresentation be
materially false or misleading and that it actually deceives or has a reasonable ten-
dency to deceive a substantial portion of its intended audience.
4 65
The MUTPCPA elaborates the forms of false advertising so that they include,
among others,
(i) Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised;
[4661
(j) Advertising goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably expect-
able public demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of quan-
tity;4 671 [and]
(k) Misrepresentations of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or
amounts of price reductions .468
Of course, reflection on the eight other general types of deceptive acts the
MUTPCPA makes actionable shows each forming the whole or a part of a claim
for false advertising in the sense that each involves some sort of false or misleading
misrepresentation with respect to goods or services offered for sale to the public.
Following the Lanham Act, the new Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competi-
tion requires here, as elsewhere, that before false advertising may be actionable, it
must be such as "is likely to deceive or mislead prospective purchasers. 469 Profes-
sor Walker has suggested that the false advertising portion of the "statute has been
narrowly interpreted. . . on proof of causation grounds," citing Dixieland Food
Stores v. Kelly's Big Star.47 The case reads the statute to require proof of causation,
that plaintiff must show a "causal connection between the inaccuracy of the adver-
tisement and any damages. . .[plaintiff may have] sustained."472 That a plaintiff
464. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988).
465. See, e.g., Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
466. The FTC's REVISED UTPCPL § 2(9) (1966) is verbatim identical.
467. The FTC's REVISED UTPCPL § 2(10) (1966) is verbatim identical.
468. The FTC's REVISED UTPCPL § 2(11) (1966) begins "(ii) making false or misleading statements of fact"
and is otherwise identical. Id.
469. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2 (Tentative Draft 1994).
470. Walker, Business Torts, supra note 27, at 13.
471. 391 So. 2d 633, 636 (Miss. 1980).
472. Id.
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providing weak proof of proximate cause should not prevail hardly suggests the
court is reading the statute narrowly. The point for the moment is that nothing in
the nature or text of the statute, nor in Dixieland Food Stores, suggests the statute
should be read narrowly, much less that a prudent lawyer should assume it so when
advising the client, ex post or ex ante.
Here Deer Creek Construction Co. v. Peterson473 is instructive. Homeowners
brought an action against the contractor they had engaged to build their home.474
The plaintiffs alleged that the contractor had represented that it would complete
the residence within ninety days.47 In point of fact, the home was not made availa-
ble to the owner for some thirteen-and-a-half (13 1/2) months.476 It is not clear
from the opinion the precise manner in which the case was pleaded, the issues
framed and litigated, but on appeal the court considered whether the ninety days'
representation, which it appears had been well breached, fell within the proscrip-
tion of section 75-24-5(2)(i), viz, "advertising goods or services with intent not to
sell them as advertised."477 The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim, holding that the
term "advertising" meant "advertising and offering to the general public and does
not include representations made during the negotiation process for the purchase
of a particular item or items."478
Arguably, as a construction of section 75-24-5(2)(i) the decision is correct, but
as a reading and application of section 75-24-5 as a whole, the decision is clearly
in error. Assuming arguendo, that a contractor's representation to an owner that it
can and will build a home within ninety days does not fit within any of the eleven
enumerated unfair or deceptive acts or practices within section 75-24-5, it is nev-
ertheless quite apparently an act of like kind or nature to the enumerated acts."'
On their face, MUTPCPA subsections (i) and (j) seem inconsistent with our
proclamation that proof of actual subjective intent is not a requisite to recovery in
business tort. The rule proscribes advertising goods and services with the intent
not to supply them as advertised or with the intent not to supply reasonably expect-
able public demand. As good grammarians, we concede the language allows an
action upon the advertisement and before a single sale is made. But a moment's
reflection on the real world makes clear proof of intent will invariably take the
form of proof of the objective fact from which the law presumes intent. No one in
his right mind is likely to sue until the defendant has sold his goods other than as
advertised or without being able to supply actual demand. We are back where we
left off at the end of Part IV. Of course, the defendant may run his mouth and pro-
vide a smoking gun, as in Memphis Steam Laundry. More likely, the plaintiff will
473. 412 So. 2d 1169 (Miss. 1982),
474. Id. at 1171.
475. Id.
476. Id. at 1170.
477. MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-4 (1991).
478. Deer Creek Constr. Co. v. Peterson, 412 So. 2d 1169, 1173 (Miss. 1982).
479. From the facts before the court, the 90-day time limit was a part of Deer Creek's contractual undertaking,
and Peterson was awarded damages for Deer Creek's breach thereof. Id. at 1171.
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prove that the defendant did not in fact supply the goods as advertised or could
not in fact supply public demand and that the circumstances were such that a rea-
sonable seller should have known he would be unable to live up to his advertising,
and no one will pause to peek inside the defendant's mind.
F Other Means of Deceptive Marketing
One question that traditionally troubled Mississippi market participants was
whether the enumeration of the MUTPCPA's eleven general and often overlap-
ping categories of unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices provides the limit of those which are actionable. The 1994 amendment to
the MUTPCPA addresses the point. The law now prefaces the enumerated torts
with the general declaration that "[u] nfair methods of competition affecting com-
merce and unfair or deceptive trade practices in or affecting commerce are prohib-
ited.""0 The question is whether this amendment makes actionable other unfair
methods of competition and other unfair or deceptive acts or practices which are
quite like unto the eleven enumerated acts or practices but cannot in candor be
squeezed within any one of the eleven more specific boxes. The 1994 amendment
could have followed its new general proscription with "including but not limited
to" or some such expression. Competent draftsmanship could have made clear that
the instances articulated in section 75-24-5(2) were illustrative and not exhaustive
of section 75-24-5(1). The way the amendment is worded leaves a crack in the
door for those who would argue the new language adds nothing of substance. This
negative approach is nothing more than an interpretive trick we (sometimes) take
seriously because we have a Latin maxim for it: expressio unius est exclusio alte-
rius.48
1
The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act [hereinafter UDTPA] solves this
problem with a catch-all twelfth category of deceptive trade practice. Section 2(a)
of the Act lists the same eleven categories of acts or practices in the Mississippi
statute, by and large in identical language, and in a twelfth paragraph declares that
"[a] person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his busi-
ness, vocation or occupation, he . . .engages in any other conduct which simi-
larly creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding."4 2 Mississippi has
not enacted the UDTPA. Perhaps more important, we know the UDTPA was
available to the legislature both in 1974 when it enacted the MUTPCPA43 and in
1994 when it most recently amended the Act.
Another model act available and almost certainly Mississippi's model back in
1974 was the Federal Trade Commission's Revised Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law [hereinafter FTC's Revised Law].'ig Section 2 of the
480. 1994 Miss. Laws, ch. 537, § 2 (codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(1) (1991 & Supp. 1994)).
481. See, e.g., 3 COREIN ON CONTRACTS § 552, 206-08 (1951) (subjects not named were intended to be ex-
cluded).
482. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 2(a)(12), 7A U.L.A. 280 (1966).
483. See 1994 Miss. Laws, ch. 555.
484. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 29 1970 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION § 72-31-00, at 146-47(1969)
(published in Louisville, Ky.).
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FTC's Revised Law addresses unlawful acts and practices and affords states con-
sidering enactment three alternative forms. The first two are general proscrip-
tions.4"' The Mississippi Legislature's enactment closely resembles "Alternative
Form No. 3" which enumerates eleven specifications of unlawful acts and prac-
tices which, with only trivial exceptions, are verbatim identical to what appears in
the MUTPCPA. The problem is that the FTC's Revised Law, like the UDTPA,
contains a twelfth subsection:
(12) engaging in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion
or of misunderstanding,6
and a thirteenth alternative subsection:
(13) engaging in any act or practice which is unfair or deceptive to the consumer. 4
7
The legislature did not enact subsections (12) or (13). Making law by not enacting
leaves an odd taste. Remembering the criteria of legal validity, there is no re-
corded vote of the House or the Senate rejecting subsections (12) or (13). Nothing
suggests these subsections were ever presented to the Governor. We are hard
pressed to explain how the exclusion of these becomes positive law.
There is a more fundamental consideration. Recalling our discussion in Part III
above, it is important to think seriously what we would do if the eleven rules or
standards of section 75-24-5, instead of being in statutory form, had in fact been
the product of eleven separate, albeit overlapping, lines of common law prece-
dent."8 It may have been, in each line of precedent, the court had from time to
time been urged to speak with breadth but had declined. If this had been the case,
accepted understandings of the common law process would mandate that we ex-
tend and enforce these principles in functionally analogous cases. The fact that the
rules are in fact stated in statutory form does not change the process. As these stat-
utory rules emanate from the legislature, the power of the value and policy judg-
ments implied in each of the eleven enumerated deceptive practices is even greater
than were they found only in common law precedents.
The Lanham Act is added to the equation. Section 43 (a) makes actionable "any
false description or representation" that is "use[d] in connection with any goods or
services."" This language is certainly inimical to the suggestion that there be only
a finite number of unlawful acts or practices, or that those practicing deceptive
marketing should be allowed to escape because the Mississippi Legislature has
failed to identify precisely the kind of conduct they pursue. Especially is this so
since the 1994 MUTPCPA amendments proscribe without limitation "unfair
methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive trade practices."490
485. Id.
486. FTC's REVISED UTPCPL § 2(12) (1966).
487. FTC's REVISED UTPCPL § 2(13) (1966).
488. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
489. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988).
490. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5(1) (1991).
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The new Restatement addresses the problem and also finds it to be the law that
unfair methods of competition are proscribed and are actionable whether ex-
pressly enumerated in statutory form or not. The Restatement addresses three
principal areas of actionable conduct: (1) deceptive marketing; (2) infringement of
trademarks or other indicia of identification; and (3) appropriation of trade val-
ues, including publicity rights and trade secrets. The Restatement goes on to rec-
ognize a right of redress from harm resulting "from other acts or practices of the
actor determined to be similarly actionable as an unfair method of competition,
taking into account the nature of the conduct and its likely effect on both the party
seeking relief and the public."491 In commentary, the Restatement advises that it is
addressing certain "recurring patterns of objectionable practices."492 The same
may be said for the enumeration of the eleven unfair methods of competition in
section 75-24-5(2). Restatement commentary continues to explain that the specif-
ically enumerated and addressed grounds "do not fully exhaust the scope of statu-
tory or common law liability for unfair methods of competition, and Subsection
(a) therefore includes a residual category encompassing other business practices
determined to be unfair."493 The commentary continues to explain the impossibil-
ity of providing a definitive test for delineating all methods of competition the
court should deem unfair and, therefore, actionable, and declares this an evolving
legal phenomenon.
Courts continue to evaluate competitive practices against generalized standards of
fairness and social utility .... An act or practice is likely to be judged unfair only if
it substantially interferes with the ability of others to compete on the merits of their
products in the marketplace or otherwise conflicts with accepted principles of public
policy as established by statute or common law.494
The legislature, of course, always has the authority to step in and say, "No, we do
not wish a given deceptive marketing practice to be unlawful, though it be func-
tionally and legally analogous to the eleven enumerated practices." The legislature
has authority to enact arbitrary limits on its laws. It seemingly has done the oppo-
site. The 1994 amendment, albeit less than perfect in form, appears to clear our
way to the enforcement of that first principle of justice -that like cases should be
treated alike- and stands as a powerful injunction to the courts doing so.
491. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 (Tentative Draft 1994).
492. Id. § 1 cmt. g.
493. Id.
494. Id.
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